Quebecers and other Canadians display similar concepts of national identity, according to Concordia researcher

2020/08/21 Leave a comment

Good summary of an interesting survey, with some similar conclusions as the 2020 Survey of Canadians: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES on the ECONOMY and CLIMATE CHANGE regarding regional differences being somewhat less pronounced than public and political discourse would have one believe:

It is no secret that Quebec distinguishes itself through its unique culture, particularly its historical and linguistic background.

In a recent study, Antoine Bilodeau, professor of political science in the Faculty of Arts and Science, and University of Ottawa professor Luc Turgeon wanted to address the topic of national identity in Quebec and the rest of Canada. They tackled the question of whether Quebecers hold a more exclusive sense of identity than other Canadians.

Their article, published in Nations & Nationalism, the Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, examines how majority-group members in Quebec and the rest of Canada define members of their respective political communities.

“We wanted to see how Quebecers define what it means to be a true Quebecer and compare it to how other Canadians define what it means to be a true Canadian,” Bilodeau explains.

The co-authors analyzed a set of “boundary markers,” which Bilodeau explains consist of traits people use to characterize members within their national communities.

“These are mental boundaries that we use to define who belongs inside the national group and who does not,” he says. “Boundary markers are images that people have in their head, so it’s not because you’re a Canadian citizen that other people might see you as such.”

Bilodeau and Turgeon examined two types of boundary markers — ascriptive and attainable characteristics. Ascriptive markers of identity are more hereditary or non-acquirable traits such as ancestry, religion and birthplace. Whereas attainable markers are developed traits such as feelings of belonging, respect for the laws and institutions of the political community and knowledge of national languages.

The researchers examined three ways Quebec and the rest of Canada might differ. Their conclusion? Quebecers and Canadians are quite similar in their approach to defining a member of their national community.

More importance attributed to attainable traits

A total of 3,688 individuals were surveyed — 551 respondents from Quebec with a French mother tongue and 3,137 respondents from the rest of Canada with an English mother tongue.

First, they examined how each group would separate ascriptive and attainable characteristics. Bilodeau explains that Quebecers and other Canadians give relatively more importance to acquired characteristics than other traits.

“In both communities, the main emphasis in defining group membership appears to be on attainable characteristics,” he notes.

“Increasingly, people are putting emphasis on criteria such as feeling like a Canadian or speaking the language, rather than being born or having ancestors from the country.”

Similar value of language

The second aspect they examined was the importance attributed to language.

“We found out that language was not a major point of differentiation between Quebec and the rest of Canada,” Bilodeau notes.

Given the historical and cultural significance around language in Quebec, Bilodeau was surprised to see that it was attributed almost the same importance in Quebec as in the rest of Canada, in the context of defining national identity.

Comparable views on immigration

Bilodeau also points out that group members in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada expressed somewhat similar views toward immigration.

“Respondents expressing a stronger attainable conception of national identity did not provide more positive attitudes toward immigration,” reports Bilodeau. “The effect is not significantly different in Quebec than in the rest of Canada.”

However, respondents who focused on ascriptive traits to determine national identity, such as ancestry and birthplace, tended to have less positive attitudes toward immigration.

“It was quite interesting to see the distinction between those two aspects.”

A rather rigid sense of identity

“The way Quebecers define what it means to be a Quebecer was not fundamentally different than the way other Canadians define what it means to be a true Canadian,” Bilodeau concludes.

And despite the fact that attainable characteristics were overwhelmingly more important than ascriptive ones in both groups, the researchers were extremely surprised by the relatively high support for the ascriptive characteristics overall.

“There is a significant residue of a more exclusive definition of national identity that really puts emphasis on being born here, having spent a lot of time in the country, but also even having ancestry in both Quebec and the rest of Canada,” Bilodeau says.

“For a country that is so proud of its inclusive definition of national identity and its policy of multiculturalism, I’m not sure we’re really there yet.”

Source: Quebecers and other Canadians display similar concepts of national identity, according to Concordia researcher

Filed under Multiculturalism Tagged with , , ,

Dialogue de sourds sur la laïcité

2019/02/04 Leave a comment

Good discussion regarding the two different forms of liberalism: in English Canada, the state should not involve itself in value conflicts between individuals (as long as no violation of the law or adverse impact on the rights of others) and in Quebec, that the state can play a more proactive role in imposing liberal values:

« Alors que le premier modèle véhicule l’idée que l’État ne doit pas s’immiscer dans des conflits de valeurs entre individus, dans le second, l’État doit être proactif pour imposer les valeurs libérales auprès des individus », détaille Luc Turgeon.

Au Québec, un citoyen qui défend des valeurs sociales libérales est plus prompt à appuyer des restrictions au port de signes religieux. Dans le reste du Canada, un citoyen qui défend ces mêmes valeurs est plus susceptible de s’opposer à toute restriction touchant le port de symboles religieux.

C’est la conclusion, à la fois étonnante et instructive, à laquelle en sont venus quatre politologues canadiens dans le cadre d’un projet de recherche lancé en 2014 dans la foulée du débat entourant la charte des valeurs du Parti québécoiset dont les résultats seront publiés prochainement dans le Canadian Journal of Political Science.

« On a testé les mêmes valeurs [appui à l’égalité homme-femme, au droit à l’avortement, à la légalisation de l’euthanasie, entre autres], on a posé les mêmes questions dans un sondage et ça prédit de façon diamétralement opposée la relation qu’entretiennent les deux communautés avec les symboles religieux », résume Antoine Bilodeau, professeur de science politique à l’Université Concordia à Montréal.

Ainsi, contrairement aux idées reçues, ce n’est pas un sentiment de xénophobie, une insécurité culturelle ou encore un niveau de religiosité plus faible qui expliquerait pourquoi l’appui à ces restrictions est plus fort au Québec qu’ailleurs au pays.

« Ce qui explique au bout du compte cette différence, c’est le fait qu’être socialement libéral au Québec et dans le reste du Canada a des effets opposés », poursuit Luc Turgeon, professeur de science politique à l’Université d’Ottawa.

Un vaste sondage

Les conclusions des chercheurs — qui signent l’article « A Tale of Two Liberalisms ? Attitudes toward Minority Religious Symbols in Quebec and Canada » conjointement avec les politologues Stephen White de l’Université Carleton à Ottawa et Ailsa Henderson de l’Université d’Édimbourg au Royaume-Uni — reposent sur des données issues d’un sondage en ligne réalisé par la firme Léger pour le compte des chercheurs et auquel ont participé 6400 Canadiens en janvier et février 2014.

Ce sondage mesurait l’appui des répondants à trois scénarios de restriction au port de symboles religieux chez les groupes minoritaires. Résultats ? L’appui aux interdictions était systématiquement plus élevé chez les Québécois.

Ainsi, 74 % des Québécois appuyaient le bannissement de signes religieux pour les policiers contre 45 % dans le reste du Canada ; 59 % des Québécois soutenaient l’interdiction pour les enseignants du réseau public, contre 29 % pour les autres Canadiens ; et 37 % des Québécois étaient d’accord avec une proscription pour les élèves des écoles publiques, contre 20 % pour les autres Canadiens.

L’enquête évaluait également l’adhésion des répondants à différentes valeurs libérales (égalité homme-femme, droit à l’avortement, légalisation de l’euthanasie, légalisation de la prostitution), mesurait leur sentiment à l’égard de l’immigrationet de la diversité ethnoculturelle et quantifiait l’importance de la religion dans leur vie.

Deux libéralismes

En analysant ces données, les quatre chercheurs ont été en mesure de conclureque le seul facteur expliquant cette différence en ce qui a trait au soutien aux restrictions est la relation qu’entretiennent les deux communautés aux valeurs libérales, des effets opposés qui s’expliquent par le fait que deux types de libéralisme se sont développés au pays au cours des trente dernières années.

Pendant que dans le reste du Canada un discours axé sur le libéralisme multiculturel a pris racine, au Québec, un libéralisme des lumières, inspiré par le modèle français, a gagné en influence.

« Alors que le premier modèle véhicule l’idée que l’État ne doit pas s’immiscer dans des conflits de valeurs entre individus, dans le second, l’État doit être proactif pour imposer les valeurs libérales auprès des individus », détaille Luc Turgeon.

Certes, la xénophobie peut mener à une volonté de restreindre les symboles des minorités religieuses dans l’espace public. « Mais ce facteur-là est aussi important au Québec que dans le reste du pays », précise Antoine Bilodeau.

Et c’est précisément là que réside l’essentiel de l’incompréhension entre le Québec et le reste du Canada dans ce fastidieux débat. « Dans la dynamique canadienne-anglaise, l’essentiel des gens qui veulent restreindre les symboles religieux, ce sont des gens qui sont mal à l’aise avec la diversité ethnoculturelle, alors qu’au Québec, ce n’est pas seulement ça », explique Antoine Bilodeau.

« Mais dans leur prisme de compréhension du monde, si tu veux restreindre les symboles religieux, la seule raison qui peut exister, c’est l’intolérance », pointe-t-il.

UNE ALLIANCE CONTRE NATURE À L’ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE

L’appui à la charte des valeurs reposait sur une « alliance insolite » (« strange bedfellows ») entre conservateurs nationalistes(« conservative nationalists ») et partisans d’un libéralisme des lumières (« liberal nationalists »), avancent les quatre universitaires.

Une idée — inspirée des travaux de Jocelyn Maclure, professeur de philosophie à l’Université Laval — que les chercheurs ont étayée dans un autre article, intitulé « Strange Bedfellows ? Attitudes toward Minority and Majority Religious Symbols in the Public Sphere », publié dans la revue Politics and Religion en 2018.

Une coalition contre nature dont le point de rupture se situe au niveau de la place réservée au crucifix à l’Assemblée nationale. « On se disait que ceux qui étaient pour la charte et pour le retrait du crucifix à l’Assemblée nationale (« liberal nationalists ») ne le faisaient pas pour les mêmes raisons que ceux qui étaient pour la charte, mais contre le retrait du crucifix (« conservative nationalists ») », explique Luc Turgeon.

Incidemment, les travaux des chercheurs ont permis de démontrer que les Québécois qui se sont prononcés en faveur de la charte, mais contre le retrait du crucifix avaient des attitudes plus négatives envers les minorités et l’immigration et avaient un sentiment de menace culturelle plus fort que ceux qui étaient contre la Charte.

« Mais ceux qui étaient pour la charte et pour le retrait du crucifix n’avaient pas une attitude plus négative par rapport aux minorités culturelles et aux gens issus de l’immigration. Ce sont des gens qui, du point de vue du libéralisme social, sont plus progressistes que les gens qui étaient contre la charte », remarque Luc Turgeon.

Alors que le débat sur le port de signes religieux est sur le point de rejaillir à l’Assemblée nationale, la question du crucifix risque encore de soulever les passions.

« Si l’opinion publique n’a pas changé par rapport à ce qu’elle était en 2014, ce sera un grand défi pour le gouvernement caquiste de régler la question du crucifix, relève Antoine Bilodeau. C’est un enjeu au potentiel de division énorme, en raison de sa sensibilité, mais aussi parce qu’il définit la ligne de démarcation, presque à parts égales, entre les deux groupes qui forment cette coalition. »

Filed under Interculturalisme, Multiculturalism Tagged with , , , ,

Seeing the Same Canada? Visible Minorities’ Views of the Federation

2015/11/20 1 Comment

IRPP - Visible Minorities and the Federation.001A useful report by IRPP researchers Antoine Bilodeau, Luc Turgeon, Stephen E. White and Ailsa Henderson on the views regarding the federation of visible minorities, divided into both immigrants and second or more generations.

These regional differences, while not terribly surprising, nevertheless are revealing in that they reflect the overall regional perspectives (similarity between visible minority and majority population in Ontario, weaker regional grievances in the West among visible minorities, and greater support for national institutions in Quebec among visible minorities).

While the authors note that the federal model of multiculturalism is attractive to visible minorities is not new, it highlights the failure of Quebec’s efforts to create an alternative interculturalism narrative, along with the all too often exaggeration of the nuanced differences between the Quebec and federal approaches).

As to their recommendation that the Quebec government should adopt a formal interculturalism policy, while sensible in some respects, this would likely reopen some of the less productive debates of the past (e.g., the PQs Quebec Values Charter). Ironically, it also might undermine the rhetoric of the Quebec model of interculturalism, given its subtle differences with multiculturalism.

One of the weaknesses of CIC/IRC citizenship program was precisely its lack of stronger citizenship promotion in Quebec, which reflected more processing and efficiency concerns rather than reinforcing Canadian identity. This will likely continue, even if it is one of the few IRC programs in Quebec, one that can play an important role in reinforcing the federal presence in Quebec.

The transfer of multiculturalism back to Canadian Heritage will provide scope for more multiculturalism programming in Quebec and thus reinforcement of Canadian identity.  (Within CIC, there was a feeling that under the Cullen-Couture agreement, which transferred immigrant selection and settlement services to Quebec, that multiculturalism program funding for Quebec was not needed – missing an opportunity to assert federal presence.):

The authors show that, compared with the majority population, members of visible minority groups as a whole have a stronger sense of loyalty to the federal government than to provincial governments, express greater support for Canada’s national policies, and are less inclined to endorse historical grievances about the Canadian federation. As for competing national and provincial visions of Canada, members of visible minority groups embrace a national vision more strongly than the majority population.

However, the extent to which members of visible minority groups hold distinctive views about the Canadian federation depends on the province they live in and whether or not they were born in Canada. In Ontario, visible minorities’ views are almost indistinguishable from those of the majority population. In Alberta and in British Columbia, visible minorities born abroad hold somewhat weaker regional grievances than the majority population. However, those born in Canada see the federation in similar terms as the majority population.

The greatest difference between visible minorities and the majority population is in Quebec, where visible minorities born abroad and those born in Canada express considerably stronger support for a national vision. The differences in outlook on the federation between non-French speaking members of visible minority groups and the rest of the Quebec population are particularly striking.

The findings suggest that the federal government’s multiculturalism policy offers a model that appeals to members of visible minority groups. Its highest level of support is among visible minorities in Quebec, whose government has never supported multiculturalism policy and has yet to offer a formal and official alternative.

[conclusion] … If the attractiveness of the federal model appears to exert an influence over visible minorities in Alberta and British Columbia, it might be enhanced in Quebec because of the alternative narrative proposed by the Quebec government. The Quebec government has never officially supported the federal multicultural model and has instead proposed a model of interculturalism that has yet to be stated formally in an official policy and remains unfamiliar to most Quebecers (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). Our findings thus lend support for those arguing for the Quebec government to adopt an official policy of interculturalism (Rocher and White 2014). A formal policy positioning of the Quebec government on matters of ethnocultural diversity would stand as a symbolic gesture recognizing the contribution of diversity within Quebec society and would promote increased interaction between minorities and the broader population. By so doing, the government could favour a rapprochement between the narrative adopted by visible minorities in Quebec and the dominant one found in Quebec and hence appease some of the tensions that have marked Quebec society over the last few years.

Our final observation concerns an exception to the patterns for all four provinces just discussed. Visible minorities in all four provinces are substantially more prone to see a positive impact of the policy of multiculturalism on Canadian identity than the majority population. This finding is not necessarily surprising considering that, more than any other issue examined in this study, the policy of multiculturalism speaks to the contribution of ethnocultural minorities to the construction of Canadian identity. Moreover, as we argued, the federal government’s multiculturalism policy might be the pivot around which the more federally oriented narrative of visible minorities is structured. Should the growing presence of visible minorities have one significant and consistent impact, it may well be to further strengthen acceptance of the country’s multicultural heritage — in the process further strengthening this pillar of Canadian identity.

http://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/study-no56.pdf?mc_cid=7023dd89ad&mc_eid=86cabdc518

Filed under Citizenship, Multiculturalism Tagged with , , , , ,

Canadians in the dark about immigration numbers: survey

2014/08/29 Leave a comment

Not surprising that people don’t know the actual immigration figures. Common to many policy areas that most people don’t follow too closely and large numbers are fairly abstract in any case.

Government messaging walks the fine line between reassuring its base, and the broader public, that it is addressing fraud and the risk of over-dramatizing the extent of fraud (e.g., birth tourism) and thus contributing to reduced public confidence:

Ignorance of the facts, however, didn’t stop most of the 3,016 participants polled by Harris/Decima from answering when asked whether there were too many, too few or about the right number of immigrants coming to Canada every year.

Twenty-six per cent said there were too many, 10 per cent said too few and 52 per cent said the number was about right. The rest said they didn’t know.

After they were told the actual number admitted each year, the number who said there were too many jumped to 36 per cent. Nine per cent said too few immigrants were admitted, while 48 per cent thought the number was about right.

When asked if Canada should increase, decrease or maintain its immigration intake over the next five years, nearly half favoured the status quo, about one-third advocated a decrease and 15 per cent wanted immigration levels to rise.

Luc Turgeon, a University of Ottawa political scientist who has studied public attitudes toward immigration, said he wasn’t surprised by the widespread ignorance of actual immigration levels.

“In numerous countries it has been proven that people have no idea how many immigrants their countries are letting in,” he said.

Turgeon said the Conservative federal government has “sent a number of signals” to reassure its base that it’s keeping a close eye on people admitted to Canada.

Those signals include tightening the rules for refugees, making it more difficult for refugees to access publicly funded health care and hinting that changes are in the works to the live-in caregiver program.

Canadians in the dark about immigration numbers: survey | Ottawa Citizen.

Filed under Immigration, Polling Tagged with ,