‘We won’t forget’: How Muslims view Pierre Poilievre’s stance on Israel-Hamas war

We shall see, look forwards to any comments on my analysis of the possible impact:

….The National Council of Canadian Muslims and dozens of Muslim organizations, mosques and groups signed an open letter to MPs ahead of Ramadan, asking them to stay away from events during the holy month if they couldn’t commit to taking several stances, including support for an immediate ceasefire and condemning some of the actions of Israeli forces.

When asked about Polievre’s outreach this year, Conservative spokesman Sebastian Skamski said Poilievre has articulated a clear position that Israel has a right to defend itself and that Palestinians need humanitarian relief “as a result of the war that Hamas has started.”

Andrew Griffith, a former director of multiculturalism policy for the federal government, said while Muslims are not a monolithic group, it’s likely Poilievre’s loud pro-Israel stance will cause some people to turn from the party, including in key ridings around Toronto.

However, he said, given the current polling numbers, it would be unlikely to do much damage to Conservative fortunes when the next election rolls around.

Skamski also pointed to a speech Poilievre delivered Tuesday in Montreal to the Beth Israel Beth Aaron Jewish congregation, where he addressed the matter head-on.

“I want you to know,” Poilievre the crowd, “I say all of these things in mosques. I do go to mosques. I love meeting with the Muslim people, they are wonderful people.”

He went on to say that when the issue of Israel is raised, “I say, ‘I’m going to be honest with you — I’m a friend of the state of Israel and I will be a friend of the state of Israel everywhere I go.'”

That runs counter to the approach taken by Justin Trudeau, continued Poilievre, accusing the prime minister of muddying the government’s position.

“While it might make for good politics to have one individual MP who says the right thing in order to get a seat back and keep Justin Trudeau in power, it does not solve the problem of having Canada take a right and principled position,” he said.

Skamski said Poilievre has met with thousands of Muslim Canadians during his team as leader and has connected on their shared values of “faith, family and freedom.”

“You can’t talk to Muslim Canadians about faith, about family values, all of those things, while at the same time turning a blind eye to 30,000 dead,” Tahir said, referring to the number of people killed in Gaza since Israel began bombarding the territory in October.

Tahir said many were disappointed in Poilievre’s opposition to funding the UN aid agency UNRWA….

Source: ‘We won’t forget’: How Muslims view Pierre Poilievre’s stance on Israel-Hamas war

Des experts se sentent ignorés par le ministère de l’Immigration

More on this sorry episode although unclear how widespread these perceptions shared among IRCC staff (but not unique…):

Une personne employée au sein d’IRCC, n’était pas surprise de ce développement. Elle voit le travail de fonctionnaires ignoré depuis des années quand leurs conclusions ne vont pas dans le sens des plans du gouvernement.

Nous donnerons à cette personne le nom fictif de Marie. Francopresse a accepté de protéger son identité, parce qu’elle craint des répercussions au travail.

Un travail qui dérange

Selon elle, la plupart des fonctionnaires n’oseraient jamais aller contre le courant : «Dès que tu dis un peu la vérité, fearless advice, dis ce que tu penses, c’est fini.»

Elle voit donc peu de gens qui osent présenter des points de vue divergents dans la fonction publique. «Il n’y a rien de pire dans une démocratie.»

Elle doute d’ailleurs que même les avertissements émanant de fonctionnaires se rendent toujours au bureau du ministre de l’Immigration.

«Je pense que plusieurs sous-ministres et sous-ministres adjoints croient que leur mission est de protéger [le ministre]. Ils empêchent que des choses soient écrites ou s’assurent que ça ne monte pas pour pouvoir dire “le ministre n’était pas au courant, donc il a continué sa mauvaise idée, mais il ne le savait pas”.»

La vérité étouffée

Selon Andrew Griffith, directeur général à IRCC de 2009 à 2011, un certain degré de tension est normal, même bénéfique.

«La bureaucratie est censée offrir des conseils sans peur en fonction de son analyse et de son expertise et le niveau politique doit apporter sa perspective», explique-t-il.

Mais la transmission des conseils à travers l’échelle bureaucratique est floue, prévient-il. La parole est habituellement plus franche chez les directeurs, mais «plus haut, les sous-ministres adjoints et les sous-ministres sont moins directs en fonction de leurs efforts à répondre aux besoins politiques».

«C’est probablement là que réside la majeure partie de la frustration liée à l’ignorance de l’expertise», précise M. Griffith.

C’est au sein même de la fonction publique que l’information semble bloquer, corrobore Marie. «Les politiciens préfèreraient éviter de faire des erreurs, mais ils se sont entourés de hauts fonctionnaires opportunistes, ambitieux, peu compétents qui étouffent la vérité.»

«Les hauts fonctionnaires qui pensent seulement à leur carrière sont le pire problème, la pire plaie. Les ministres peuvent influencer leur carrière, alors ils s’autocensurent, censurent les autres et s’entourent de gens peu compétents ou qui leur ressemblent», poursuit-elle.

Manque d’expertise chez les cadres supérieurs

Dans le rapport d’un examen effectué par l’ancien sous-ministre d’IRCC, Neil Yeates, ce dernier parle de tensions à IRCC qui seraient «exacerbées par la forte baisse d’expertise en matière d’immigration parmi les [sous-ministres adjoints] et les [directeurs généraux]».

Selon lui, cette baisse d’expertise est relativement nouvelle et crée un «manque de crédibilité vis-à-vis des employés de première ligne et des gestionnaires» qui connaissent bien la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés.

«Qui voudrait d’une douche froide?»

L’immigration a toujours été très politisée, fait remarquer Andrew Griffith. «Là où les choses se sont gâtées, c’est dans l’encouragement de l’immigration à grande échelle qu’a défendu l’Initiative du siècle, diverses organisations commerciales [et d’autres] sans qu’aucun d’entre eux, jusqu’à trop tard, ne commence à dire : “Attendez une minute, il va y avoir des implications à cela. Avons-nous les capacités d’absorption pour tous ces immigrants?”»

Il ne croit pas que l’argument selon lequel il faut hausser les seuils d’immigration afin de remédier au vieillissement de la population ait été assez remis en question. Surtout lorsque l’on considère le nombre de démographes qui ne partageaient pas cette analyse.

Plusieurs économistes ont aussi critiqué cette approche, dont Mikal Skuterud, professeur d’économie à l’Université de Waterloo, en Ontario. Il a l’impression que parmi tous les experts en immigration, ce sont surtout les économistes qui sont ignorés.

«Qui voudrait d’une douche froide? Pourquoi voudraient-ils nous parler si on ne leur donne pas les réponses qu’ils veulent?», demande-t-il.

Le gouvernement avance que l’augmentation de l’immigration permet la croissance économique, «mais pour l’économiste, ce n’est pas vraiment honnête».

«Pour l’économiste, la croissance économique vient de l’augmentation du PIB par habitant, explique-t-il. Et rien ne prouve que l’augmentation de l’immigration fasse croitre le PIB par habitant.»

En fait, dans les dernières années, celui-ci a chuté. «Les économistes avaient donc raison, mais ils ont été complètement ignorés sur cette question», déplore Mikal Skuterud.

«Je ne pense pas que l’identité de la personne qui transmet le message soit importante, tant que le message est conforme aux objectifs du gouvernement», ajoute-t-il.

Étant lui-même immigrant, le professeur aimerait pouvoir dire qu’une hausse de l’immigration améliorera le sort économique de tous. «C’est une très belle histoire à vendre, mais c’est juste faux, martèle-t-il. Ce n’est pas si simple.»

Les affaires, ce n’est pas l’économie

Christopher Ragan, professeur en économie à l’Université McGill, à Montréal, était membre du Conseil consultatif en matière de croissance économique mis sur pied par le gouvernement libéral en 2016 et présidé par Dominic Barton, ex-directeur de la firme McKinsey et cofondateur de l’Initiative du siècle.

«Je ne voyais aucune raison à l’époque, et je n’en vois aucune aujourd’hui, de penser que l’augmentation de l’immigration puisse être le pivot d’une stratégie de croissance. Du moins, pas le type de croissance qui devrait nous intéresser. J’ai mené ce combat au sein du Conseil et j’ai perdu», a déclaré l’économiste sur X en janvier 2024.

Sa position n’a pas été retenue dans les rapports du Conseil, probablement parce qu’«un consensus entre 12 personnes n’arrivera jamais», déclare-t-il en entrevue avec Francopresse.

«Le gouvernement perçoit mal l’immigration et son rôle dans la croissance générale et je crois que le Conseil y est pour quelque chose», assure-t-il.

Christopher Ragan était l’un des seuls économistes au sein de ce conseil : «La plupart étaient des gens d’affaires, ce qui est problématique pour un conseil sur la croissance. […] Leur point de vue est important, mais ils n’ont généralement pas beaucoup de compétences en termes de politiques.»

«Je pense que le gouvernement a aussi écouté le lobby des affaires qui a demandé plus d’immigration, en particulier d’immigration temporaire, pour remplir des pénuries de main-d’œuvre, parce qu’ils préfèrent embaucher des immigrants que d’augmenter les salaires», se désole-t-il.

Source: Des experts se sentent ignorés par le ministère de l’Immigration

COVID-19 Immigration Effects – January 2024 update

Regular monthly data update.

Overall normal post December increase across programs with the exception of asylum claimants and students.

The percentage of former temporary residents transitioning to permanent residency was the highest to date, 78 percent of all Permanent Residents.

Asylum claimants continue at about 15,000 per month.

The impact of the cap on international students is not yet apparent in the February website data (possible leading indicator). February operational data on applications and permits issued will likely indicate impact.

Full 2023 settlement services now included, showing 53 percent increase compared to 2022.

Full 2023 citizenship application data now included, showing 20 percent increase compared to 2022, with the January number of new citizens increasing by a comparable on a year-over-year basis.   

COVID-19 Immigration Effects – December 2023 update

Regular monthly data update.

Highlights on slide 3.

Canadian Immigration Tracker December 2023

Canadian Immigration Tracker – November 2023 update

No major changes from October.

The one element to flag is the sharp increase in the number of asylum claimants, from a monthly average of about 10,000 January to June 2023 to about 15,000 July to November, largely driven by the easing of visa restrictions, with close to two-thirds of claims being “inland.” Given the large number of Mexican claimants, averaging more than 2,000 per month in 2023, there will continue to be calls to reimpose the visa requirement on Mexicans, as well as more general calls to restore the previous visa restrictions.

Highlights on slide 3.

https://www.slideshare.net/slideshows/canadian-immigration-tracker-key-slides-november-2023/265358086

COVID-19 Immigration Effects – October 2023 update

Regular monthly data update.

Highlights:

Percentage of former temporary residents transitioning to permanent residency partially bouncing back after September (from 32 to 39 percent, 2023 January to August average 65 percent). Year to date: 404,000 of which 212,000 are former temporary residents.

Temporary residents (IMP): Year to date 757,000 compared to 484,000 in comparable 2022 period

Temporary residents (TFWP): Year to date 172,000 compared to 124,000 in comparable 2022 period

Asylum claimants continue to grow significantly, reflecting easing of visa requirements and other factors: Year to date 117,000 compared to 70,000 in comparable 2022 period. Unclear whether visa exemption for Mexico will remain tenable given sharp increase and rumblings in US border states regarding increasing arrivals from Canada: Year to date 22,000 compared to 12,000 in comparable 2022 period.

The number of new citizens remains strong, largely driven by virtual ceremonies being the default option (almost 90 percent of new citizens participated in virtual ceremonies). Year to date: 317,000 largely the same as the comparable 2022 period. 

Highlights on slide 3.

What changes a Conservative government might make to Canada’s immigration policies

My latest. Speculative but reasoned (IMO):

With the Conservatives leading the polls, it is worth speculating what changes a Conservative government might bring to immigration, citizenship, multiculturalism, and employment equity policies, and the degree to which Tories would be constrained in their policy and program ambitions. Despite talking about change and “common sense,” they will still be constrained by provincial responsibilities and interests, the needs and lobbying of the business community, and an overall limitation of not wanting to appear to be anti-immigration.

Constraints

One fundamental political constraint is that elections are won and lost in ridings with large numbers of visible minorities and immigrants, like in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area, British Columbia’s Lower Mainland, and other urban areas as shown in Figure 1. Arguably, the Conservatives learned this lesson in the 2015 election, where citizenship revocation provisions and the Barbaric Cultural Practices Act signalled to many new Canadians they were not welcome.

The demographic of immigrants and minorities across Canadian electoral ridings. Graph courtesy of Andrew Griffith

Given that immigration is a shared jurisdiction with the provinces, any move to restrict the numbers of permanent residents, temporary workers, and foreign students will likely be met with provincial opposition. All provinces—save Quebec—largely buy into the “more is merrier” demographic arguments. Provincial governments and education institutions rely on large numbers of international students to fund higher education, and thus have already signalled concerns with the current government’s trial balloon about capping students from abroad.

Stakeholder pressures are a further constraint. Business groups, large and small, want a larger population to address labour market needs, and that includes international students for low-value-added service jobs. A larger population also means more consumersImmigration lawyers and consultants, both in Canada and abroad, benefit from more clients. Settlement and refugee groups can continue to press for increased resources even if evaluations question their effectiveness with respect to economic immigrants. Most academics focus on barriers to immigrants and visible minorities rather than questioning their assumptions. Lobby groups like the Century Initiative and others continue to push the narrative that a larger population is needed to address an aging population, a narrative that is supported by all these stakeholders, and federal and provincial governments (except for Quebec).

Few of these stakeholders seriously address the impact of immigration on housing availability and affordability, health care, and infrastructure, despite all the recent attention to the links between housing and immigration. Most stakeholders are either in denial, claim that ramping up housing can be done quickly as many recent op-eds indicate, or argue that raising these issues is inherently xenophobic if not racist.

Global trends that also could shape a possible Conservative government include increased refugee and economic migrant flows, greater global competition for the same highly skilled talent pool and, over time, expanded use of AI and automation as a growing component of the labour market.

Immigration

Given these constraints and the fear of being labelled xenophobic, Conservatives have focused more on service delivery failures than questioning immigration levels, whether it’s permanent resident targets or the rapid increase in uncapped temporary workers and international students. Poilievre has stated that the Conservative focus will be on the “needs of private-sector employers, the degree to which charities plan to support refugees, and the desire for family reunification,” suggesting greater priority on economic and family immigration categories, as was largely the case for the Harper government. The Conservatives’ recent policy convention was largely silent on immigration. They are engaging in considerable outreach to visible minority and immigrant communities, adopting the approach of former Conservative minister Jason Kenney, “the minister for curry in a hurry.”

That being said, it is likely that a Conservative government would likely freeze or decrease slightly the number of permanent residents rather than continuing with the planned increases (the Liberal government recently indicated that it is not “ruling out changes to its ambitious immigration targets.)”

Figure two highlights the growth in permanent and temporary residents since 2015. The extent of public debate on the impact of immigration on housing provides latitude for a freeze at 2023 levels, or a small decrease given that immigrants and non-immigrants alike are affected. Graph courtesy of Andrew Griffith

It is less clear whether a Conservative government would have the courage to impose caps on temporary workers given pressure from employers, including small businesses. However, the previous Conservative government did have the political courage to impose restrictions following considerable abuse of the temporary work program, ironically exposed by the Liberals and NDP. Similarly, imposing caps on international students would run into strong resistance from provincial governments given their dependence on students from abroad to support higher education. Even placing caps on public colleges that subcontract to private colleges—which are more for low-skilled employment than education—would be challenging given employer interest in lower-wage employees. They may, however, reverse the Liberal government’s elimination of working-hour caps for foreign students.

The emphasis on charity support for refugees suggests a renewed focus on privately sponsored refugees compared to government-assisted ones. Expect the usual dynamics at play in terms of which groups have preferential treatment (e.g. Ukraine, Hong Kong) that influence all parties, and greater sensitivity to religious persecution, particularly Christians. They are likely to remember how their callous approach to Syrian refugees and the death of Alan Kurdi contributed to their 2015 defeat, and thus be more cautious in their approach to high-profile refugee flows and cases. Whether they would remove health-care coverage for refugee claimants as the Harper government did in 2012 is unclear, but as that was ruled by the Federal Court as incompatible with the Charter, they may demur. 

Whether a Conservative government would go beyond the usual federal-provincial-territorial process and provide financial support for foreign credential recognition, or be more ambitious and transfer immigrant selection of public sector regulated professions (e.g., health care) to the provinces is unclear. However, given that regulatory bodies are provincial and, for health care, provinces set the budgets, they may explore this option.

While the simplification and streamlining of over 100 immigration pathways is long overdue, given the complexity for applicants to navigate the system, and for governments to manage and automate it, such longer-term “fixing the plumbing” initiatives are less politically rewarding than addressing various stakeholder pressures. 

Given the increased number of asylum claimants, a Conservative government would be likely to restore requirements for claimants to have sufficient funds and an intent to leave, and may consider reimposing a visa requirement on Mexican nationals.

The over $1.3-billion funding for settlement agencies would likely decrease given expected overall fiscal restraint.

Citizenship 

Citizenship is arguably the end point of the immigration journey as it represents full integration into society with all the political rights and responsibilities that entails. This assumption is being challenged by a combination of Canadian economic opportunities being relatively less attractive for source countries such as China and India, along with greater mobility of highly educated and skilled immigrants. As a result, the naturalization rate is declining as shown in figure three.

Figure three depicting naturalization rates between 1996 and 2021. Graph courtesy of Andrew Griffith

The previous Conservative government was more active on citizenship than other recent governments. In 2009, it released a new citizenship study guide, Discover Canada, with a greater focus on history, values and the military. It also required a higher passing score on the citizenship test—up to 75 per cent compared to 60 per cent—and different versions were circulated to reduce cheating. Language requirements were administered more strongly, and adult fees were increased from $100 to $530. A first generation cut-off for transmission of citizenship was implemented as part of addressing “lost Canadians” due to earlier Citizenship Act gaps. C-24 amended the Citizenship Act to increase residency requirements from three to four years, increased testing and language assessment to 18-64 years from 18-54 years, and a revocation provision for citizens convicted of treason or terror.

The Liberal government reversed the changes to residency requirements, the age changes for testing and language assessment, and the revocation provision, and promised to issue a revised citizenship study guide and to eliminate citizenship fees. Subsequently, the Liberals amended the citizenship oath to include reference to Indigenous treaty rights in response to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

It is unclear the degree to which the Conservatives will consider citizenship a priority in relation to other immigration-related issues. From an administrative perspective, changing residency requirements again would simply complicate program management, make it harder to reduce processing times, and would not provide any substantive benefit. Re-opening citizenship revocation would simply draw attention to the risks that countries would offload their responsibilities, as the example of former U.K. citizen and Canadian citizen by descent Jack Letts illustrates. 

Given that the Liberal government to date has not issued a revised citizenship guide, the Conservatives would likely stick with Discover Canada, issued in 2009. Similar, the existing citizenship test and pass rates, and proof of meeting language requirements would not need to be changed. As the Liberal government never implemented 2019 and 2021 campaign commitments to eliminate citizenship fees, one should not expect any change from the fee increase of 2014.

On the other hand, the pandemic-driven shift to virtual citizenship ceremonies in 99 per cent of all such events would likely to be reversed given strong Conservative opposition in recent discussions at the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, along with the proposed self-affirmation of the citizenship oath (“citizenship on a click”). It is also likely that a Conservative government may wish to revert to paper citizenship certificates, and away from the option of e-certificates

The Liberals and the NDP have been trying to weaken the first generation cut-off for transmission of citizenship for those with a “substantial connection” to Canada. Despite the Conservatives opposing this change, largely on process grounds as this was tacked on to a Senate private member’s bill, it is unclear whether they would reverse this change if implemented. However, if some particularly egregious public examples emerge, just as the Lebanese evacuation of 2006 prompted the government to legislate the cut-off given the large numbers of “Canadians of convenience,” they may well decide to act.  

The Conservatives may wish to revisit the issue of birth tourism. In 2012, they pushed hard, but ultimately the small numbers known at the time and provincial opposition to operational and cost considerations made them drop their proposal. Since then, however, health-care data indicated pre-pandemic numbers of birth tourists to be around 2,000, although these dropped dramatically during the pandemic given visa and travel restrictions.

The Conservatives are unlikely to revisit the issue of Canadian expatriate voting limitations given the Supreme Court’s ruling that expatriates have the right to vote no matter how long they have lived outside Canada

Part II

In contrast to immigration and citizenship, a Conservative government would face fewer constraints with respect to multiculturalism and employment equity. Their public criticism of wokeism, their policy resolutions stressing merit over “personal immutable characteristics“, their criticism of diversity, equity and inclusion training, and their criticism of Liberal government judicial, Governor in Council, and Senate appointments all point to a likely shift in substance and tone.

Multiculturalism and Inclusion

The Conservative government moved multiculturalism from Canadian Heritage to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) given its refocused the program on the integration of new Canadians. Grants and contributions were similarly refocused, and overall funding to the program declined from about $21-million to $13-million (operations and maintenance), and from about 80 to 34 employees. The Conservatives also implemented a historical recognition program to recognize previous discriminatory measures against Ukrainian, Chinese, Italian, Jewish, and Sikh Canadians.

The Liberal government moved multiculturalism back to Canadian Heritage. Funding increased dramatically, with $95-million for Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy, refocusing the program on anti-racism and systemic barriers to full participation in Canadian society. Additional funding was provided to the Canadian Race Relations Foundation. Greater emphasis was placed on addressing barriers facing Black Canadians such as the Black Canadian Communities Initiative and the Black Entrepreneurship Program. A special representative to combat Islamophobia was appointed. More comparative research by Statistics Canada highlighted differences in visible minority economic outcomes. Heritage months for Canadian Jews and Sikhs were introduced among others. 

It is highly likely that resources would be cut sharply under a Conservative government given their overall approach to government expenditures, their general approach to limit government intervention and their scepticism regarding critical race theory, systemic racism, and diversity, equity, and inclusion training. There would likely also be a return to a more general integration focus between and among all groups. They would, of course, be unlikely to curb any of the recognition months or days, given the importance to communities (and their political outreach). 

The Conservatives would likely be more cautious about using language like “barbaric cultural practices” in their communications given how that eventually backfired in the 2015 election. One can also expect them to be cautious with respect to Quebec debates on secularism or “laïcité,” such as Bill 21.

Just as the Liberal government cancelled the Conservative appointment of an ambassador for religious freedom, a Conservative government would be likely to cancel the representative to combat Islamophobia.

Hopefully, a Conservative government would neither diminish the value of the mandatory census by reverting to the voluntary and less accurate National Household Survey approach, nor dramatically reduce the budget of Statistics Canada given the impact on the quantity and quality of data and related analysis.

A future Conservative government is likely to revisit the guidelines for funding research away from diversity, equity and inclusion priorities, along with Canada CouncilTelefilm, and others, based upon party policy resolutions

Employment Equity

A Conservative government might reduce the amount and quality of data available regarding visible minority, Indigenous Peoples, persons with disabilities represented in public service, and other government appointments. 

The Liberal government expanded public service data to include disaggregated data by sub-group, allowing for more detailed understanding and analysis of differences within each of the employment equity groups since 2017, along with data on LGBTQ+ people. Previous government reports only covered the overall categories of women, visible minorities, Indigenous Peoples and persons with disabilities. It is uncertain whether these reports under a future Conservative government would revert back to only reporting on overall group representation, hirings, promotions and separations. Given that this concerns public service management, it may well decide to continue current practice or the more sceptical elements may press for change.

On the other hand, political appointments—judges, Governor-in-Council, Senate—are another matter. Appointment processes are likely to be revised given concerns that the processes introduced by the Liberal government unduly favoured candidates more on the centre-left than centre-right. Figure 4 highlights the increased representation of women, visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples in political appointments.

Figure four highlights the increased representation of women, visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples in political appointments. Graph courtesy of Andrew Griffith

At the end of the Conservative government, judicial appointment were 35.6 per cent women, two per cent visible minorities and 0.8 percent Indigenous. The Liberal government introduced a new application process that aimed to—and succeeded in—vastly increasing the diversity among judicial appointments. As of October 2022, they sat at: 55.2 per cent women, 12.5 per cent visible minorities, and four per cent Indigenous.

Similarly, at the end of the last Conservative government, Governor-in-Council appointments to commissions, boards, Crown corporations, agencies, and tribunals were 34.2 per cent women, 6.1 per cent visible minorities, and 2.9 per cent Indigenous. Under the Liberal government, the number of women increased to 51.4 per cent, visible minorities to 11.6 per cent, and 4.2 per cent Indigenous by January 2023.

Senate appointments present a more nuanced picture. Conservative appointment of visible minorities was at 15.8 per cent, representing a conscious effort to address under-represented groups, but women, at 31.6 per cent of appointments, and Indigenous Peoples at 1.8 per cent, were significantly under-represented. The Liberal introduction of a formally independent and non-partisan advisory board resulted in a sharp increase in diversity: 58.8 per cent women, 20.6 per cent visible minorities, and 16.2 per cent Indigenous Peoples.

Along with these process changes, the Liberal government expanded annual reporting to include visible minorities, Indigenous Peoples, persons with disabilities, and judicial appointment reporting also included LGBTQ and ethnic/cultural groups. Should a Conservative government decide to stop these annual breakdowns, it will be harder to track any shifts in representation. 

The current review of the Employment Equity Act, launched in 2021, has not yet resulted in any public report on consultations and recommendations from the Task Force. Given limited parliamentary time and higher priorities during the current mandate, it is unlikely that any revisions to the Act will be approved. However, should any legislation come to pass, it is likely that a future Conservative government might wish to revisit some of the provisions.

Concluding observations

To date, two overarching themes have driven Conservative discourse: Canada is broken, and the need to “remove the gatekeepers.” The Yeates report confirms that the immigration department is broken, reflecting long neglect of organization weaknesses, a lack of client focus, and, I would argue, an excessive multiplicity of programs that make it harder for clients to navigate, and more difficult for IRCC to manage. 

One of the ironies of assessing likely Conservative policies is immigration, citizenship, and related areas all pertain to government being “gatekeepers.” It’s easier to shrink the gate for some policies and programs than others (e.g., government political appointments). Others, such as reducing levels of permanent and temporary residents, are much more challenging given the strength of provincial, business, and other stakeholders opposition. The degree to which a Conservative government is prepared to expend political capital will obviously reflect whether or not it has a majority in Parliament. 

The sharp decrease in public support for immigration, given the impact on housing, health care, and infrastructure, likely provides greater flexibility for any future Conservative government. While there is greater flexibility with respect to multiculturalism and employment equity, a Conservative government could also be ambitious with needed immigration reforms for permanent and temporary immigration.

While some have argued that immigration and related issues have become a third rail in Canadian politics, this need not be the case. The concerns being raised are regarding the impact of large and increasing numbers of permanent and temporary migration on housing, health care, and infrastructure, not the racial, religious or ethnic composition of immigrants. These issues affect immigrants and non-immigrants alike and focus on commonalities, not differences.

Source: What changes a Conservative government might make to Canada’s immigration policies

COVID-19 Immigration Effects – September 2023 update

Regular monthly data update.

Of particular note this month is the drastic drop in the number of temporary residents transitioning to permanent residency and a an equally sharp decrease in the number admitted under IMP.

Asylum claimants continue to increase.

The number of new citizens rose sharply.

Highlights on slide 3.

Personal reflections on the immigration levels plan

Reviewing the plan and the coverage to date, my initial reflections are as follows:

The approach of stabilizing levels at 500,000 in 2025 resulted in the headlines the government likely wanted, with words like “plafonnent,” “hold back,” “capping,” “level out” and”stabilize.”

However, given that means an increase from 2023 levels of 465,000 to 500,000 in 2025, this “stabilizing” is more virtue signalling that they are listening to public concerns than actually taking action. The fact that any further adjustment would happen after the 2025 election makes is likely meaningless for the current government.

Moreover, given timelines to increase housing and healthcare capacity, continued increases in immigration levels will simply exacerbate the gap between levels and absorptive capacity. Hard to see this as a winning strategy…

However, should, as appears likely, the Conservatives form the next government, they would be faced with a high baseline level that may or may not be politically difficult to undo. And of course, the Liberals may have thoughts of this being a potential wedge issue for immigrant origin voters, a dubious strategy given that immigrant voters are more concerned about high immigration levels than Canadian-born (Environics Focus Canada 2023).

The plan, as is common in government documents, fails to acknowledge the negative impacts of some policy changes:

On the positive side, the government belatedly notes the impact of high levels of immigration on housing, healthcare and infrastructure and notes the need for a “whole of government” approach to improve the absorptive capacity:

While immigration contributes to the supply of labour, alleviates demographic pressures, and provides social and cultural benefits, it also creates demand for infrastructure and services. With significant and sustained growth in planned notional immigration levels, success for newcomers and all Canadians means working collaboratively with other federal departments, provinces and territories, communities and municipalities, Indigenous communities, the private sector, and stakeholders.

While there is more discussion on the role and importance of temporary foreign workers but no details on possible actions resulting from his media comment that “Canada has become “addicted” to temporary foreign workers, which has created what he called “perverse incentives” and, in some cases, led to abuse of the workers.” Minister Miller has started to address the abuse of the international student program but still too early to tell how effective these changes will be given implementation issues.

Canadian immigration update: August 2023

Latest monthly update. Highlights:

Two-thirds of permanent residents were former temporary residents, mainly reached a new high, mainly from International Mobility Program and the Post-Graduate Work Program. Year to date: Permanent Residents: 338,000 out of which 189,000 are former temporary residents.

Among temporary residents, the greatest growth is with respect to the International Mobility program, recently driven by “Research, educational or training programs,” over one-third of total IMP. Year to date: 605,000. The number of international students also increased dramatically (school year), year to date: 475,000.

Asylum claimants remain high, year to date: 85,000, the majority of which are inland claims, perhaps reflecting relaxed visa requirements and vetting. 

The number of new citizens remains strong, largely driven by virtual ceremonies being the default option (ill-advised IMO). Year to date: 338,000. 

Visitor visas issued year to date: 1,293,000.