Ndiaye: Voici pourquoi il est difficile – et peu souhaitable – de « fermer » le chemin Roxham

We will see what the SCC rules. But not convinced that the shutting or Roxham Road would have a minimal impact on numbers. The reason why over 95% choose Roxham is because of its convenience, relatively low risk and accessibility. Some are likely to weigh the risks accordingly and thus results in fewer irregular arrivals:

« Fermer » le chemin Roxham a été invoqué à maintes reprises ces dernières semaines, tant par des chroniqueurs que des élus, créant même un imbroglio entre la ministre québécoise de l’Immigration, Christine Fréchette, et son propre gouvernement caquiste. En 2022, un record de 50 000 demandeurs d’asile sont passés par le désormais célèbre chemin, qui relie la Montérégie et l’État de New York.

Ces demandeurs d’asile évitent les postes-frontières officiels entre le Canada et les États-Unis en raison de l’entente sur les tiers pays sûrs, signée en 2002 et entrée en vigueur en 2004. En vertu de cette entente, « les personnes qui entrent au Canada à un point d’entrée terrestre ne sont toujours pas admissibles à présenter une demande de statut de réfugié, et seront renvoyées aux États-Unis à moins qu’elles ne satisfassent à l’une des exceptions prévues dans l’Entente ».

Il y a en effet peu de chances qu’un demandeur d’asile puisse invoquer des persécutions aux États-Unis, un pays considéré comme « sûr ». De fait, sur les 62 113 demandes encore en instance devant la CISR en septembre 2022, seulement 274 considéraient les États-Unis comme pays de persécution.

La question qui se pose est la suivante : est-ce que l’entente sur les tiers pays sûrs pourrait être appliquée tout au long des 8 891 km qui nous séparent des États-Unis, afin de limiter le passage de ces demandeurs d’asile empruntant le chemin Roxham et d’autres chemins alternatifs ?

Du point de vue opérationnel, la réponse est non. Pas plus que le Québec ne peut fermer le chemin Roxham, car c’est le gouvernement fédéral qui a la compétence pour gérer les frontières canadiennes.

Par ailleurs, le Canada est soumis à des obligations résultant de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés : il ne peut renvoyer les demandeurs d’asile vers un pays où il existe un risque de torture. En vertu du droit international, le Canada a aussi ratifié la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés et la convention contre la torture, qui implique ce principe de non-refoulement à toute personne risquant la torture, des traitements inhumains ou dégradants.

Professeure de droit des migrations à l’UQÀM, je suis directrice de l’Observatoire sur les migrations internationales, les réfugiés, les apatrides et l’asile (OMIRAS). Je propose ici un survol de ce que disent les lois internationales sur l’accueil de réfugiés.

Devant la Cour suprême

La saga judiciaire pour invalider l’entente sur les tiers pays sûrs a débuté en 2007 devant la Cour fédérale, ensuite devant la Cour d’appel fédérale, et s’est finalisée en 2009 par un rejet de la Cour suprême.

Depuis 2020, avec l’arrivée de dizaines de milliers de demandeurs arrivant des États-Unis par des points d’entrée non officiels, une nouvelle demande a été introduite par Amnistie internationale, le Conseil canadien des Églises, le Conseil canadien pour les réfugiés et des demandeurs d’asile afin de faire invalider l’entente. À la suite de plusieurs aller-retour devant la justice, une demande d’autorisation d’appel a été introduite. Le 16 décembre 2022, la Cour suprême a accepté de recevoir la cause et de réviser l’entente. Il faudra donc attendre la décision de la plus haute juridiction canadienne sur la validité ou non de l’entente

Un droit garanti en droit international

Le Canada accueille un nombre infime des demandeurs d’asile dans le monde. Le HCR les estime à plus de 4,9 millions. À eux s’ajoutent les 25 millions de réfugiés et plusieurs autres millions de déplacés internes. La plupart vivent dans les pays limitrophes de leur pays d’origine, comme la Jordanie, la Turquie ou le Liban, au Moyen-Orient, la Colombie, en Amérique du Sud, ou l’Ouganda et le Kenya, en Afrique (continent qui accueille le plus grand nombre de réfugiés).

Ultimement, le Canada est obligé de laisser les gens disant fuir des persécutions présenter leurs demandes d’asile, un droit garanti par l’ONU. Toutes ces demandes d’asile doivent être jugées recevables avant d’être transmises à la Section de protection des réfugiés, compétente pour examiner les demandes de protection internationale au Canada. Si les demandes remplissent les critères, les personnes seront reconnues comme des réfugiées au Canada.

Migrants irréguliers et demandeurs d’asile

Il y a présentement un amalgame entre migrations irrégulières et accueil des demandeurs d’asile. Pour ces derniers, l’entente sur les tiers pays sûrs leur permet d’arriver au Canada à travers le chemin Roxham (à leurs risques et périls). L’invalidation de l’entente permettrait aux personnes disant fuir des persécutions de présenter leur demande d’asile en toute sécurité au Canada, quel que soit leur lieu d’arrivée. Notons que des organisations de défense des migrants, dont Amnistie internationale, relatent des pratiques qui enfreignent les droits humains des demandeurs d’asile aux États-Unis.

Pour les migrations irrégulières, le Canada dispose d’un Programme d’aide mondiale aux migrants irréguliers (PAMMI) et des dispositions législatives pour éradiquer l’immigration irrégulière. Le Québec devra continuer la collaboration avec le gouvernement fédéral afin de lutter efficacement contre les migrations irrégulières notamment en ciblant les causes réelles de ces déplacements (inégalités économiques, changements climatiques, conflits et violences dans le monde).

D’autres chemins ouvriront

Le chemin Roxham présente des enjeux complexes. Mais il faut le situer dans son contexte mondial, avec la présence de plus de 100 millions de personnes en exil dans le monde.

Devant l’afflux de plus en plus de réfugiés, plus de 68 % des Québécois souhaitent la fermeture du chemin Roxham. Les pressions sur le système se font grandissantes. Il en coûte 20 millions de plus par mois à Québec en prestation d’aide sociale, notamment en raison du fait que le Québec accueille 64 % de ces demandes d’asile au Canada et que le Canada tarde à délivrer des permis de travail.

Malgré cela, il n’est pas pertinent de fermer le chemin Roxham, car d’autres points d’entrée le remplaceront, exposant les demandeurs d’asile à davantage de risques et de dangers. L’exemple de l’Union européenne est révélateur : dès qu’une route se ferme, d’autres encore plus dangereuses s’ouvrent et le nombre de personnes décédées ou disparues grimpent. À cela s’ajoutent les multiples violations des droits humains dont font l’objet ces millions d’hommes, de femmes et d’enfants fuyant les guerres et les persécutions.

Source: Voici pourquoi il est difficile – et peu souhaitable – de « fermer » le chemin Roxham

ICYMI – Hébert: Justin Trudeau’s anti-Islamophobia disaster reveals a government dangerously out of touch with voters

Of note, searing yet valid:

By appointing Amira Elghawaby as his lead representative on the Islamophobia file, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has thrown the equivalent of a political grenade into his Quebec trenches.

The damage to his party and to the cause she is tasked with advancing could be consequential.

Here is an early assessment.

At week’s end, Elghawaby’s appointment had been disavowed by most of the leading figures of Quebec’s political class.

The ranks of those who believe Trudeau should reconsider his choice extend well beyond the fans of Quebec’s controversial law on securalism and its attending ban on religious vestments in selected public service workplaces.

Take former NDP leader Thomas Mulcair. Throughout his tenure, he had been a top Quebec anti-Islamophobia advocate.

His uncompromising defence of religious and minority rights has come at some political cost. In the 2015 election, his denunciation of the Conservatives’ so-called niqab ban took a toll on NDP fortunes in Quebec. 

In his Montreal Gazette column this week, Mulcair argued Elghawaby, a former Star columnist, was the wrong person for the job. That is also the position of the provincial Liberals, the party with the most diverse base. (Mulcair then stated in a subsequent column he was willing to accept her apology at face value. The Quebec Liberals did not.) 

No one in Quebec seriously expected Trudeau to appoint a special representative on anti-Islamophobia who was a supporter of Bill 21. But, by the same token, few expected the prime minister to appoint someone who had burned her bridges with Quebecers on her way to this new role.

A lot of the media commentary this week has focused on Elghawaby’s misrepresentation of a poll to shore up her assertion that most supporters of Bill 21 are Islamophobic.

But chances are her apology for an ill-thought-out column would have found more takers if it had not been part of a larger pattern.

The latter suggests either an abysmal ignorance of Quebec history or a blatant indifference to Canada’s less-than-glorious past treatment of its francophone minority.

In a since-deleted tweet, Elghawaby wrote that assertions to the effect French-Canadians had been oppressed and seriously discriminated against under the British rule made her want “to throw up.”

Coming from someone who lives in Ontario — a province that once outlawed any teaching in the French language — that’s a rich comment.

Should she develop an appetite for facts, Trudeau’s representative may want to acquaint herself with the findings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Alternatively, she might want to read up on the deportation of Canada’s Acadian community.

But whether she does or not, it will likely be too little, too late.

Given her baggage, it will be hard for Elghawaby to be much of an asset to Quebec’s anti-Islamophobia forces.

Moving on to Trudeau. He and his Liberals have just been on the receiving end of the biggest Quebec backlash of his tenure as prime minister. 

By all available indications, the prime minister was only aware of some of Elghawaby’s musings about Quebec prior to her appointment. He may not have been briefed about the vomit tweet.

What is certain is that, notwithstanding any after-the-fact apology, anyone who had cavalierly dismissed the historical grievances of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples would not have been appointed to a federal bridge-building role. 

It sometimes seems the due diligence approach of this Prime Minister’s Office to the vetting of high-profile appointments is to dismiss potentially inconvenient facts rather than dig into them.

On that score, the most glaring example remains Julie Payette’s elevation to the role of governor-general. 

In this case, the tendency seems to have been compounded by a serious PMO disconnect from Quebec.

If there is someone on Trudeau’s staff with a solid Quebec antenna and the influence to draw attention to red flags, he or she must have taken January off.

And if such a person does not currently exist, prudence would have required turning instead to his Quebec ministers for advance feedback on the planned appointment.

Judging by the stunned reaction of the prime minister’s Quebec lieutenant, Pablo Rodriguez, that did not happen.

This latest mess comes on a week when an Abacus poll found the Conservative party with a solid lead on the Liberals in national voting intentions. 

For months, all polls have shown that, among the larger provinces, Quebec was most responsible for keeping Trudeau’s party competitive with the Conservatives. The Liberals can only hope that won’t change as a result of this week’s events.

In the larger picture, the Abacus poll found that 75 per cent of Canadians do not believe the current government is focused enough on the top-of-mind cost-of-living crisis. The numbers on health care were not much better for the government.

Against that background, a Liberal week spent on the defensive on the divisive front of identity politics can only drive home the opposition’s message that on the issues that matter most to voters these days, Trudeau’s government is missing in action.

Source: Hébert: Justin Trudeau’s anti-Islamophobia disaster reveals a government dangerously out of touch with voters

McWhorter: Police Brutality Is Not Always About Race

A reminder:

The brutal killing of Tyre Nichols by Memphis cops horrified and infuriated many Americans, not least because it was another in what has been an endless litany of Black men and boys killed by police officers in America: George Floyd, Eric Garner, Philando Castile, Tamir Rice, Michael Brown and literally thousands of names less well known. There is one confounding detail in Nichols’s death, however. The five policemen who mercilessly beat the life out of him were all Black.

Thus, to understand the full tragedy of Tyre Nichols, it is important to ask hard questions about the culture and behavior of police officers — including grappling with the fact that whatever role race played in Nichols’s death, it was more complicated than the racist-white-cop-kills-Black-man framework into which we typically sort such horrific episodes. One possibility that needs further exploration is the role that poverty plays in determining the victims of police killings — a characteristic that overlaps with but is obviously distinct from race.

Much of the conversation about police violence in recent years has been through a lens of systemic racism, white cops and antiracism reform goals. But a man (or a woman) who is killed by a police officer merits our attention and response, regardless of the race of either victim or killer. There has long been a theory afoot that hiring more Black cops would result in fewer shootings of Black civilians. But there is little evidence that this intuitive solution has any meaningful effect. (It’s worth noting here that there is substantially more readily available data regarding the race of victims of police violence than that of the perpetrators.)

More than one study has suggested that the difference in likelihood between white and Black cops killing Black people is much smaller than one might suppose. Expert observers on the subject regularly concur, and it is a commonplace in Black community discussions that one cannot necessarily expect any particular clemency from Black officers in tough situations. The Memphis Police Department is 58 percent Black and has a Black police chief; that did not prevent the horrific acts of violence perpetrated on Nichols.

As Duane Loynes Sr., an assistant professor of urban and Africana studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, told The Los Angeles Times’s Jaweed Kaleem, “Here’s a dirty little secret: Studies indicate that Black officers are just as brutal and at times even more brutal against Black bodies as their white counterparts.”

The point is not that we don’t have a grievous problem but rather that the problem is not exclusively racist white cops. It’s cops, period. (An important note: When it comes to nonlethal mistreatment, as opposed to police shootings, studies demonstrate the existence of outright racial bias. This is very much a problem but a very different problem from police killings.)

The way we are trained to view the situation is understandable but outdated. As recently as the 1970s and 1980s, cops killed people — Black and white alike — at much higher rates in major cities than they do now, as the criminologist Peter Moskos has shown. I grew up in the Philadelphia of that era, where Mayor Frank Rizzo openly condoned cops’ brutality against Black people. By morbid coincidence, I saw the gruesome videotaped beating of Nichols shortly after I rewatched Melvin Van Peebles’s pioneering 1971 film “Sweet Sweetback’s Baadasssss Song.” In the movie, Van Peebles plays a Black man on the run from racist white cops whose shameless, bloodletting brutality roughly corresponded to what some Black people of the period actually experienced. A lot of time has passed since then, but the way we discuss police brutality against Black people today can sometimes make it sound as if there is no difference between the situation Van Peebles depicted — of marauding, openly racist cops — and the one we face today.

Yet white Americans are also killed by police officers in appalling numbers — many more, overall, than Black Americans, owing to the fact that the latter make up only about 14 percent of the U.S. population. In 2022, The Washington Post’s database on cop killings documented that of 755 victims whose race was known, 225 were Black and 389 were white.

Because casual and sometimes lethal violence against Black people by cops is part of our shameful and still recent national narrative, names like those of the victims I cited earlier sometimes become national news stories. But the media rarely even covers police killings of white people, which don’t fit so neatly into that existing narrative.

So we largely missed the story that in 2015 in Paradise, Calif., a white officer, Patrick Feaster, shot a white man, Andrew Thomas, as he was getting out of the S.U.V. he had crashed during a pursuit, even as Thomas’s wife lay gravely injured on the ground at the scene. The parallel with what happened to Nichols is ghastly, as is that between Floyd’s murder and what happened in 2016 to Tony Timpa, a white man in Dallas. Although Timpa had requested police officers’ help because he was off his medication, he was killed when they pinned him to the ground as he called out desperately. It was recorded on the officers’ body cams. Members of Timpa’s family have contacted me wondering why the media had so little interest in what happened to him; last year, the officer who had pinned him was promoted.

A common response here is to note that nevertheless, police officers kill unarmed Black people at more than three times the rate they kill unarmed white people and that this disproportionate rate of Black killings demonstrates that racism affects whether cops kill. But this assumption seems oversimplified. One reason is that poverty also helps determine whether — and in what way, with what results — one encounters the cops.

The police are called to, as well as directed to, poorer neighborhoods more often than to middle-class or affluent ones. Poverty can nudge a person into criminal activities — including intrinsically violent ones, such as the illegal drug trade — that are far more likely to lead to dangerous encounters with cops. It is also not an accident that so many of these gruesome killings by cops happen when someone flees after being stopped because he already has an outstanding warrant. Such warrants are frequently outstanding as a result of poverty.

And in a striking parallel, unarmed Black people are not only more than three times as likely as white people to be killed by a cop but also more than twice as likely to be poor. In 2021 the poverty rate for white Americans was 8.1 percent, while for Black Americans, it was 19.5 percent.

We could propose that the match between these statistics bears no relevance to the issue of police violence and racism and dismiss them as a coincidence. But this would be willfully resistant to examining the significance of patterns in a way that no one would even venture in drawing parallels between, for example, poverty rates and obesity.

Police killings of unarmed or unthreatening American citizens are a national disgrace and one that requires action. But action requires comprehension, and the simplest explanation — “racist white cops kill Black people” — is clearly often not the correct one.

Source: Police Brutality Is Not Always About Race

Dutrisac: Visas et immigration: y a-t-il un ministre responsable?

Bonne question? Malheureusement, trop d’exemples:

À la fin août de 2022, le ministre fédéral de l’Immigration, Sean Fraser, donnait l’assurance que les inacceptables délais pour la délivrance d’un visa de visiteur au Canada seraient considérablement réduits à compter d’octobre de la même année.

Le ministre faisait valoir que son ministère, Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada (IRCC), embaucherait 1250 nouveaux fonctionnaires afin de régler « d’ici la fin de l’année » les importants arriérés dans la production de visas et de documents relatifs à des demandes d’immigration.

Or, comme l’a rapporté Le Devoir la semaine dernière, les délais pour obtenir un visa n’ont pas diminué ; bien au contraire, ils ont explosé. Entre l’engagement du ministre Fraser et janvier 2023, les délais, tels qu’ils ont été rendus publics par IRCC, se sont allongés pour 179 des 195 pays dont les citoyens doivent se munir d’un visa pour entrer au Canada. Et l’attente est franchement surréaliste. Quelques exemples : un an et demi pour la Tanzanie, au lieu de 64 jours l’été dernier, quelque 500 jours pour le Honduras ou le Nicaragua, alors que l’attente oscillait autour de 80 jours. Rappelons que le délai normal pour la délivrance d’un visa de visiteur par IRCC est de 14 jours.

Les explications du ministère ne sont pas des plus limpides : les fonctionnaires traitent des arriérés qui existent depuis longtemps. Une part de ces phénoménaux arriérés a été constituée pendant la pandémie. Le délai par pays, tel qu’il est affiché sur le site du ministère, dépend du temps qu’il a fallu pour traiter 80 % des demandes dans un intervalle de deux à quatre mois. IRCC a prévenu Le Devoir que ses chiffres « peuvent être faussés par des valeurs aberrantes ». Pas étonnant que des avocats qui assistent des étrangers dans leur démarche se plaignent du manque de fiabilité du tableau colligé par le ministère. Quelles que soient les justifications d’Ottawa, ces délais, tout en reposant sur des données douteuses, sont inadmissibles.

Selon le cabinet du ministre, bien que les chiffres se détériorent, les choses s’améliorent ; la capacité de traitement d’IRCC est passée de 180 000 demandes de visas par mois avant la pandémie à 260 000 en novembre dernier.

Sean Fraser est à la tête d’un ministère dysfonctionnel. À l’heure actuelle, il y a plus de 2 millions de demandes de tout ordre en attente au ministère, que ce soit pour des permis de travail, l’octroi de la résidence permanente, des décisions relatives aux demandeurs d’asile et à leur statut de réfugié, les demandes de visas, etc.

Selon une note de service interne d’IRCC, datée du début de décembre, dont le Globe and Mail a obtenu copie, le ministère est prêt à prendre des mesures draconiennes pour se sortir de ce magma kafkaïen où croupissent plus de 700 000 demandes de visas. Selon une des options envisagées, des exigences d’admissibilité tomberaient : le demandeur n’aurait plus à convaincre un agent d’immigration qu’il retournera dans son pays après son séjour (occuper un emploi, posséder une propriété ou des actifs financiers et avoir de la famille dans son pays d’origine) ni à en fournir des preuves. Seule la vérification relative à la sécurité et à l’absence de casier judiciaire demeurerait. Pour se sortir la tête de l’eau, le ministère est prêt à renoncer à assumer ses responsabilités. C’est tout un aveu d’incurie.

Cette négligence n’est pas sans conséquences. On peut penser aux pertes économiques que subit l’industrie touristique. Mais là n’est pas le plus important. Des milliers d’immigrants ne peuvent pas recevoir la visite de leurs proches restés dans leur pays d’origine. Ou s’ils y arrivent, c’est après des mois et des mois de retard et d’incertitude. Pour un pays qui se veut un modèle d’accueil pour ses immigrants, ce laxisme administratif envoie un mauvais message et nuit à sa réputation sur la scène internationale.

Les échanges culturels sont perturbés, tout comme les rencontres internationales qui se déroulent au Québec. Les conférences et colloques universitaires, qui comptent sur la présence de sommités en provenance de l’étranger, en pâtissent. Comme l’a rapporté Le Devoir, une conférence, organisée par l’Université de Montréal et, de surcroît, subventionnée par le gouvernement fédéral, pourrait être reportée parce que des chercheurs invités ne peuvent obtenir leur visa en temps utile. L’organisateur désespère de voir débarquer à Montréal des experts du Sénégal, du Maroc et du Cameroun. Pour un citoyen sénégalais, le temps d’attente est de 462 jours, confirme IRCC. La situation affecte non seulement les activités de recherche, mais aussi le rayonnement international de l’Université de Montréal, qui se veut l’université francophone la plus influente au monde.

Il existe un principe nommé responsabilité ministérielle : un ministre doit répondre de ses actions (ou de son inaction), mais aussi de celles de ses fonctionnaires. C’est un principe qu’on aurait avantage à se rappeler à Ottawa.

Source: Visas et immigration: y a-t-il un ministre responsable?

Mahboubi, Skuterud – The Unintended Consequences of Category-Based Immigrant Selection

Valid critique:

From: Parisa Mahboubi and Mikal Skuterud

To: Sean Fraser, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada

Date:  February 6, 2023

Re: The Unintended Consequences of Category-Based Immigrant Selection

Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) recently held consultations on plans aimed at giving the department more flexibility in how it prioritizes economic-class applicants for permanent residency.

The new rules will, in effect, free the immigration minister to bypass the existing system for selecting candidates, known as the Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS), to target applicants with particular “attributes” such as work experience in a particular occupation.

This may alleviate some labour shortages, but we see significant unintended consequences.

Leveraging immigration to boost average living standards in the population requires selecting immigrants whose Canadian earnings exceed average earnings in the pre-existing population, thereby pulling up average incomes and per capita GDP.

The CRS aims to achieve this by ranking and cream-skimming economic class candidates who have the highest expected Canadian earnings. This is estimated using data on the earnings of previous cohorts of immigrants who arrived with similar human capital characteristics. Of particular importance in the CRS calculation are education, age, language abilities, and Canadian work experience.    

Recent analysis using Statistics Canada survey and census data, as well as our own examination of immigrants’ income tax records (see Figure below,) provides encouraging evidence that the CRS has contributed to rising earnings for newcomers since its launch in January 2015.  

By prioritizing applicants’ occupations, IRCC hopes it can be more responsive to employer needs, as well as address Canada’s chronic labour shortages.

But accurately identifying labour market requirements and being sufficiently responsive is difficult, if not impossible. Tight labour markets can quickly become slack. By the time targeted immigrants arrive, their skills may no longer align with employer needs, thereby exacerbating long-standing mismatch issues between immigrant skills and job openings. For this reason, the CRS does not use specific occupational information in its calculation.

The raison d’être of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program, which allows Canadian businesses to employ guest workers on limited-term contracts, is to meet temporary labour-market shortages. The objective of our permanent immigration system, on the other hand, should be to drive new employment growth in high-productivity sectors that are intensive in their use of skills and new technologies.

Unfortunately, we increasingly have a system where our temporary and permanent immigration systems are focused on the same objective – satisfying employers’ current labour needs. The risk is that the overall immigration system fails to do anything well.

An important advantage of the CRS is its transparency. Candidates can determine their own scores using a simple online tool and IRCC reports cutoff scores in their bi-weekly draws allowing unsuccessful candidates to identify what’s needed to be selected. The category-based selection system that IRCC is proposing compromises this transparency by leaving screening criteria to the whims of the minister of the day. This risks increasing applicant confusion and frustration and increases the need for immigration consultants and lawyers to help applicants navigate the system. At worst, it drives applicants with the best outside options to other countries.

Allowing the ministers to determine which candidate attributes are prioritized also risks politicizing the process. Research shows that while temporary worker inflows in Canada are responsive to the intensity of corporate lobbying, the same has not been true for permanent immigration. One explanation is that ‘point systems’ like the CRS remove immigrant selection decision making from the political realm in the same way that the Bank of Canada’s inflation mandate keeps its interest rate decisions from being politicized. Look for that to change.  

In our view, prioritizing candidates’ occupational work experience in immigrant selection makes most sense in sectors where the competitive market mechanism to address labour shortages does not exist, such where wages are set by collective agreements or government regulation.

In these settings, labour shortages are less likely to induce the wage adjustments necessary to encourage job switching and training and education investments within the existing population. Chronic shortages of nurses and other healthcare workers are an important example.

Nonetheless, we question if it makes sense to prioritize applicants for permanent residency whose foreign work experience is in an occupation where credential recognition in Canada is problematic. It doesn’t really matter if credential recognition problems reflect genuine skill and competence issues, or the self-interested behaviour of professional associations. Either way, we are prioritizing applicants who will contribute relatively little to Canadian economic growth, thereby compromising the key objective of our economic immigration system.

In our view, IRCC’s planned reform of how it selects economic-class immigrants is just one step in a series of pandemic-era policies compromising the prioritization of skilled immigrants. The CRS has come to be seen by IRCC as a constraint rather than an effective quality-control mechanism. In prioritizing employers’ short-term labour needs, IRCC is being forced to lower the average CRS score of selected immigrants and, in turn, average expected earnings. The hard reality is that Canada’s newcomers continue to experience labour market challenges that are longstanding and exceptional. The risk is that the last decade’s significant gains will be undone.

Parisa Mahboubi is a senior policy analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute and Mikal Skuterud is professor of economics at the University of Waterloo. 

Source: Mahboubi, Skuterud – The Unintended Consequences of Category-Based Immigrant Selection

Usher: The EDI Hiring Bulge

Good analysis and myth destroying by Alex Usher:

A couple of days ago on the website Minding the Campus, a product of the National Association of Scholars (one of those Alan Bloom-loving revere-the-classics, free-exchange-of-ideas, but no-not-those-kinds-of-idea outfits) a research associate named John Sailer posted a list of academic jobs that were being advertised at The Ohio State University (you have to include the “the”. It’s a rule.) as an example of “political activism.”  Here’s the meat of the post:

[OSU’s] RAISE initiative (extends to fields that have little connection with DEI. The university is currently seeking three STEM professors—in chemistrymathematics, and physics—who will “study issues relevant to educational equity.” One cluster hire on the social determinants of health includes roles in medicine, nursing, and engineering. Successful candidates for these jobs must show “a demonstrated commitment to diversity and inclusive excellence” and submit “a brief DEI narrative describing commitment to improving inclusive excellence” and demonstrating how their research focuses on “improving health equity.”

Many of Ohio State’s humanities jobs, meanwhile, now focus exclusively on race. The history department currently lists just two positions: “Contemporary African American History” and “African American History to 1820.” The Department of Comparative Studies lists three: “Indigenous Knowledge,” “Race, Science, and Technology,” and “Race and Health Equity.” The Department of French and Italian is hiring only one professor, an “Assistant Professor of French and Francophone Studies with a specialization in Black France.”

The university’s indigenous studies cluster hire—which is independent of the RAISE initiative—includes a role in “Indigenous Feminisms,” calling for a professor who will study “gendered and sexualized disparities alongside the dispossessions of settler colonialism” and “the potentials of women- and two-spirit or queer-led innovations in preserving embattled minority and colonized food/health/body/eco cultures.” Another role in the cluster is more novel, “Indigenous Siberian Studies,” a scholar in the Department of Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures who will “explore questions about indigenous people’s knowledges and cultural practices” related to “race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality, im/mobility, health, food, and environment, in imperial/post-imperial, communist/post-communist, or comparative contexts.”

The argument here is an anti-EDI one, but it is different from the ones you usually see.  It is not “EDI is unjust reverse discrimination” as much as it is “EDI is changing and perhaps perverting the nature of academic disciplines.”   The argument was pitched to specialists, claiming that their specialty is changing and perhaps leaving them behind. 

So, has OSU been “captured” by people who want to make it Subaltern U?  Well, in the first place, caution is warranted because we don’t have a good picture of how many jobs are up for grabs at OSU.  The article refers to about 10 positions. My guess is that OSU – which is the fourth-largest institution by enrolment in the United States and over 2,000 permanent faculty members – hires over 100 academic staff a year.  Question number one about this set of examples therefore is: “how representative is this list?”  And if it represents just 10% of new staff, then why should anyone consider it a big deal?

In the second place: ask yourself whether all these positions are misguided in the way Sailer charges.  A French department that doesn’t cover francophone Africa would be very limited, given that’s where over half of all French-speaking people live.  Physics departments that aren’t looking for people who can lead outreach and support programs for Black students are increasingly rare these days.  Specializations in Indigenous Siberian Studies might sound a bit obscure, but there’s any number of Indigenous studies programs focusing on North America, so it’s not obvious to me why offering similar treatment to indigenous cultures in Russia is illegitimate from an academic POV, unless you start from the perspective that certain cultures aren’t worth studying (there is, admittedly, a question about whether a position in Indigenous Siberian Studies located in Columbus, Ohio will bring in the necessary students and research dollars to pay its way, but that’s the department Chair’s call). 

In any event, colour me unpersuaded that the examples Sailer draws on to represent a wave of “misguided priorities” at the institution.  The job descriptions are much less radical that the author seems to think, and there’s no sense here of whether the author is cherry-picking (for what it’s worth, the OSU program through which these scholars are being hired was designed to bring in 50 scholars between 2020 and 2030, which at an institution the size of OSU is peanuts).  It read like cherry-picking and not of a particularly sophisticated variety.  But what was interesting to me is the number of twitter accounts from people I would normally qualify as pretty sensible tut-tutting about “the state of academia” exposed by this piece.

And I kind of get it.  If one isn’t quite alive to the extent of selective argumentation going on here (at most universities, 10 appointments is a pretty big fraction of annual hiring), and one interprets this kind of change as being “the shape of things to come”, then one might conclude that a wide variety of academic fields are being threatened with radical change in the sense that the focus of inquiry is changing completely (e.g. from France to Africa in the case of the French Studies, from Moscow to Siberia in the case of Russian studies).  And loyalty to discipline is a consistent theme amongst academics. It’s not difficult to see why something that seemed to be an attempt to alter disciplinary foci might seem threatening.

But the evidence that this is a permanent shift is thin.  Academia goes through cycles.  Right now, the cycle is one where many institutions, across a wide range of disciplines, are either trying to reach out to undergraduates from under-represented groups, or incorporate non-Western perspectives, or both.  This is a long and ongoing process, mainly because demand for scholars who can do such outreach or conduct effective research in these areas presently outstrips current supply.  It is not about making universities totally devoted to Subaltern studies (though this is pretty clearly what the author of this piece wanted readers to think); it is about a one-time Big Push to make sure under-represented students and previously neglected areas of studies have a larger place in the academy – sufficiently large, in fact, that maintaining strength in these areas no longer requires special hiring initiatives but is “par for the course”. That’s necessarily going to create a “bulge” in hiring to bring numbers up to that level: significant in the short-term, but less so in the long-term.

Anyways, if you’re tempted to get angry or despondent about a hiring story like this, just remember: it’s very likely that the extent of the phenomenon is inflated, and even to the extent it is not, the duration of the phenomenon is probably limited too. 

Source: The EDI Hiring Bulge

ICYMI Globe Editorial: There’s a growing crisis at Roxham Road, and Ottawa doesn’t have a plan to fix it

Valid critique:

Is Canada in the midst of a border crisis? It’s hard to tell. Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, however, there was no doubt about it.

In 2017, a dramatic surge in the number of people entering Canada illegally on an uncontrolled rural road running across the border between Quebec and New York State was the hot story of the summer.

Source: There’s a growing crisis at Roxham Road, and Ottawa doesn’t have a plan to fix it

ICYMI: Quebec ups funding for asylum groups as New York issues free bus rides to border

Of note:

Quebec is increasing its funding to community groups that help refugee claimants as the province grapples with a sharp increase of people coming through the unofficial border crossing at Roxham Road, south of Montreal.

The announcement came on the same day the mayor of New York revealed that his administration helps provide bus tickets to migrants looking to leave the city, including those travelling north to claim asylum in Canada.

Quebec’s Immigration Minister Christine Fréchette said she was “surprised” by the story and that it highlights the need for Ottawa to solve the problem at Roxham Road, used by tens of thousands of people last year.

She and the Minister of Social Solidarity and Community Action, Chantal Rouleau, announced $3.5-million in funding for dozens of groups helping to provide shelter, food and clothing to newcomers. They were responding to a recent call for help from community organizations.

“Right now, in Quebec, the resources devoted to immigrants and to the most vulnerable people are stretched to the limit,” Ms. Fréchette said. “Obviously the large number of people entering Quebec through Roxham Road is contributing to this overload.”

Roughly 60,000 asylum seekers arrived in Quebec last year, double the annual number from before the pandemic, the minister added, calling it an “unprecedented situation.”

New York Mayor Eric Adams told Fox 5 Monday morning that his administration helps in the “reticketing process” for people who arrive in the city but want to go elsewhere.

He told the news station that the city does not push or force people to leave but some express a desire to move on to other places, including Canada.

His comments come after the New York Post reported that some migrants in New York City are being given free tickets to Plattsburgh, N.Y., from where they travel about half an hour by shuttle or taxi to cross into Quebec at Roxham Road.

An official with Mr. Adams’s office said the city doesn’t treat requests for bus tickets to Plattsburgh any differently than those for other American cities.

In October, 2022, Mr. Adams declared a state of emergency as the number of people in New York City’s overwhelmed homeless shelters soared amid the influx of thousands of migrants from Latin America.

Federal opposition parties in Canada have repeatedly called for a review of the Safe Third Country Agreement with the U.S. – a long-standing pact that requires border agents from each country to turn away asylum seekers from the other if they present themselves at official land border crossings – but anxiety about the situation has been sharpest in Quebec.

The RCMP intercepted 34,478 asylum seekers who did not use official ports of entry to enter Quebec between January and November of 2022, according to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada data, compared with just 316 in the rest of the country.

The opposition Parti Québécois put forward a motion in the province’s National Assembly last week calling on the government to shut down Roxham Road with police help if necessary.

Source: Quebec ups funding for asylum groups as New York issues free bus rides to border

John Pasalis: Canada’s immigration policies are driving up housing costs

Although correlation is not causation given that other factors given domestic migration (rural to urban, interprovincial) and housing policies, high immigration levels are one of the more significant factors. Signal that some of the various analyses and commentary making the link are becoming more widespread, with Pasalis challenging a “third rail” of Canadian politics, immigration:

Ask a Canadian why home prices are so high and you’ll certainly get a whole host of answers from foreign buyers to greedy investors and, up to recently, a long period of low interest rates.

But the most common answer you are likely to hear is that a lack of supply of new housing in Canada is the primary cause of the high cost of housing.

The lack of supply narrative has been the dominant explanation for high home prices in Canada over the past five years. Every level of government in Canada cites a lack of supply as the primary cause for high home prices and countless academic and bank economists have made the same argument. Scotiabank’s chief economist went so far as to argue that a lack of supply was the underlying cause “for rising prices and diminished affordability”. When an economist says A causes B they mean that the relationship is a statistical fact rather than an opinion.

The debate regarding the key drivers of high home prices has been so one-sided it led Howard Anglin, former deputy chief of staff under Stephen Harper, to write a column in The Hub in 2021 titled, “The one factor in the housing bubble that our leaders won’t talk about.”

What’s the one factor not talked about? How Canada’s immigration boom is impacting the demand for housing and, by extension, increasing the cost of housing.

Over the previous decade, Canada admitted roughly 275,00 new immigrants each year. In 2022, Canada saw a record 431,645 new permanent residents and this number is expected to reach 500,000 annually by 2025.

An unequal two-sided problem

When considering these two demand and supply factors alone, demand for homes due to changes to Canada’s immigration level and the lack of supply of new homes to meet this demand, we see an interesting phenomenon. One factor, the lack of supply, has been discussed for many years, and year after year, political efforts to mitigate this issue have failed. The other factor, immigration, is one that policymakers have far more control over.

Policymakers don’t have any direct control over the number of new homes developers launch and complete each year, a number that has always been hard to achieve due to labour shortages and other factors, and is only expected to decline in the years ahead due to higher interest rates and the current economic uncertainty.

So why has the debate about the high cost of housing focused on a solution that policymakers have no direct control over, building more homes, as opposed to addressing the demand for housing from changes in our immigration level, something policymakers have direct control over?

I’ll highlight what I believe are the two primary reasons.

The false lure of the zoning panacea

A popular area of academic research has been to explore the role that local zoning policies have on the supply of new housing and home prices, and the academic conclusions on the surface sound very intuitive.

Municipalities that have relatively few zoning restrictions on the supply of new housing tend to have more affordable homes and experience more moderate growth in house prices because builders can more easily adjust to changes in demand by building more homes. Academics also argue that these cities with few zoning restrictions have fewer and shorter housing bubbles.

I’ll admit, it’s a wonderful story! If cities simply remove zoning barriers to new housing, builders will flood our market with new homes putting an end to years of rapid price growth and leaving us with an affordable housing market for all.

Unfortunately, the academic theories don’t hold up very well in the real world. Many of the cities that economists cite as having relaxed zoning policies which, in theory, should see modest price growth, such as U.S. cities like Houston, Atlanta, and Charlotte, have all seen a significant surge in home prices over the past decade. Cities like Phoenix in the U.S. and Dubai more globally which have relatively relaxed zoning policies experienced housing bubbles during the first decade of the 2000s because the supply of housing wasn’t able to keep up with the sudden surge in demand from investors.

The fact is that even with relaxed zoning policies, it’s very hard for the construction sector to respond to a rapid surge in demand for housing.

A report by the Bank of Montreal found that countries with higher rates of population growth also saw the most rapid increase in home prices, a result that is intuitively obvious, and one we are seeing in Canada. While it’s very easy for our government to double the number of immigrants moving to Canada each year, it’s extremely hard for them to double the number of homes being built to house these new Canadians. When housing completions don’t increase enough to match a country’s immigration goals, the result is what we are experiencing in Canada: a spike in the cost of housing.

Despite the evidence, the solution to our housing crisis promoted by our policymakers and expert economists continues to be rooted in the delusion that housing supply can respond to any sudden surge in the demand for housing if we simply reform zoning policies.

This does not mean supply-side reforms that encourage more housing and more density are not important, they are. But supply-side policies alone are not the panacea to our housing crisis that some academics and economists make them out to be.

A politically sensitive issue

The other likely reason that many economists have argued that a lack of supply is the cause for high home prices is because any suggestion that Canada’s record high immigration levels may in fact be the bigger driver of home prices runs the risk of being called xenophobic. I’ve experienced this myself from self-described “housing advocates” who believe that with the right zoning reforms, there is no limit to how many homes Canada can build.

But questioning what is the right level of immigration for our country, and whether the current level is doing more harm than good, isn’t xenophobic at all. It’s a critical policy question that for a long time has been ignored out of fear that one might be called a racist for even raising the question.

But the times are changing.

Over the past month we have seen a significant shift in this discussion. More journalists, economists, and editorials are questioning the goal of our federal government’s immigration strategy and whether their current immigration targets are doing more harm than good.

After years of silence regarding the impact our government’s immigration policies are having on healthcare, housing, and wages, more and more experts are starting to ask some very important questions. And not surprisingly, in virtually every column the author clarifies that they are not xenophobic or against immigration, but are noting some of the negative side effects of our country’s aggressive immigration strategy.

Why are more experts starting to talk about our government’s immigration targets?

It’s becoming clearer that the federal Liberal government’s strategy to nearly double the number of immigrants admitted to Canada each year without making the necessary investments to support them is straining our housing markets and health-care system.

A demand crush that further hurts renters

The other important factor is that many of the negative side effects of Canada’s immigration strategy are starting to be felt most by the poorest and most marginalized communities in Canada—including many of these immigrants themselves.

While the discussion about Canada’s housing crisis often centres around the high price of homes and its impact on first-time buyers, a bigger concern should be how our government’s policies are driving up the cost of renting as renters typically have much lower household incomes as compared to homeowners, and unlike homeowners they don’t benefit financially from the rising cost of housing.

To provide some context to the recent acceleration in rents, it is helpful to compare how average rents have changed before and after the current Liberal government took office in 2015.

Under the previous federal Conservative government, the average rent for a Toronto condominium went from $1,570 in 2006 to $1,866 in 2015, a $297 (or 19 percent) increase in nine years. In contrast, average rents under our current Liberal government have climbed from $1,866 in 2015 to $2,657 in 2022, a $791 (or 42 percent) increase in just seven years.

Am I suggesting that our current government’s change in immigration policy alone is responsible for this outsized increase in average rent in Toronto? Of course not, but of the most common explanations for the high cost of housing, from foreign buyers to low interest rates and even irrational exuberance, this one has the most direct impact on rents.

Calculating the demand and price of a property is more complex as the source of capital and the cost of debt are all important factors, alongside the usual factors such as the number of households requiring housing. Rent, on the other hand, is simply the cost of housing services, a cost more closely linked to the demand and supply for housing services, and not as impacted by other factors.

It’s worth noting that the higher appreciation in condo rents since 2015 was not due to a lack of building. Average annual condo completions were 12 percent higher after 2015 when compared to the period before 2015. This additional supply didn’t cool condo rents because Canada’s population was growing faster than these housing completions.

The impact of—and on—foreign students

The other aspect of Canada’s immigration policies that is often overlooked is the growth in the number of international students attending universities, which are not directly included in Canada’s immigration numbers today. An important part of Canada’s immigration pipeline, the number of foreign study permit holders in Canada has climbed from 352,330 in 2015 to 621,565 in 2021.

The Globe and Mail’s Matt Lundy argues that there is a simple explanation for this boom in foreign students: money.

The annual tuition for foreign students is five times what domestic students pay, so post-secondary institutions are doing what any profit-maximizing corporation would do: they are admitting as many foreign students as they can.

But unlike Canada’s program for permanent residents, there are no targets for foreign study permit holders—post-secondary institutions can admit as many students as they want each year. But while these institutions have the right to maximise their profits by admitting as many foreign students as possible, they have no obligation to ensure there is adequate housing for the students they are admitting. The lack of planning and investment from post-secondary institutions into the housing needs of their students means that the burden of Canada’s housing crisis has fallen in part on these often financially stretched students who are moving to Canada for a better life but are left feeling exploited. When foreign students are fighting for the most affordable rentals in their community, it also puts pressure on low-income households looking for the same.

It’s time to start asking harder questions about the negative side effects of Canada’s immigration policy. As economist David Green wrote, immigration is not some magic pill for saving the economy.

John Pasalis is President of Realosophy Realty, a Toronto real estate brokerage that uses data analysis to advise residential real estate buyers, sellers, and investors.

Source: John Pasalis: Canada’s immigration policies are driving up housing costs

‘Hip Hip Hooray!’ Cheering News for Free Speech on Campus

Funny but pointed analysis of the Stanford list of banned common words:

The following is a celebration of the cancellation of the Elimination of Harmful Language Initiative, an attempt by a committee of IT leaders at Stanford University to ban 161 common words and phrases. Of those 161 phrases, I have taken pains to use 45 of them here. Read at your own risk.

Is the media addicted to bad news? It’s not a dumb question, nor are you crazy to ask. After all, we follow tragedy like hounds on the chase, whether it’s stories about teenagers who commit suicide,victims of domestic violence or survivors of accidents in which someone winds up quadriplegiccrippled for life or confined to a wheelchair. We report on the hurdles former convicts face after incarceration, hostile attitudes toward immigrants and the plight of prostitutes and the homeless. Given the perilous state of the planet, you might consider this barrage of ill tidings to be tone-deaf.

Well, I’m happy to report good news for a change. You might call it a corrective, or a sanity check, but whatever you call it — and what you can call things here is key — there have been several positive developments on American campuses. The chilling effects of censorship and shaming that have trapped students between the competing diktats of “silence is violence” and “speech is violence” — the Scylla and Charybdis of campus speech — may finally be showing some cracks.

Matters looked especially grim in December, when the internet discovered the 13-page dystopicallly titled “Elimination of Harmful Language Initiative. A kind of white paper on contemporary illiberalism, it listed 161 verboten expressions, divided into categories of transgression, including “person-first,” “institutionalized racism” and the blissfully unironic “imprecise language.” The document offered preferred substitutions, many of which required feats of linguistic limbo to avoid simple terms like “insane,” “mentally ill” and — not to beat a dead horse, but I’ll add one more — “rule of thumb.” Naturally, it tore its way across the internet to widespread mockery despite a “content warning” in bold type: “This website contains language that is offensive or harmful. Please engage with this website at your own pace.”

Before you get worked up, know this: A webmaster has taken the site down and the program has been aborted for re-evaluation. Last month, in a welcome display of clear leadership, Marc Tessier-Lavigne, Stanford’s president, said the policy, brainchild of a select committee of IT leaders, had never been intended as a universitywide policy and reiterated the school’s commitment to free speech. “From the beginning of our time as Stanford leaders, Persis and I have vigorously affirmed the importance and centrality of academic freedom and the rights of voices from across the ideological and political spectrum to express their views at Stanford,” he wrote, referring to the school’s provost, Persis Drell. “I want to reaffirm those commitments today in the strongest terms.”

Could this be a seminal moment for academic freedom? Consider other bright spots: Harvard recently went ahead with its fellowship offer to Kenneth Roth, the former head of Human Rights Watch, which was earlier rejected, allegedly owing to his critical views on Israel. M.I.T.’s faculty voted to embrace a “Statement on Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom.” At Yale Law School, which has been roiled by repeated attempts to suppress speech, a conservative lawyer was allowed to appear on a panel with a former president of the A.C.L.U. after protests disrupted her visit the year before. And Hamline University, which had refused to renew an art history professor’s contract because she showed an artwork that some Muslim students may have found offensive, walked back its characterization of her as “Islamophobic.”

Finally, when an office within the School of Social Work at the University of Southern California banned the terms “fieldwork” and “in the field” to describe research projects because their “anti-Black” associations might offend some descendants of American slavery, U.S.C.’s interim provost issued a statement that “The university does not maintain a list of banned or discouraged words.”

It’s hard to know how much these shifting prohibitions distress students, whether freshman or senior, given how scared many are to speak up in the first place.

But we do know two things: First, college students are suffering from anxiety and other mental health issues more than ever before, and second, fewer feel comfortable expressing disagreement lest their peers go on the warpath. It would be a ballsy move to risk being denounced, expelled from their tribe, become a black sheep. No one can blame any teenager who has been under a social media pile-on for feeling like a basket case. Why take the chance.

Yet when in life is it more appropriate for people to take risks than in college — to test out ideas and encounter other points of view? College students should be encouraged to use their voices and colleges to let them be heard. It’s nearly impossible to do this while mastering speech codes, especially when the master lists employ a kind of tribal knowledge known only to their guru creators. A normal person of any age may have trouble submitting, let alone remembering that “African American” is not just discouraged but verboten, that he or she can’t refer to a professor’s “walk-in” hours or call for a brown bag lunchpowwow or stand-up meeting with their peers.

“You can’t say that” should not be the common refrain.

According to a 2022 Knight Foundation report, the percentage of college students who say free speech rights are secure has fallen every year since 2016, while the percentage who believe free speech rights are threatened has risen. Nearly two-thirds think the climate at school prevents people from expressing views that others might find offensive. But here, too, let’s convey some good news: The number of students who say controversial speakers should be disinvited has fallen since 2019. And one more cheering note: The editors of The Stanford Review, a student publication, poked gleefully at the document before it was taken down, with the shared impulse — irresistible, really — of using a number of taboo terms in the process.

Surely my ancestors from the ghettos of Eastern Europe couldn’t anticipate that their American descendants would face this kind of policing of speech at institutions devoted to higher learning. (While we’re on history, per the document, but news to all the Jews I know: “Hip hip hooray” was a term “used by German citizens during the Holocaust as a rallying cry when they would hunt down Jewish citizens living in segregated neighborhoods.”)

Consider what learning can flourish under such constraints. In a speech last fall celebrating the 100th anniversary of PEN America, the novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie noted: “Many American universities are well-meaning in wanting to keep students comfortable, but they do so at the risk not just of creating an insular, closed space but one where it is almost impossible to admit to ignorance — and in my opinion the ability to admit to ignorance is a wonderful thing. Because it creates an opportunity to learn.”

It is reasonable to wonder whether any conceivable harm to a few on hearing the occasional upsetting term outweighs the harm to everyone in suppressing speech. Or whether overcoming the relatively minor discomforts of an unintentional, insensitive or inept comment might help students develop the resilience necessary to surmount life’s considerably greater challenges — challenges that will not likely be mediated by college administrators after they graduate.

Rather than muzzle students, we should allow them to hear and be heard. Opportunities to engage and respond. It’s worth remembering how children once responded to schoolyard epithets: “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never harm me.” Narrow restrictions on putatively harmful speech leave young people distracted from and ill-prepared for the actual violence they’ll encounter in the real world.

Source: ‘Hip Hip Hooray!’ Cheering News for Free Speech on Campus