The U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Reaches New Levels and Diversifies, MPI Estimates Show

More interesting analysis by MPI:

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) today released its latest estimates of the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States, pegging the number at 15.8 million in mid-2024, after hovering in the 11 million range throughout the decade beginning in 2010. 

The increase is primarily driven by record unauthorized arrivals at the U.S.-Mexico border and the Biden administration’s wide use of humanitarian parole programs to reduce chaos at the border. As a result of these grants of parole and other Biden administration moves, MPI estimates that, as of mid-2024, a maximum of 40 percent of unauthorized immigrants in the United States held a liminal (or “twilight”) status providing them temporary protection from deportation, such as Temporary Protected Status (TPS), Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), humanitarian parole or pending asylum application. 

The MPI estimates, developed in concert with Jennifer Van Hook, a demographer at The Pennsylvania State University’s Population Research Institute, derive from a residual method that subtracts estimates of the legally resident foreign born from the total immigrant population recorded in the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). The most recent ACS is for 2024. 

The estimates reflect the growing diversification of the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population, due to the widening array of nationalities arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border over the past several years from within and beyond this hemisphere. The Mexican share of the unauthorized immigrant population was 35 percent as of 2024—a sharp decline from the 62 percent share in 2010 and 49 percent in 2019. …

Source: The U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Reaches New Levels and Diversifies, MPI Estimates Show

MPI: Population Aging Is Here. Immigration Can Offer Half an Answer.

Another analysis on the limits of immigration to address population aging and low fertility rates:

Countries around the world face a demographic transition that is arriving faster than many governments have planned for, as falling fertility and aging populations place growing pressure on workforces, tax bases and the public systems that support retirees. 

The scale of the change is now visible well beyond the wealthy countries that have long grappled with aging populations. China’s annual births have fallen to levels not recorded since 1949, and comparable declines are underway in countries across Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, leaving many countries old before they grow rich, with shrinking workforces and rising costs for pensions and health care. 

new Migration Policy Institute (MPI) policy brief finds that treating immigration as a numbers game—rather than planning for integration and workforce participation—leaves much of its demographic dividend on the table. 

In many fast-aging, wealthier countries, governments have long leaned on immigration as a response to shrinking, aging workforces, but the math does not support that expectation at scale, Meghan Benton, director of MPI’s Global Program, writes in Population Aging Is Here. Immigration Can Offer Half an Answer. Holding worker-to-retiree ratios steady through migration alone would require a 75 percent increase in the combined population of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries by 2050—a level of growth few, if any, publics would accept. 

Immigration should be understood as a partial lever rather than a substitute for broader demographic strategy, which must include retirement-age extensions, productivity investments, family-friendly policies and social security reforms, the brief notes. 

On the immigration front, Benton argues that governments need to pay greater attention to whether newcomers and their families can participate fully in the economy; failure to do so leaves real fiscal value on the table when integration is treated as secondary. 

The brief sets out several principles for better leveraging immigration, including prioritizing the skills and career stage of arriving immigrants; treating integration programming, including language training, as an investment rather than a cost; folding immigration into the same long-term planning governments already apply to pensions, housing and infrastructure; addressing pension gaps for aging immigrants through portable retirement funds; and ensuring immigration narrows rather than widens global inequality by investing in skills partnerships that connect training, mobility and local development. 

The brief also cautions against assuming artificial intelligence can quickly substitute for immigration. Benton notes that prioritizing high earners may be difficult given rising low-skilled labor shortages in sectors such as elder care, agriculture, hospitality and construction, which remain largely resistant to near-term automation. Governments will need to prioritize those with flexible skills. 

“While immigration cannot solve population aging, it can be a useful demographic and economic lever—if it is employed more effectively,” Benton writes. “The next few years will provide a real-time experiment in the success of policies that prioritize immigration versus other economic levers to help countries navigate population aging, including extending retirement age, investing in productivity advances and reforming social security systems. Different models are already taking shape.” 

Source: Population Aging Is Here. Immigration Can Offer Half an Answer.

Immigrants to Canada have adopted the country’s low-fertility rates, new research finds

Not new but further confirmation that immigration has a limited impact on overall population growth:

Economic migrants, who make up the bulk of Canada’s immigrants, have adopted their new country’s behaviour in one significant area — they have very low fertility rates, new research suggests.

“Immigrants are feeling the low-fertility pressure of Canada here, like everyone else,” says demographer and sociologist Rachel Margolis, a professor at Western University, and one of the authors of a new paper on immigration and fertility.

Even groups with relatively high fertility — family stream and refugees — are also below the replacement level of 2.1 children, according to the research. Additionally, the top three source countries Canada draws immigrants from are low-fertility nations. The total fertility rate in India, the top source country, for instance, has dropped to 1.9 children per woman.

At a record low of 1.25 children per woman, Canada has entered an “ultra-low fertility” era. In 2024, it joined a list of several countries, including Finland, Italy and South Korea, with a fertility rate below 1.3.

Canada grows its population and bolsters the economy through immigration. But that short-term solution for population loss doesn’t address long-term population aging, according to the study….

Ramos highlights that it’s probably time for the country to consider a population strategy. “I think Canada’s policy has largely focused on economic issues and treated other issues as challenges to the economy, whereas really, underlying most of the economic issues are demographic issues.

Source: Immigrants to Canada have adopted the country’s low-fertility rates, new research finds

The Population Forecasts Are Grim. They’re Still Too Optimistic.

More on demographics:

…There are two major pieces of wishful thinking in the flights of fancy that underpin American population forecasts. The first is immigration. The Census Bureau assumes the United States will have an annual net migration (immigrants minus emigrants) of about one million immigrants through the end of the century. The United Nations and Social Security trustees assume about 1.2 million immigrants a year throughout the 21st century. None of these forecasts are plausible. Net migration under President Trump will most likely turn out to be near zero, and he won’t be the last immigration restrictionist in our nation’s highest office.

Moreover, birthrates are collapsing across the entire planet, not just here at home. The supply of would-be migrants will shrink as more countries run out of young people, and the skilled ones every aging country covets will be fought over. With most countries staring down the same cliff, and with emigration from the United States rising, permanent high net migration is more of an aspiration than a forecast.

But the second act of wishful thinking has an even bigger effect. Many forecasters are assuming that current low fertility rates are temporary, that women are merely delaying having children rather than forgoing it entirely. But this isn’t true: Research shows that delays in childbearing are usually not made up, and, anyway, estimates that take deferred childbearing into account have fallen by just as much as the headline fertility rate.

Up until quite recently, the Social Security trustees’ main scenario assumed that fertility rates will rise from now until 2050, and stabilize at 1.9 children per woman. In 2023, the Census Bureau predicted that fertility rates will only gradually decline from 1.64 to 1.58 by 2075. Spoiler: Data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has already shown a 1.57 fertility rate for 2025. The U.N. expects that the U.S. fertility rate will be flat at about 1.65 through the entire 21st century. To its credit, Social Security trustees released new numbers just last month that revised their expectations down to 1.75 in 2050, but that is overly optimistic. The Congressional Budget Office is more realistic, but even it predicts that fertility will decline to 1.53, then stabilize….

 Lyman Stone is the director of the Pronatalism Initiative at the Institute for Family Studies and the director of research for the consulting firm Demographic Intelligence.

Source: The Population Forecasts Are Grim. They’re Still Too Optimistic.

America is depopulating at record levels. Here’s what the numbers say

Of note. As is the case for Canada, largely driven by fewer immigrants and temporary residents:

…In 2025, net migration in the U.S. turned negative — with the loss of some 150,000 people by some estimates — a trend not seen since the Great Depression. Further declines are expected in 2026 and 2027, Brookings Institution, a public policy think tank has found.

While the U.S. data does not capture outbound emigration, many of its citizens are reportedly turning up in Europe and bordering countries — for education, housing and even long-term care needs. In 2025, more Americans moved to Germany and Ireland than the other way around, a change attributed to “a life away from the rat race at home” by London’s I Paper. The Czech Republic, Spain and Netherlands have reported similar highs….

The U.S. government is also dealing with a backlog of Americans renouncing their citizenship, with embassies in London, Sydney and most Canadian major cities reporting wait-lists stretching into months, the Guardian reported in April. One in five Americans said in a November Gallup poll that they would like to leave the country, twice as many as 10 years ago.

Between four to nine million Americans live abroad, a figure that is likely an undercount due to people flag-poling with tourist visas, travellers who straddle borders and students with long-term visas being left out of the count, according to the Wall Street Journal. The paper noted that newer emigres are ordinary citizens seeking better housing opportunities, telecommuting or choosing to retire somewhere cheaper….

Source: America is depopulating at record levels. Here’s what the numbers say

Why One of the Causes of Falling Birthrates May Be Prosperity

Interesting and I think good analysis:

People in rich countries have fewer children

There are many factors that can contribute to lower fertility rates. China and India, for example, both had decades-long government programs designed to lower their birthrates. And experts have suggested that many other aspects of modern life — birth control, shifting marital patterns, increased career and education opportunities for women, and perhaps even smartphones — could also play a role.

But the statistics are very clear. As economies get richer, children get rarer. Today, nearly all developed countries have fertility rates between 1.2 and 1.8 births per woman, significantly below the “replacement level” of 2.1 that allows populations to remain stable over time.

The social and economic changes of the last 50 years mean that many people now have more choices, and the ability to freely make them. In the past, laws that banned contraception and abortion and limited women’s ability to own property often caused families — and women in particular — to have more children than they wanted.

But that is not the whole story. Survey data shows that around the world, people consistently have fewer children than they say they would like to have. Gallup opinion polling has found that Americans’ ideal number of children per family has averaged about 2.5 since the late 1970s, even as the actual fertility rate has fallen much lower. Financial concerns are the most commonly cited reason for this gap.

What’s going on here? It may seem paradoxical that people would claim to be less able to afford children as their countries become richer. But as economies grow, several things happen.

Wages rise, which means that the opportunity cost of unpaid activities like parenting also goes up. The more parents can earn in paid work, the more of a sacrifice it becomes to spend their time on unpaid parenting instead.

Parenting also becomes more labor-intensive, because developed countries tend to put a greater premium on education and human capital, which require more effort and attention from parents. In most developed countries, parents now spend roughly twice as much time on child care as they did in the 1960s.

There are also big changes that take place as developed countries build a social safety net. In less-developed economies, children often work for family farms and small businesses from a young age, then support parents in their later years. But as countries get richer, they tend to tax working adults to pay for retirees’ benefits. That means today’s children grow up to support everyone’s parents, not just their own, but individual parents still bear the vast majority of the costs of raising children. That puts parents at a financial disadvantage in comparison to their peers who have fewer or no children.

The end result: As countries get richer, parenting shifts from being a way to save for retirement and be better off financially to being an obstacle to financial well-being.

Even the most generous welfare states do very little to defray those costs. Nordic countries, which are famed for their subsidized child care and maternity leave, for example, actually have some of the highest parenting costs in Europe, once parents’ time and out-of-pocket costs are taken into account.

Of course, becoming a parent is not strictly an economic decision. Children bring joy and meaning, and the loving bonds between a parent and a child, or between siblings, are among the most rewarding human relationships. But even the most loving and dedicated parents are still subject to economic reality.

Even if they have one child or two, they may decide not to have more, because they love the ones they already have and want to give them the best lives possible. That might explain why more than three-fifths of the decline in birthrates comes from people having fewer children, not from people opting to remain childless, a recent working paper found.

The problem or the cause?

For those who believe women should return to traditional gender roles, falling fertility has become a convenient way to argue that women’s participation in the work force is a threat to the survival of humanity. But the reality, unsurprisingly, is more complex.

Claudia Goldin, a Harvard economist who won a Nobel Prize in 2023 for her work on women in the work force, found in a recent working paper that birthrates have fallen especially steeply in countries like Japan, South Korea and Italy, where economic growth rapidly sent more women into the workplace, but gender attitudes failed to adjust to that shift. In those countries, women began working more hours outside the home, but men did not do more housework or child care, leaving women with a heavy double burden.

In that situation, Dr. Goldin writes, “women must reduce something,” and that something turned out to be children. In South Korea, for example, fertility rates plummeted from an average of six children per woman in the late 1950s to just 0.75 in 2024 — the lowest in the world….

Source: Why One of the Causes of Falling Birthrates May Be Prosperity

Theo Argitis: Canada’s great immigration experiment is ending 

Good take:

For nearly the first time in our history, Canada’s population growth has come to a near standstill. Remarkably, the state of things is such that we are celebrating this as a policy success and long-overdue correction.

Statistics Canada released its quarterly population estimates, showing the country grew by 20,000 people in the first three months of this year. That’s the third weakest quarterly increase in data going back to 1946—and less than one-tenth the average quarterly gain over the past three years.

Four provinces and one territory—Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, and Yukon—actually posted population declines.

The numbers reflect the dramatic reversal of policy late last year by the former Trudeau government, when it abruptly tightened permit approvals for international students and foreign workers after overseeing record immigration levels since 2021.

Under the plan, the intake of new permanent residents, or what the government calls immigrants, would be lowered from 485,000 in 2024 to 365,000 by 2027.

The number of non-permanent residents living in Canada—which had increased five-fold since 2015 to more than 3 million—would be cut by about one million over two years.

That post-pandemic rush of newcomers exacerbated housing shortages, strained public services, and disrupted the job market. It was perhaps the worst policy error of the past two decades, and in need of correction.

But, ironically, the sharp reversal in policy is now creating its own problems, impacting everything from demand for cell phones and banking services to funding for universities and colleges.

The whole episode has been a mass social experiment that will be studied for years.

“You’re going to see a ton of research on this, no question, because it’s like this little experiment here in Canada that no other country has done to this extent,’’ said Mikal Skuterud, a labour economist at the University of Waterloo and director of the Canadian Labour Economics Forum. “And there’s all kinds of dimensions to how this impacted the economy.”

The latest numbers suggest the government’s curbs are beginning to work. While still elevated, the number of non-permanent residents has started to decline—down almost 90,000 from its peak in September. The number of permanent residents, or immigrants, is now running at an annual pace closer to 400,000, down from nearly half a million.

Prime Minister Mark Carney has essentially adopted the Trudeau plan, which if successful will keep the current population steady at about the current 41.5 million level over the next two years. It would mark the first time since Confederation in 1867 that the country saw zero population growth.

Yet when viewed over the full horizon, the curbs will simply bring the average population growth rate for the decade back to about 1.3 percent, which is much closer to historical norms. We’re simply correcting a major policy anomaly.

Looking back, it’s too early to know for certain what effect the population surge had on wages and joblessness, according to Skuterud, who notes that younger Canadians, in particular, may have borne the brunt of it, given they tend to compete with newcomers for entry-level jobs.

What’s less in dispute is how the immigration surge lowered average living standards.

The evidence suggests that looser entry requirements over recent years brought in lower quality workers. Because of this, the economy failed to grow in line with population. The size of the pie didn’t grow fast enough to keep up with the number of people trying to take a slice.

The end result was the erosion of public confidence in immigration, which could linger in Canadian politics for years.

This is particularly true among younger Canadians, who now appear more open to curbing immigration levels. For many, tighter labour markets and more affordable housing—not higher population numbers—are the priority. Slower immigration supports those goals.

So, how did the government misjudge the situation so badly? And is there a lesson here for the Carney government?

Part of the problem stemmed from the unique distortions of the pandemic. The government overestimated labour shortages and then overcompensated by opening the immigration floodgates.

But there was also a broader miscalculation. Trudeau emerged from the pandemic with renewed ambitions and a belief that he had an expanded mandate to pursue transformative change, including on the immigration front.

Ambition, however, has a way of outpacing reality. And overshooting is always a risk when leaders grow too confident in their ability to enact change.

Carney is now putting forward an ambitious agenda of his own. Whether he’ll draw any lessons from Canada’s great immigration experiment remains to be seen.

Source: Theo Argitis: Canada’s great immigration experiment is ending

Canada’s temporary resident population declines for the first time in 3 years

Corrective action working, although Skuterud notes not enough:

The number of temporary residents in Canada has declined for the first time in three years, in the wake of a series of policy changes introduced by Ottawa last year to reduce immigration levels.

New data from Statistics Canada shows that there were roughly 30,000 fewer non-permanent residents in the country as of Jan. 1, 2025, compared to Oct. 1, 2024.

The total number of non-permanent residents stood at just over three million people, or 7.3 per cent of the population, down from 7.4 per cent the previous quarter.

The decrease in the number of temporary residents is causing overall population growth to slow. In the fourth quarter of 2024, the population grew by 0.2 per cent to roughly 41.5 million people, the slowest rate of growth since late 2020, when many border restrictions were in place because of the pandemic.

Canada’s population is still increasing, just not at the rate it did in 2022 and 2023….

Achieving Ottawa’s 5-per-cent non-permanent resident target is less realistic now than a year ago, according to Mikal Skuterud, an economist at the University of Waterloo. Prof. Skuterud estimates that in order to meet the target, the number of temporary residents will have to decline by almost 32 per cent in two years.

If that happens, the Canadian population will subsequently decline by 0.4 per cent over two years, Prof. Skuterud’s calculations show….

Source: Canada’s temporary resident population declines for the first time in 3 years

Coyne – Tariffs are only the start: we must buckle down for years of conflict with the U.S. [population]

Coyne somewhat surprisingly ends up endorsing the Century 2100 population goal, with little critical thinking regarding its limitations and fallacies (a larger population does not mean a more prosperous population):

…Last, and perhaps most important: if we’re tired of the Americans kicking sand in our faces, maybe it’s time we bulked up. We’re roughly 42 million to their 340 million today. But suppose we aimed to make that eight-to-one margin more like four-to-one by the end of the century. Suppose, that is, we took seriously the idea of aiming for a population of 100 million.

To get there in 75 years would require no acceleration in population growth: in fact, it would mean slowing our growth considerably, to roughly 1.2 per cent per annum, from the 1.5 per cent annually it has averaged over the last 75 years.

It isn’t only our relationship with the United States this would change. Most other large developed countries are projected to flatline or shrink over the same interval. By 2100, according to the United Nations, the population of Japan will fall from 123 million today to 74 million; Germany, from 85 million to 71 million; Italy, from 59 million to 35 million. France and the United Kingdom are projected to grow slightly, to 68 million and 74 million, respectively.

Were we merely to double our current population by then (a growth rate of less than 1 per cent annually), therefore, we would be the second largest developed country, a major player on the world stage – and better placed to hold our own against the Great Republic to our south.

Source: Tariffs are only the start: we must buckle down for years of conflict with the U.S.

Prousky: Canada’s housing crisis is fuelling a population crisis

Interesting turning around debates over immigration levels. But yes, levels have to come down given the time it takes to increase housing:

…The global pool from which to attract smart, employable immigrants is slowly shrinking. Africa is now the only region on Earth whose population is expected to grow by the end of the century. Meanwhile, the world’s population is expected to decrease in that time period. So in the coming century, rich nations – all of which have birth rates well below 2.1 – may be competing for the same small pool of working-age migrants.

Beyond immigration, there are a host of pro-natal policies that countries have devised to boost fertility. Governments in Asia have spent hundreds of billions of dollars to stave off looming population crises. Singapore, with one of the lowest fertility rates in the world at just 0.97, offers generous grants and tax rebates to parents with two or more children. But its fertility rate hasn’t budged.

It’s only a matter of time, it seems, before the Canadian government begins throwing big money at the country’s nascent fertility problem. The lesson from abroad is, don’t wait. Increasing the country’s housing supply today could be the best defence against a population crisis down the road.

Source: Canada’s housing crisis is fuelling a population crisis