Lederman: The fallout from the Gaza War continues to be felt in the literary world

Sad that this needs to be said:

…A plea – and I make this as someone whose own appearance at a book festival last year attracted letters of protest: We must ensure literary spaces are inclusive and encourage intellectual debate and diverse voices. We must not seek to censor well-meaning, serious artists, but to invite them in and respectfully challenge opinions that rankle (although there should be no place for actual hate). To allow discussion about their books and beliefs. That is the value of a literary festival, a literary prize, and books themselves.

Source: The fallout from the Gaza War continues to be felt in the literary world

Immigrants more likely to cite human rights, diversity as ‘Canadian values’: survey

Of note:

Immigrants are more likely than those born in Canada to identify things like respect for human rights and gender equality as “shared Canadian values,” say survey results in briefing notes prepared for Immigration Minister Lena Diab.

The survey results — part of a package assembled for the minister when she took over the portfolio last May — were obtained by The Canadian Press through an access to information request.

The Statistics Canada survey asked respondents whether they saw human rights, respect for the law, gender equality, linguistic duality, ethic and cultural diversity and respect for Indigenous culture as shared “Canadian values.”

In each case, the percentage of immigrants surveyed who said they saw those values as distinctly Canadian was higher than the percentage of people born in Canada who said the same.

The data was pulled from Statistics Canada’s December 2022 general survey on social identity. The data was collected between August 2020 and February 2021, with a sample of more than 34,000 people that included almost 14,000 landed immigrants.

The survey suggests 67 per cent of immigrants who were aged 13 or older when they came to Canada see respect for the law as a shared Canadian value, while just 40 per cent of respondents born here agreed.

The responses from people who came to Canada aged 12 and younger were more in line with those of people born here.

Lori Wilkinson, Canada Research Chair in migration at the University of Manitoba, said she thinks that statistic is the result of a younger cohort of immigrants growing up in Canada.

“The longer (immigrants) stay here, the more they act Canadian. And I suspect that that’s an issue with attitudes as well,” she said.

“The more you’re here, you pick up the norms and values of the Canadians that you live around. So it’s not surprising they become more like Canadians.”

The survey suggests about 58 per cent of immigrants are satisfied with their lives, while just 44 per cent of Canadian-born respondents said the same.

The survey was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic — a time when many people were stuck at home due to public health measures and more likely to be out of work.

Daniel Bernhard, CEO of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship, said this result matches research his organization has conducted. He said immigrants tend to be more focused on their potential for future prosperity after making personal sacrifices to come to Canada.

“There is recognition there that it is difficult to move to a new country, that the economic conditions here, you know, can be difficult for everybody. But as long as they feel that they’re making progress, they’ll be willing to stay,” he said.

Bernhard said his institute has also found immigrant attitudes tend to converge with those of Canadian-born citizens the longer they’re in Canada.

Wilkinson said she expects satisfaction rates across the entire population have declined in recent years due to the elevated cost of living.

“I think people in general, whether you’re immigrant or not, are going to be more angry the longer that affordability is not addressed, the longer homelessness and (housing) precarity are not addressed,” she said….

Source: Immigrants more likely to cite human rights, diversity as ‘Canadian values’: survey

L’immigration se régionalise au Québec, The immigration shift away from Canada’s three biggest cities

Of note:

“Le dernier bilan démographique des régions laisse entrevoir une répartition accrue de l’immigration aux quatre coins du Québec. Si Montréal attire encore la majorité des nouveaux arrivants, les autres régions obtiennent une part de plus en plus grande du gâteau. La régionalisation tant souhaitée depuis des décennies est-elle en voie de se réaliser ?

La part des immigrants permanents s’installant à Montréal a de nouveau reculé, passant de 48 à 45 % sur un an, selon les données publiées mercredi par l’Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) pour la période allant du 1er juillet 2024 au 1er juillet 2025.

Il y a 20 ans, cette proportion était de 75 %.

Après Montréal, c’est la Montérégie (13,2 %) et la Capitale-Nationale (12,8 %) qui attirent le plus les nouveaux arrivants, suivies de Laval (5,2 %), de l’Outaouais (4,6 %) et de Chaudière-Appalaches (3,6 %).

Dans le même bilan, on remarque aussi que dans 11 des 17 régions du Québec, le nombre de nouveaux immigrants admis à titre de résidents permanents a été le plus élevé depuis que les données sont disponibles, soit depuis 2001.

“Le dernier bilan démographique des régions laisse entrevoir une répartition accrue de l’immigration aux quatre coins du Québec. Si Montréal attire encore la majorité des nouveaux arrivants, les autres régions obtiennent une part de plus en plus grande du gâteau. La régionalisation tant souhaitée depuis des décennies est-elle en voie de se réaliser ?

La part des immigrants permanents s’installant à Montréal a de nouveau reculé, passant de 48 à 45 % sur un an, selon les données publiées mercredi par l’Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) pour la période allant du 1er juillet 2024 au 1er juillet 2025.

Il y a 20 ans, cette proportion était de 75 %.

Après Montréal, c’est la Montérégie (13,2 %) et la Capitale-Nationale (12,8 %) qui attirent le plus les nouveaux arrivants, suivies de Laval (5,2 %), de l’Outaouais (4,6 %) et de Chaudière-Appalaches (3,6 %).

Dans le même bilan, on remarque aussi que dans 11 des 17 régions du Québec, le nombre de nouveaux immigrants admis à titre de résidents permanents a été le plus élevé depuis que les données sont disponibles, soit depuis 2001.

« Les migrations internationales occupent un rôle accru dans le bilan démographique de certaines régions où, il n’y a pas si longtemps, “l’immigration jouait un rôle assez mineur, notamment dans les régions plus éloignées des grands centres. Dans les dernières années, ç’a été déterminant dans des régions comme l’Abitibi-Témiscamingue, la Côte-Nord, le Saguenay–Lac-Saint-Jean », observe Martine St-Amour, démographe à l’ISQ.



Sans l’immigration, la plupart des régions vivraient une décroissance démographique.”.

Source: “L’immigration se régionalise au Québec”

“The latest demographic assessment of the regions suggests an increased distribution of immigration across the world of Quebec. While Montreal still attracts the majority of newcomers, the other regions are getting an increasingly large share of the cake. Is the regionalization that has been longed for decades in the process of being realized?

The share of permanent immigrants settling in Montreal has declined again, from 48 to 45% over a year, according to data released Wednesday by the Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) for the period from July 1, 2024 to July 1, 2025.

20 years ago, this proportion was 75%.

After Montreal, it is the Montérégie (13.2%) and the Capitale-Nationale (12.8%) that attract the most newcomers, followed by Laval (5.2%), the Outaouais (4.6%) and Chaudière-Appalaches (3.6%).

In the same assessment, we also note that in 11 of the 17 regions of Quebec, the number of new immigrants admitted as permanent residents has been the highest since the data is available, since 2001.

“The latest demographic assessment of the regions suggests an increased distribution of immigration across the world of Quebec. While Montreal still attracts the majority of newcomers, the other regions are getting an increasingly large share of the cake. Is the regionalization that has been longed for decades in the process of being realized?

The share of permanent immigrants settling in Montreal has declined again, from 48 to 45% over a year, according to data released Wednesday by the Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) for the period from July 1, 2024 to July 1, 2025.

20 years ago, this proportion was 75%.

After Montreal, it is the Montérégie (13.2%) and the Capitale-Nationale (12.8%) that attract the most newcomers, followed by Laval (5.2%), the Outaouais (4.6%) and Chaudière-Appalaches (3.6%).

In the same assessment, we also note that in 11 of the 17 regions of Quebec, the number of new immigrants admitted as permanent residents has been the highest since the data is available, since 2001.

“International migration plays an increased role in the demographic balance of certain regions where, not so long ago, “immigration played a rather minor role, especially in regions further away from major centers. In recent years, this has been decisive in regions such as Abitibi-Témiscamingue, Côte-Nord, Saguenay–Lac-Saint-Jean, “observes Martine St-Amour, a demographer at the ISQ.

Without immigration, most regions would experience a demographic decline.”

At the national level, The immigration shift away from Canada’s three biggest cities:

Canada’s three largest metropolitan areas once together attracted the vast majority of new immigrants to Canada, but a combination of eroding affordability and the influx of international students to smaller cities has sent the three cities’ share of new immigrants to a record low.

Over the 12 months ending in mid-2025, the three census metropolitan areas of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal attracted a combined 46 per cent of new immigrants, down from close to 80 per cent two decades earlier, according to municipal-level population estimates released by Statistics Canada.

Across Canada, the number of new immigrants is in decline as Ottawa tightens its immigration rules, falling 6.2 per cent between 2023-24 and 2024-25. But the drops in Toronto and Vancouver were particularly steep, declining 10 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. 

The decline in the large cities’ share of new immigrants is explained, in part, by the number of international students who attended college or university outside of the three major metro areas, then later obtained permanent residency in those smaller locales, said Mike Moffatt, an economist and founding director of the Missing Middle Initiative at the University of Ottawa.

But the declining share is part of a broader population slowdown for Canada’s largest urban centres, with growth in Toronto and Vancouver in particular coming to a standstill. 

Fixing Canada’s broken immigration system – Presenting more data to Parliament: Michael Barutciski

First in a series of opinion pieces by MLI. In reading Barutciski’s recommendations for more data, he presents the case as if no data available when in fact in most areas he mentions, open data has rich data sets, albeit historic but regularly updated. Valid to argue more breakdowns in terms of future permanent and temporary residents and the like in the annual levels plan. Certainly, he flags some areas where data is lacking, particularly exit data undocumented, removals and deportations.

On country of origin, he argues that “Identifying source countries can also help to clarify whether immigrants are coming from jurisdictions with inferior educational standards and from cultures that are not necessarily going to make it easy for them to succeed in Canada.” I would argue better to focus on the skill, education level etc rather than country of origin, as there is a mix of skill levels in all countries, and selection should focus on the higher skilled within each country (dilution of the CRS used in Express Entry is of concern in that regard). His arguments tend towards generalizations with some reasonable examples, but no government is likely to return essentially back to race or country criteria.

One particularly notable gap is relative silence on the impact of immigration on housing, healthcare, infrastructure etc, which has largely contributed to the shift to lower support for immigration. This needs to be part of the levels plan, along with a number of his suggestions, some of which are being implemented (e.g., temporary residents), albeit imperfectly.

Recommendations as follows:

Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to oblige the immigration minister to provide Parliament with data on countries of origin for all migrant categories.

Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to also include detailed information on temporary residents.

Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to oblige the immigration minister to provide data on work permits issued to temporary residents.

Recommendation: International students should be required to show to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) upon arrival that they have pre-paid full tuition.

Recommendation: To encourage scrutiny of any discrepancies between issued visas and actual enrolment, the immigration minister should be obliged under section 94 of the IRPA to report on immigration compliance data from educational institutions.

Recommendation: The federal government should clarify the objectives of the IMP and provide data on who is being admitted under this stream, along with future planning.

Recommendation: The federal government should explore the feasibility of authorizing all provinces to select their own candidates for the IMP.

Recommendation: In accordance with the Statistics Act, the Chief Statistician should be directed to revise the assumption that non-permanent residents leave the country 120 days after visa expiry. The Chief Statistician should correspondingly adjust the way general statistics relating to immigration and emigration under s. 22 of the Act are collected and analyzed.

Recommendation: CBSA should be directed by the minister of public safety to provide Statistics Canada with its exit data. Data related to the relationship between expired visas and actual departures at the border should be presented in the report produced by the minister of immigration under section 94 of the IRPA.

Recommendation: The Canada Revenue Agency Act should be amended to oblige the CRA to provide Canada Border Services Agency and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada with any data it holds regarding migrants unlawfully present in the country. These data should be presented in the report produced by the minister of immigration under section 94 of the IRPA.

Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to oblige the minister of immigration to provide information about the country of origin of asylum seekers, the location where they presented their claim, along with their immigration status prior to the claim.

Recommendation: The immigration minister’s annual report under s. 94 of IRPA should specify the following information regarding asylum claims: it should include how many migrants claim asylum each year, how many proceed to a hearing before the IRB, how many are recognized as needing protection, how many remain in Canada despite not being granted formal protection, how many benefit from a deferral or moratorium regarding removal, as well as how many disappear altogether from the system. For a truly constructive debate, the immigration minister should be encouraged to present comparable data regarding our peers: the US, the UK, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, along with other EU member states such as Sweden and Denmark.

Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended so that the minister of immigration is required to provide data on removals and deportations.

Source: Fixing Canada’s broken immigration system – Presenting more data to Parliament: Michael Barutciski

Nicolas | Maintenant… l’avenir du Québec

Lot’s of various commentary, with this one focussing on the polarization on identity issues Legault engendered:

…“Des ministres comme Jean-François Roberge, Simon-Jolin Barrette et Bernard Drainville semblent particulièrement à l’aise avec l’aspect plus « identitaire » de la coalition. Je soupçonne fortement des ministres comme Mathieu Lacombe, Eric Girard ou Sonia LeBel de nourrir ailleurs leur passion pour la chose publique. Je ne sais pas si Kateri Champagne Jourdain est particulièrement à l’aise avec le traitement réservé aux Premiers Peuples dans le projet de Constitution québécoise. Je mettrais ma main au feu que le discours de certains collègues sur l’immigration ou sur le filet social a travaillé la solidarité ministérielle d’un Lionel Carmant, bien avant que le débat sur la rémunération des médecins ne soit lancé.

Le premier ministre a démissionné en reconnaissant que les Québécois veulent du changement. Sa succession doit être libre de prendre ses distances par rapport à certaines de ses idées, méthodes, discours ou approches. La course au leadership qui s’organise devra certainement être libre d’en débattre.

“Si la CAQ veut se donner une chance de se renouveler, la première étape, c’est de ne pas lier les mains de sa succession à un agenda législatif qui non seulement polarise inutilement et crée de potentiels dommages à notre état de droit, mais n’aura pas réussi à faire ce pour quoi il a été pensé : sauver François Legault et son parti. Il faut proroger le Parlement durant la course, se donner au moins l’option de repartir sur du neuf.”

Source: Chronique | Maintenant… l’avenir du Québec

“Ministers like Jean-François Roberge, Simon-Jolin Barrette and Bernard Drainville seem particularly comfortable with the more “identity” aspect of the coalition. I strongly suspect ministers like Mathieu Lacombe, Eric Girard or Sonia LeBel of nurturing their passion for public affairs elsewhere. I don’t know if Kateri Champagne Jourdain is particularly comfortable with the treatment reserved for the First Peoples in the Quebec Constitution project. I would put my hand on the fire that the speech of some colleagues on immigration or the social net worked the ministerial solidarity of a Lionel Carmant, long before the debate on the remuneration of doctors was launched.

The Prime Minister resigned, acknowledging that Quebecers want change. His succession must be free to distance himself from some of his ideas, methods, speeches or approaches. The leadership race that is being organized will certainly have to be free to debate it.

“If the CAQ wants to give itself a chance to renew itself, the first step is not to bind the hands of its succession to a legislative agenda that not only polarizes unnecessarily and creates potential damage to our rule of law, but will not have succeeded in doing what it was designed for: saving François Legault and his party. We must extend the Parliament during the race, at least give ourselves the option to start again.”

Parkin – Freedom vs. equality: Quebec and the rest of Canada

More interesting findings:

…Do these differences among provinces and regions matter to our politics? On the one hand, they should not be exaggerated (and we should always resist the urge to stereotype): opinions in every region are fairly divided, with at least two in five in every region favouring each of the two options. Appeals to either freedom or to equality will win support among a significant number of voters, no matter where you are in the country. On the other hand, promises to make Canada the freest country in the world, and attacks on wokeism or policies to advance diversity, equity and inclusion will appeal more in some regions than others – specifically, they will appeal to more voters in the Prairies than in Quebec, and particularly more to men in the Prairies than to women in Quebec. This is as it should be: the point of democratic politics is to offer people choices. But these public opinion data do contribute something to our efforts to understand the way recent elections have played out.

Source: Freedom vs. equality: Quebec and the rest of Canada

StatsCan: Overrepresentation of Indigenous and Black adults in provincial and federal custody

Usual sound data analysis from StatsCan, higher gaps than I expected:

In 2023/2024, Indigenous adults were incarcerated at a rate 10 times higher than non-Indigenous adults in the six provinces with available data (Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia), according to a new measure called the overrepresentation index. Over the five-year period studied (2019/2020 to 2023/2024), overrepresentation of Indigenous adults in custody increased each year. In 2023/2024, the Black population was incarcerated at a rate three times that of the white population in the four provinces where disaggregated data on racialized groups are available (Nova Scotia, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia).

The overrepresentation of Indigenous (First Nations, Inuit and Métis) and Black adults under correctional supervision in Canada is a significant and persistent concern. Designed to improve the measuring of overrepresentation and to monitor progress more effectively over time, this Daily release presents a detailed analysis of previously released indicators. For the first time, these measures combine correctional data from the federal, provincial and territorial levels to provide data on the entire correctional system for reporting provinces and territories. These measures also allow for further disaggregation of the non-Indigenous population into white and racialized group populations, offering a more comprehensive view of correctional involvement among Indigenous and Black populations in Canada. 

To reflect the distinct histories, structural factors and lived experiences of Indigenous and Black populations in Canada, the analysis is presented in two parts. The reasons overrepresentation exists in the Canadian justice system are complex and long-standing. They are discussed further in this release in the section on overrepresentation of Indigenous people and in the section on overrepresentation of Black persons.

Overrepresentation of Indigenous adults in custody

The overrepresentation of Indigenous people in Canada’s correctional systems is a long-standing and deeply rooted issue. For over three decades, this issue has been highlighted by commissions, rulings from the Supreme Court of Canada and various other official inquiries.

The causes of overrepresentation are complex and interconnected, though indisputably linked to colonialism, displacement, socioeconomic marginalization, intergenerational trauma and systemic discrimination. A key legal milestone was the 1999 Supreme Court case R v. Gladue, which emphasized that lower courts should carefully consider an Indigenous offender’s background during sentencing. This was reaffirmed and expanded in R v. Ipeelee (2012).

In 2015, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada issued Call to Action 30, urging all levels of government to commit to eliminating the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in custody within a decade. The Call also emphasized the importance of ongoing monitoring through detailed annual reporting….

Overrepresentation of Black adults in custody

In Canada, the Black population faces social and economic challenges linked to the historic and ongoing harms caused by colonial laws, policies and practices, including racial segregation and discriminatory immigration policies. These challenges, compounded by anti-Black racism and systemic discrimination, have resulted in the overrepresentation of Black persons in Canada’s correctional system. As a result of changes in reporting, Statistics Canada is now able to report on the overrepresentation of Black persons in the correctional system for the following jurisdictions: Nova Scotia, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia.

Black persons incarcerated at a rate three times their proportion of the population

In 2023/2024, Black persons in custody from the four reporting provinces accounted for 12.8% of the custodial population on an average day, while they made up 3.3% of the general adult population. 

The incarceration rate of Black persons in 2023/2024 was 32 adults per 10,000 population, compared with 8 adults per 10,000 population for the white population. The rate was highest among Black men (62 adults per 10,000 population) and lowest among Black women (2 adults per 10,000 population). By comparison, rates were lower among white men (15 adults per 10,000 population) and white women (1 adult per 10,000 population).

Overall, 0.8% of the adult Black population was incarcerated at some point during the 2023/2024 reference year, compared with 0.2% of the white population….

Source: Overrepresentation of Indigenous and Black adults in provincial and federal custody

MacDougall | Canada does not need to lie down and accept Elon Musk’s giant mess

Good commentary:

…Welcome to the classic Big Tech manoeuvre: make (or enable) a giant mess, and then bark at others to clean it up. But that’s a poor response to minor offences and an egregious one to the generation and distribution of CSAM [child sexual abuse material]. Canadian legislators and regulators shouldn’t accept it.

But how do we stop them from making a mess? And can we do it short of a controversial “ban”?

To begin, we must understand that legislators and regulators have spent most of Big Tech’s existence trying to regulate their content outputs instead of taking a hard look at the inputs, imperatives and incentives driving these services. If these services are spraying crap like CSAM around social media platforms, the answer must be to prevent the platforms from spraying the crap, not trying to clean up all the crap after it has been sprayed on unsuspecting users. This is a business model problem, and we must focus on the model, not what it produces. 

As it stands, the major social media platforms and AI services are free to use (Musk only tucked some of Grok’s features behind a paywall after it was caught facilitating CSAM, though users can still access the features in other ways). And when a platform is “free” to use, it must make its money elsewhere: through advertising. In other words, these platforms exist to monetize our attention, not to provide free speech. And when attention is the key revenue metric, addiction becomes the business model, because more time on screen equals more money. That’s how you end up with a world where children now spend an average of five hours on social media every day, with adults struggling to control their usage, too. 

Given these figures, it’s no wonder the platforms call us their “users” not their customers. If we were customers, we would exchange some money for these services at the point of sale, not be monetized after the fact. If we were customers, we could demand changes to the service we are provided, not simply be forced to accept whatever content the platforms find delivers better “engagement” (hint: it’s not journalism). If we paid, the platforms would be forced to compete on utility, not addictiveness.

In this new world of competition, nobody but pedophiles would be asking X and Grok for CSAM. So let’s build this world instead of accepting the business models people like Musk are now forcing on us. And if the platforms don’t want to have that conversation, we should look good and hard at a ban, but of their business models, not their outputs. There is no rule saying we must accept a business model that generates tremendous harms while forcing the public to bear the cost of those harms.

Source: Opinion | Canada does not need to lie down and accept Elon Musk’s giant mess

MPI: Unleashing Power in New Ways: Immigration in the First Year of Trump 2.0

Usual good and comprehensive analysis by MPI:

Having campaigned on and won re-election with immigration as a top issue, President Donald Trump has kept it at center stage in the first year of his second term. Immediately upon returning to office, the administration advanced sweeping changes to immigration policy, unprecedented in their breadth and reach. These changes have made the United States more hostile to unauthorized immigrants while also altering how the government treats immigration and immigrants of all legal statuses and the communities in which they live. The impacts on individuals, families, workplaces, and the nation’s overall economic outlook and global standing will be felt for years ahead.

While some efforts have stalled or not yet met the White House’s lofty goals, the administration has dramatically reshaped the machinery of government to target unauthorized immigrants in the country, deter unauthorized border arrivals, make the status of many legally resident immigrants more tenuous, and impose obstacles for lawful entry of large swaths of international travelers and would-be immigrants. These changes could set the course for reduced family, humanitarian, and employment-based immigration in the future, while also driving key aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

In This Article

To accomplish the administration’s mass deportation goal, Trump advisor Stephen Miller and other aides dismantled longstanding norms. The White House invoked archaic statutes, enlisted support from state and local law enforcement as well as federal agencies that historically had no immigration enforcement role, and pressured foreign governments to receive deportees. Perhaps most visibly, it militarized immigration enforcement: Scenes of troops and masked federal agents roaming U.S. streets, lobbing tear gas and in some cases violently—and even fatally—subduing individuals, have garnered global attention and profoundly changed how many residents go about their daily lives. Among other changes, some U.S. citizens now feel compelled to carry identification with them at all times.

The administration has leaned heavily on executive action rather than seeking legislative change in Congress. As of January 7, Trump had signed 38 executive orders related to immigration, accounting for nearly 17 percent of the 225 total orders signed so far during his first year, which is more than the 220 executive orders signed during his entire first term. The administration also ushered in hundreds of other actions via presidential proclamations and policy guidance that have had profound impacts on immigration policy. The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) estimates that the Trump administration in the first year of its second term took more than 500 actions on immigration, surpassing the 472 actions over all four years of Trump’s first term.

While some elements of the administration’s approach mirror policies of the prior term, albeit at far greater scale and scope, the changes of the last year have been arguably more impactful than any during the first term. Administration officials appear to have learned from their first-term experience and have also benefited from a much more sympathetic Congress and Supreme Court. Indeed, Congress in July provided the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with a staggering $170 billion to upscale over Trump’s second term what was already the world’s largest detention and deportation machinery. And the Supreme Court has greenlit several high-profile actions, including revoking Temporary Protected Status (TPS) from about 600,000 Venezuelans, although it blocked the administration from deporting noncitizens without due process and did not allow deployment of the National Guard for immigration enforcement. Key questions on birthright citizenship and other immigration policies are yet to be resolved.

The net change has been dizzying in its scope and speed. After the administration further shut down access to asylum, unauthorized arrivals at the U.S.-Mexico border plummeted to the lowest levels since the 1970s. This development has allowed the administration to shift its focus largely to unauthorized immigrants living in the United States, whom MPI estimates numbered 13.7 million as of mid-2023. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests have more than quadrupled since Trump took office, while average daily detention has doubled. On December 19, DHS said that 622,000 noncitizens had been deported since Trump took office, a high—but not historic—number. It is below the 778,000 repatriations carried out in the final full fiscal year of the Biden administration, and well short of the Trump team’s pledge of 1 million deportations per year. The administration’s deportation number likely includes noncitizens turned away at U.S. borders and at airports; limited release of immigration enforcement data means it is unclear who is being counted and how. While the administration claims 1.9 million people have “self-deported” during that same period, it has not provided any data, including on use of the CBP Home app, through which immigrants are offered a free flight and $1,000 payment if they return to their origin country.

The hardline approach has extended to many lawfully present immigrants and those aspiring to come legally. The administration has stripped temporary legal protections from more than 1.5 million humanitarian parolees, nearly completely halted refugee resettlement, and severely restricted access to asylum. It has also erected obstacles and therefore slowed the granting of lawful permanent residence, temporary visas, and U.S. citizenship. International students and scholars have been targeted for expressing their political opinions, many newcomers face extensive vetting of their social media activity and medical history, and hefty new fees and visa bonds have caused some would-be immigrants and visitors to rethink plans to come to the United States. Slower legal immigration will likely affect labor markets, local economies, and the broader economic outlook for years to come, with the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and the Congressional Budget Office already reporting negative effects and potential future implications.

This article reviews the changes to U.S. immigration policy during the first year of the second Trump term….

Source: Unleashing Power in New Ways: Immigration in the First Year of Trump 2.0

Ottawa’s shutting-out of startup founders is shutting down Canada’s future

Hard to square “rigorous integrity checks” with speed in decision making. Government generally has a poor record in assessing business immigration programs:

…We are not the only country wrestling with the politics of immigration. Even as the United States turns inward and raises barriers for skilled workers and entrepreneurs, its technology dominance still rests disproportionately on immigrant founders and their teams. 

This should be Canada’s moment: to position ourselves as the destination of choice for the world’s builders, especially in the sectors that will determine our economic sovereignty – artificial intelligence, quantum computing, defence and dual‑use technologies, life sciences, energy transition and advanced manufacturing.

It is not too late to correct course. Ottawa must treat the shutdown of the Start‑up Visa Program not as a restart but a fast pivot. That pivot must include a fast‑track, by‑invitation pathway for founders with credible backing to build from Canada, with rigorous integrity checks rather than paralyzing backlogs. Anything less will send the most ambitious entrepreneurs elsewhere.

Yung Wu is a serial entrepreneur and the former chief executive of MaRS Discovery District.

Source: Ottawa’s shutting-out of startup founders is shutting down Canada’s future