Proportion of women in the House of Commons dips, with slight rise in minority MPs

Latest article with preliminary analysis of 2025 election results in terms of MP diversity:

…In Canada, Indigenous representation in the House also dipped slightly, according to an analysis by Andrew Griffith, a fellow of the Environics Institute and a former director-general in the federal immigration department. He found that 3.3 per cent of elected MPs are Indigenous after this election, down from 3.5 per cent in 2021. 

However, there was a slight rise in the number of visible minority MPs. Mr. Griffith found that their representation stands at 18.1 per cent now, compared with 15.7 per cent at the last election. 

“We appear to have reached a plateau with respect to women and Indigenous peoples MPs,” he said in an e-mail.

“On the other hand, the combination of growth in immigration and visible minorities, matched with most political party candidates being visible minorities in ridings with high numbers of visible minorities and immigrants, continues the trend of increases in their representation.”…

Source: Proportion of women in the House of Commons dips, with slight rise in minority MPs

Number of female candidates drops across parties: study

Results of the preliminary analysis by Jerome Black and myself:

…Mr. Griffith, who has carried out similar research for previous elections, said he was surprised to see the drop in the proportion of female candidates, particularly among the Conservatives. They had a lot of candidates in place soon after the election was called, whereas the NDP and Liberals were later with nominations, he said.

“It’s surprising that the number of women standing for the Conservatives actually declined very significantly: a third of the nominations in 2021 to not even a quarter of the nominations in 2025,” he said. “Conservatives actually made a concerted effort to recruit visible minorities, but they seem to have dropped the ball with respect to women.”

He said some women may have been deterred from standing by the rise in abuse directed toward female politicians.

“It’s certainly part of it,” he said. “But I’m still surprised at such a dramatic decline.”

Source: Number of female candidates drops across parties: study

Experts urge parties to rethink immigration priorities

Perspectives from economist Mikal Skuterud, focussing on need to focus on high skilled immigrants, Gauri Sreenivasan, CCR, on refugee concerns and myself on the opportunities for rethinking immigration policies and priorities. pdf link not password protected.

Source: Experts urge parties to rethink immigration priorities, pdf

Saunders: Canada’s border is broken, but not the way Trump thinks. Here’s how the next government can fix it

Good long and thoughtful commentary:

…There has to be a sensible Canadian space between Trumpist mass deportations and closed borders on one hand, and on the other the current reality of a set of policies and institutions that make Canadian governments unable to control who enters the country.

Luckily, there seems to be an awkward political consensus around this. Both the federal Conservatives and the major Liberal leadership candidates appear to be united (though they might not admit it) around a common set of aspirations: a return to a focus on permanent, citizenship-focused immigration of intact families and a reduction of temporary migration to a minimum; immigration targets tied to economic conditions and population-growth needs; a refugee policy driven by genuine humanitarian need and not by irregular border crossings or opportunism.

Those goals won’t easily be attained with mere tinkering of the sort that governments this century have engaged in. Rather, they require a set of systemwide reforms. After interviewing a dozen former immigration officials and experts, I found a strong consensus on the changes that would make the system work:…

Source: Canada’s border is broken, but not the way Trump thinks. Here’s how the next government can fix it

Todd: Should birthright citizenship, banned in most countries but not Canada, be a human right?

More on birth tourism, based on some of my analysis:

Birth tourism” is on the rise again in Canada.

In the past year, 5,219 babies were born in Canada to travelling foreign nationals.

In B.C., 102 non-resident births were at Richmond General Hospital; 99 were at Surrey Memorial; 97 were at Vancouver’s St. Paul’s Hospital; and another 85 were at Children’s Hospital, according to Andrew Griffith, a former senior director in Canada’s immigration department who is now an immigration analyst.

At the same time that Griffith was releasing data showing non-resident births are returning to 2019 levels in an article published in Policy Options last month, entrepreneurs in Richmond said there has been an uptick in inquiries from women in China and other parts of East Asia who want to have their babies in Canada now that President Donald Trump aims to end birthright citizenship in the U.S.

The ethical debate over birthright citizenship, also known as jus soli (right of the soil), is coming to a head as Democratic U.S. states challenge Trump’s initiative and non-resident births rise again in Canada with the easing of COVID-19 restrictions.

Data from the Canadian Institute for Health Information shows the percentage of non-resident births in Canada fell from 1.6 per cent of total births in 2019-20 to 0.7 per cent in 2020-22. It rebounded to 1.5 per cent in 2023-24.

A majority of countries forbid birthright citizenship, including virtually every country in Europe, Asia and Africa. It’s permitted in only about 33 nations.

Even though 160 years ago the U.S. enshrined the 14th Amendment to protect the constitutional rights of those born on its soil, particularly former slaves, Griffith said Canada’s laws on birthright citizenship could be more easily changed than in the U.S.

While most countries mandate that a child’s citizenship depends on the passport held by the parents, Canadian academics argue that birthright citizenship should be a “global human right.”

Today, one of the most common rebuttals to such a stand is that babies who receive citizenship only because they were born on Canadian territory are jumping the country’s immigration queue, which others must go through to qualify to become permanent residents and access universal education, health care and social services.

Two Canadian scholars who have obtained federal government grants to research birth tourism insist it must be protected in the name of “reproductive autonomy.” They say those who oppose it are “demonizing” and “criminalizing” non-resident pregnant people.

University of Carleton law professor Megan Gaucher believes critics of birthright citizenship are engaging in “settler-colonial” thinking that reflects “long-standing racist ideas.”

Ottawa’s Gaucher co-wrote an article on the subject with Lindsay Larios, an assistant professor of social work at the University of Manitoba who has obtained a federal grant to do collaborative research on birthright citizenship with B.C.’s Migrant Workers Centre.

Gaucher and Larios maintain attempts to portray birth tourists “as queue jumpers and citizenship fraudsters ignores the real-life obstacles they encounter within the health-care system and the Canadian immigration system.”

Larios argues that opponents who say offspring shouldn’t get citizenship because of their birth parent’s “precarious” immigration status are ignoring what she calls “reproductive justice.”

Opposition to the position set out by Gaucher and Larios has come from politicians, and medical and immigration professionals.

Rather than being disadvantaged, Griffith said, most women who engage in birth tourism come to North America with enough wealth to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for travel, accommodation (including in so-called “birth hotels”), and hospital deliveries.

The Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada has said birth tourism needs further investigation. And Dr. Jon Barrett, head of obstetrics at McMaster University in Hamilton, has written that Canadian hospitals should have “absolutely zero tolerance” for it.

Doctors “should unite in a firm stand against birth tourism,” Barrett said, arguing it stresses Canada’s health-care system and puts pregnant foreign nationals at risk of being “fleeced by unethical individuals.”

An Angus Reid Institute poll found that in 2019, when Richmond Hospital was the epicentre of Canada’s birth tourism industry, that two-of-three Canadians believed “a child born to parents who are in this country on tourist visas should not be granted Canadian citizenship.”

Births to non-residents now make up 6.9 per cent of all deliveries at Richmond Hospital, which is down from 24 per cent before the pandemic. Despite this year’s jump in inquiries from people seeking to have babies in Canada because of Trump’s threat, Griffith believes the overall decline over the last few years at Richmond Hospital is owed largely to China restricting its citizens’ travel.

There is no data on whether international students in B.C. have given birth in hospitals here. International students in this province can join the Medical Services Plan by paying $75 a month. In Ontario, said Griffith, some non-resident mothers who have paid for hospital deliveries could be foreign students as that province doesn’t allow them to receive subsidized health care.

In light of a lack of government oversight of birth tourism, Griffith said there is need for more research, including like one study from Calgary. Four-of-five non-resident mothers who delivered babies in that city said their primary motivation was to give their newborn Canadian citizenship. The largest group, one-of-four, was from Nigeria.

Given the ethical issues at stake, Griffith suggests Canada, whose citizenship rules aren’t bound by a Constitution like in the U.S., take a responsible middle way in regard to birthright citizenship.

To reduce the chances of exploitation, he recommends Canada follow the lead of Australia, which allows a baby born on its soil to receive citizenship only if at least one of the child’s parents already has that status.

Source: Should birthright citizenship, banned in most countries but not Canada, be a human right?

Canadian Immigration Tracker – December 2024 update and full-year comparisons

Full Year 2024 annual comparisons

  • Permanent residents admissions: From 449,00 in 2023 to 482,000 in 2024 or 7.3 percent.   
  • TR2PR (Those already in Canada): From 244,000 in 2023 to 247,000 in 2024 or 1.3 percent. 
  • TRs-IMP: From 874,000 in 2023 to 746,000 in 2024 or -14.7 percent. Significant decrease in PGWP and spouses
  • TRs-TFWP: From 191,000 in 2023 to 198,000 in 2024 or 3.6 percent.
  • Students: From 709,000 in 2023 to 540,000 in 2024 or -28.9 percent. Post-secondary only: Decline from 544,000 to 387,000 or 23.9 percent.
  • Asylum Claimants: From 149,000 in 2023 to 175,000 in 2024 or 17.5 percent.
  • Citizenship: From 377,000 in 2023 to 372,000 in 2024 or -1.3 percent.
  • Visitor Visas: From 1,846,000 in 2023 to 1,478,000 in 2024 or -19.9 percent.
  • Note settlement services and citizenship application numbers for 2024 requested and will post when received.

Canadian Immigration Tracker – December 2024 update and full-year comparisons

Canadian Immigration Tracker – November 2024

Highlights:

  • PR Admissions: Increase from 34,360 in October to 36,820 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2022 in parentheses): Economic – PNP 25.0% (22.8%), Economic – Federal 38.2% (51.6%), Family 52.4% (84.0%), Refugees -19.3% (-12.6%)
    • Applications: Given time delays in entering application data, am using a six month time lag. Decrease from 54,001 in April to 44,040 in May. May year-over-year change (change from 2020): -10.7% (81.9%).
    • Express Entry and Arrima Invitations to Apply: Decline from 5,507 in November (0 Arrima) to 2,561 in December (0 Arrima). December year-over-year change (change from 2022): -84.2% (23.3%)
    • TR to PRs transition (i.e., those already in Canada): Increase from 13,135 in October (38.2% of all PRs) to 17,390 in November (47.2% of all PRs). November year-over-year change (change from 2022): 65.3% (347.0%)
  • Temporary Residents:
    • TRs/IMP: Decrease from 60,945 in October to 48,560 in November. November year-over-year (change from 2022): Agreements: 29.0% (-30.4%), Canadian Interests: -11.4% (-7.5%), Other IMP Participants -47.7% (105.2%), Not stated -39.8% (-43.4%)
      • IMP by occupation code: not meaningful given only about 10 percent have NOC codes
    • TRs/TFWP: Stable from 11,860 in October to 11,540. November year-over-year change (change from 2022): Caregivers 12.2% (19.6%), Agriculture -1.1% (-20.0%) and Other LMIA 6.3% (32.6%).
    • TRs by occupation code (September, updated quarterly): 39.8% low-wage (D), year-over-year (D) change (change from 2022) 14.0% (157.4%)
  • Students: Decrease from 32,100 in October to 28,470 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2023): All -3.1% (22.0%), post-secondary -1.4% (22.7%)
    • Applications: Decrease from 40,846 in October to 39,759 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2021): -53.6% (-49.3%)
    • Web Get a study permit: Increase from 29,396 in October to 51,416 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2022): -0.1% (-25.0%) (December data not released)
  • Asylum Claimants: Decrease from 14,155 in October to 12,590 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2022): -22.9% (28.5%)
    • Irregular arrivals (Roxham Road etc): Increase from 62 in October to 79 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2021): 21.5% (-97.9%).
  • Settlement Services (2023): Increase from 1,941,480 in 2022 to 2,960,330 in 2023 (most recent data, services, not unique clients). 2023 year-over-year (change from 2021): 52.5% (53.3%)
  • Citizenship: Stable from 26,082 in October to 25,234 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2022): -28.9% (-29.1%)
    • Applications (2023): From 264,231 in 2022 to 317,538 in 2023. 2023 Year-over-year change (change from 2021): 20.2%% (36.3%)
  • Visitor Visas: Stable from 102,304 in October to 100,845 in November. November year-over-year change (change from 2022): -34.2% (-24.9%).

https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/canadian-immigration-tracker-key-slides-november-2024-pdf/274868539

Canadian Immigration Tracker – October 2024 Update

Year to date highlights:

  • Permanent residents admissions: Increase January-October from 404,000 in 2023 to 413,000 in 2024 or 2.3 percent.   
  • TR2PR (Those already in Canada): Increase January-October from 212,000 in 2023 to 219,000 in 2024 or 3.3 percent. 
  • TRs-IMP: Decrease January-October from 757,000 in 2023 to 648,000 in 2024 or -14.5 percent.
  • TRs-TFWP: Decrease January-October from 172,000 in 2023 to 165,000 in 2024 or -4.0 percent.
  • Students: Decrease January-October from 570,000 in 2023 to 461,000 in 2024 or -19.2 percent. Post-secondary only: Decline from 431,000 to 328,000 or 23.9 percent.
  • Asylum Claimants: Increase January-October from 117,000 in 2023 to 149,000 in 2024 or 27.3 percent.
  • Citizenship: Increase January-October from 317,000 in 2023 to 329,000 in 2024 or 3.7 percent.
  • Visitor Visas: Decrease January-October from 1,567,000 in 2023 to 1,290,000 in 2024 or -17.7 percent.

https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/canadian-immigration-tracker-october-2024-pdf/274022459

COVID-19 Immigration Effects – September 2024 Third Quarter

Highlights (some data not yet posted on open data)

  • Permanent residents admissions: Increase January-September from 370,000 in 2023 to 379,000 in 2024 or 2.3 percent.   
  • TR2PR (Those already in Canada): Increase January-September from 199,000 in 2023 to 205,000 in 2024 or 3.3 percent. 
  • TRs-IMP: Decrease January-September from 681,000 in 2023 to 584,000 in 2024 or -14.2 percent.
  • TRs-TFWP: Decrease January-September from 160,000 in 2023 to 153,000 in 2024 or -4.0 percent.
  • Students: Decrease January-September from 544,000 in 2023 to 428,000 in 2024 or -21.3 percent. 
  • Asylum Claimants: Increase January-September from 100,000 in 2023 to 135,000 in 2024 or 34.6 percent.
  • Citizenship: Increase from 33,179 in June to 36,070 in July. July year-over-year change (change from 2022): 15.4% (25.0%). Year-to date 2024 compared to 2023 increase of 16 percent OPEN DATA NOT UPDATED FOR AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER
  • Visitor Visas: Increase from 118,402 in June to 127,399 in July. July year-over-year change (change from 2022): -19.7% (37.6%). OPEN DATA NOT UPDATED FOR AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER

https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/canadian-immigration-tracker-key-slides-september-2024/273373580

What citizenship applications tell us about policy implementation

My latest in The Hill Times. Password protected so here is the analysis (tables simplified in the HT):  

Analysis of citizenship applications between 2005 and 2023 reveals how the previous Conservative government’s pledge to make citizenship “harder to get and easier to lose” resulted in significant delays and reduced approval rates before political realities resulted in mitigating those impacts. The Liberal government reversion to previous residency and other requirements cemented a return to historic approval rates and processing times.

This analysis looks at four periods, roughly aligned to Census periods:

  • 2005-10: During this period, the new Discover Canada citizenship study guide was introduced in 2009 with more detailed content and more complex language, along with a more rigorous knowledge test based upon the guide and more objective language assessments. The policy intent was in part to reduce the previous approval rate of approximately 95 percent to between 80 and 85 percent (“harder to get”).
  • 2011-15: The impact of these 2009-10 operational policy changes was felt during this period. In addition, the Conservative government passed C-24 (Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act) in 2014, expanding knowledge testing and language assessment to those between 14 and 64 years old compared to the previous 18 and 54. Fees increased from $200 to $630 per adult or over $1,400 for a family of four in 2015. The fee increases may have been a Treasury Board condition in order to obtain funding to address a processing backlog.  Revocation provisions for “treason and terror” were included.
  • 2016-20: The election of a Liberal government resulted in the reversal of knowledge and language assessment to those between 18 and 64 years old and removed the revocation provisions, among other changes. The Liberal party’s 2019 and 2021 election platforms committed to waiving citizenship fees but were not implemented. Similarly, successive ministers of immigration have noted plans for a revision to Discover Canada but the current version remains in effect.
  • 2021-24: The citizenship oath was updated with a reference to indigenous treaty rights in 2021. The pandemic resulted in the virtual shutdown of citizenship ceremonies for a number of months and a shift to the majority of ceremonies taking place on line. The proposed repeal of the first generation limit in C-71 and replacement by a time-unlimited residency requirement would result in an unknown number of additional Canadian citizens.  

 Application data by gender, immigration category or country of birth highlights the dramatic initial impact of the policy changes of the Conservative government and how these were relaxed by the Conservatives themselves before having virtually no impact after a number of years under the Liberals. The same pattern applies no matter what the variable, the 2011-15 period was the worst period in terms of delays and approval rates.

Figure 1 provides the overview by period highlighting that in general, women applicants were granted citizenship faster than men and had higher approval rages, save for the 2011-15 period. The percentage not granted citizenship rose to over ten percent in 2012 and 2013, before recovering to just over seven percent in the last years of the Conservative government. Moreover, only about 20 percent of applications were processed within the service standard of one year 2010-13. Apart from the pandemic years 2021-22, service standards were met close to 80 percent of the time.

Figure 2 provides the category comparison, highlighting lower refusal rates for economic class and particularly relatively higher refusal rates immigrants for family and refugee class during the first years of the Liberal government, given that legislation reversing the Conservative age range requirement for knowledge and language assessment only came into force October 2017. But since then, refusal rates are negligible, less than three percent, or lower than 2005.

Figure 3 shows the impact on the five largest immigration source countries, showing again the same overall pattern. Of particular note is the higher rate of Chinese rejections across most periods which may reflect weaker language fluency compared to the other large source countries. 

Concluding observations

This analysis highlights the impact that operational policy changes can have on citizenship, making naturalization harder or easier, particularly for family class and refugees. The effective relaxation of knowledge and language assessment in 2014-15 reflects high refusal rates were not politically tenable, particularly in the lead up to the 2015 election.

Application data suggests that immigrants delayed submitting applications 2016-17 once the Liberal government announced it would return to the previous 18 to 54 age requirements. The data also shows a drop in applications in 2020 reflecting applicants waiting for the government to implement its 2019 election commitment to eliminate citizenship fees.

Citizenship applicants pay attention to operational and legislative policy changes and adjust their application timing accordingly. 

It is unclear whether or not citizenship changes would be a priority for an expected Conservative government and whether it would want to revert to Harper-era policies. However, citizenship changes would likely be a lessor priority than immigration changes given changing public sentiment on immigration that reflecting debates and discussion on immigration’s impact on housing and healthcare. 

Moreover, the fact that the previous government had to soften its “harder to get” approach may provide a cautionary tale in terms of what may or may not be acceptable to immigrant-origin communities. 

Methodological notes

Data provided by IRCC, 2005 to April 2024.  This partial 2024 data included in overall 2021-24 numbers.

 Source: What citizenship applications tell us about policy implementation