Quebec premier’s multiculturalism comments ‘painful’: World Sikh Organization

Premier Legault seems to have a habit of poor phrasing when discussing immigration and multiculturalism/interculturalism:

When Quebec Premier François Legault said bluntly this week that he and his party “oppose multiculturalism,” he tried to add some qualifiers to that argument.

Quebec has a different model from the rest of Canada, Legault explained — “interculturalism” rather than multiculturalism, where different cultures don’t just co-exist but blend into a dominant, French-speaking culture.

He added that he’s against putting “all cultures on the same level.”(opens in a new tab)

He prefers a “culture of integration” first and foremost, he also said.

But some of those who know this debate most intimately said there’s little nuance to be found in the premier’s comments, and that his words aren’t surprising but are still deeply unwelcome.

“Every time it’s as painful as it is the first time,” said Harginder Kaur, the Quebec spokesperson for the World Sikh Organization of Canada.

“You don’t expect such comments from the government [of the place] you live in.”

Kaur, 22, said immigrants to Quebec are more aware than anyone of the emphasis on “francization,” or learning to live in French and blending into Quebec culture.

“I speak fluent French, I have implemented all Quebecois values — my family as well, my friends as well,” said Kaur….

Source: Quebec premier’s multiculturalism comments ‘painful’: World Sikh Organization

As the war in Gaza rages, social cohesion in Australia is under strain — how to ensure it doesn’t break?

Good discussion of the perils of too much emphasis on intra-group dimensions compared to inter-cultural dimensions and Canada has also neglected inter-cultural dimensions and the civic integration focus of multiculturalism:

Australian multiculturalism is being shaken to its core by deepening community tensions and rising levels of hate speech and intimidation, triggered by the humanitarian catastrophes associated with the conflict in Gaza. The response to these traumas in this country, to date, has been characterised by a misplaced focus on the part of some political leaders on protests, a reluctance to build inter-cultural community relations, and the long-held but shallow emphasis on celebratory harmony, rather than meaningful collaboration and genuine community engagement.

It is worth reflecting, then, on the way sociological concepts and scholarly collaboration might help facilitate such engagement, as well as deepen mutual understanding and calm some of the trigger-point anger that government admonishment has yet to ameliorate. Perhaps more urgently, we wonder whether and under what conditions the universalist ethos expressed in multiculturalism can safeguard us against destructive forms of tribalism that do not see the humanity of others.

There has already been a great deal of public commentary about the way support for both “sides” of the Gaza conflict is threatening social cohesion and destabilising existing political allegiances. The decision of Senator Fatima Payman to defy her own party and vote instead with the Greens in their demand for immediate recognition of Palestinian statehood — a decision which led, ultimately, to Senator Payman’s defection from the Labor Party — is a particularly vivid example of this phenomenon.

We believe that social divisions such as these are, in part, a consequence of the emphasis being placed on the intra-groupdimensions of multicultural policy, however poorly enacted. This comes at the expense of cultivating and enhancing the inter-culturalpriorities and skills that are necessary for social cohesion. Too often governments have seen emotional engagement on ethno-religious issues as detrimental to building a common purpose, condemning such perspectives and haranguing their exponents.

Solidarity under threat

Against this background, we write as Australian scholars with Arab/Muslim and Jewish heritages, respectively, who have dedicated our academic careers to the study of multiculturalism, diversity governance, interfaith dialogue, and inter-cultural relations. We have pursued these academic studies from a principled commitment to universal human rights, social justice, and deep equality. We have been following with great moral concern the catastrophic war unfolding in Gaza and its serious implications for community relations and social cohesion in Australia.

As perceived representatives of the main sides in this conflict — particularly in the context of diaspora communities — Jewish and Arab Australians have faced undeniable bigotries in the form of antisemitism and Islamophobia, and have often responded to such bigotries by publicly calling out these and other forms of systemic racism. Although there is an understandable sensitivity on both sides to hate speech, it is all the more disappointing that advocacy can degenerate into their own punitive strategies and inflammatory language.

It is bitterly ironic, then, to watch certain members of these two Australian communities engage in forms of “cancel culture” through the intimidation and public shaming of those deemed adversaries in the daily commentary on the Gaza war. As some have put it, the war in Gaza may be “tearing us apart” and threatening transcultural social solidarity and the viability of respectful pluralism.

One of the more worrying effects of the local mobilisation of communities on the critical social infrastructure of our multicultural society — which has been forged with such difficulty over the past fifty years — has been the rapid decay in engagement between Jewish and Muslim/Arab community organisations. We have also witnessed a widening divide among some Australian scholars of Arab/Muslim heritage and Jewish backgrounds. Pre-existing apprehensions have been exacerbated and long-held certitudes undermined, undermining public declarations of respect for Australia’s multicultural achievement.

Principles of multiculturalism

In light of the way these tragic events overseas have revealed key weaknesses in Australia’s approach to multiculturalism over the past two decades, it is important to remind ourselves of some of the key principles of multiculturalism as a nation-building and inclusive strategy — one which respects diversity and difference, but which seeks to encourage inter-cultural collaboration and creativity.

Multiculturalism represents far more than the demographic recognition of the origins and persistence of transported diasporic cultural mores. From the very beginning, multiculturalism in Australia was understood to be a political ideal that can harness principles of equality and social justice strategies during times of upheaval, heightened social tensions, and severe emotional distress.

Importantly, the liberal ideal of the person as a free subject able to pursue their values and beliefs — upon which the normative ideal of multiculturalism is based — has also been shaped by the social justice concerns for rights and well-being. For according to this ideal, in order for anyone to have these opportunities and rights, everyone has to have them. This points to the existence of constraints on those opportunities that might impinge upon the well-being of others. Hence, when competing truths vie for dominance in a shared society, pathways to engagement must remain open and be socially facilitated.

Social scientists understand society to be constituted by overlapping realms of social capital strengthened by trust. In multicultural societies, during conflicts with outer others the social capital built within communities may be hardened, while that between groups is diluted if not almost totally dissolved. Moreover, the settlement and social integration experiences of diverse diaspora communities are likely to be affected by an absence of multigenerational social networks that would otherwise facilitate social integration, national attachment, and political affiliation — which may then lead to a sense of social marginalisation and disempowerment, in many cases breeding resentment and outright hostility. These are significant signals of a fragile trust.

In institutions like universities, it is therefore vital that we rebuild and model trust among colleagues of different intellectual persuasions and ethno-religious affiliations, using the space afforded by scholarly interaction to explore in what ways and to what end such a dialogue can be extended.

Diversity comes with obligations

Australia has not always had a great record of trying to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts and build a rights-based social sphere. But since multiculturalism was first launched fifty years ago, the recognition of diversity and opposition to racism have been widely accepted as core multicultural values — albeit not always without resistance, contestation, and even scepticism, particularly in relation to First Nations people.

Furthermore, a key concept in multiculturalism and other pro-diversity approaches relates to inter-cultural engagement. By committing to, rather than withdrawing from, dialogue premised on mutual respect and support for justice and human rights, we are committing to recognise cultural and religious differences and uphold shared values within the multicultural ethos. Only then can we hope to minimise the risk of reaching a tipping point for multiculturalism that will significantly deepen community tensions and further weaken social cohesion.

There needs now to be serious engagement between people who are committed to keeping Australia’s multicultural project on track. To this end, the federal government must no longer procrastinate over two important initiatives — the Multicultural Framework Reviewand the Anti-Racism Framework. After all, one of the keys to Labor’s victory at the last federal election was the number of culturally diverse candidates the ALP placed on the ballot in order to reflect the diverse reality of contemporary Australian society.

Yet, as Senator Payman pointed out in the wake of her resignation from the Labor Party, embracing diversity comes with obligations. Indeed, the superdiversity of our multicultural society should be reflected in the way our key institutions — including political parties and universities — operate. Senator Payman is one of those new faces who reflect the aspiration of many communities to have an equal place at the national table.

There must be space for a diversity of perspectives and positions that reflect the multilayered identities of modern Australians. This is how we ensure that multiculturalism works for everyone.

Distinguished Professor Fethi Mansouri is the founding Director of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University.

Andrew Jakubowicz is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Technology Sydney.

Source: As the war in Gaza rages, social cohesion in Australia is under strain — how to ensure it doesn’t break?

Rioux | Victoires à la Pyrrhus

One pessimistic longer term take on the French election results:

« Il faut que tout change pour que rien ne change », dit le dicton attribué à Tancrède, le jeune noble interprété par Alain Delon dans Le guépard de Visconti. Rarement une phrase aura mieux décrit le psychodrame qui s’est joué en France depuis trois semaines.

Tel est en effet le bilan de ces élections législatives déclenchées sur un coup de tête par Emmanuel Macron dans des délais qui ignorent toute exigence démocratique. Comment qualifier autrement des élections qui auront tout au plus permis à un président narcissique de revenir au centre du jeu, pour un temps du moins, et enfoncé le pays dans une forme de paralysie durable dont il ne pourra pas sortir avant un an, une nouvelle dissolution n’étant pas possible plus tôt ? À moins que le cauchemar ne dure jusqu’à la prochaine présidentielle, dans un peu moins de trois ans.

Car les « barrages » ne font ni un programme ni une majorité. On aura beau tourner les résultats dans tous les sens, personne ne sort victorieux de cette inutile saga électorale. Quel qu’il soit, le prochain gouvernement devra gouverner par ordonnances et faire passer ses lois à coups de procédures d’exception.

À tout seigneur tout honneur, commençons par la gauche, qui est la seule à crier victoire dans la cacophonie ambiante. Avec 182 députés, le bloc de gauche du Nouveau Front populaire arrive miraculeusement en tête, mais à des kilomètres de la majorité absolue (289). Cette pseudo-victoire n’a été possible qu’avec une alliance contre nature, qui a même vu l’ancien premier ministre Édouard Philippe voter communiste pour la première fois de sa vie ! La gauche a d’autant moins raison de crier victoire que sa propre union ressemble à un panier de crabes, où l’on trouve indifféremment un ancien président discrédité comme François Hollande, un « antifa » fiché par les services de police comme Raphaël Arnault, ainsi que des sociaux-démocrates ragaillardis, mais dont le leader Raphaël Glucksmann n’a cessé de traiter d’antisémite celui qui demeure le seul véritable patron de la gauche, Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

Sans oublier que son programme économique, avec ses 230 milliards d’euros de dépenses supplémentaires d’ici 2027, plongerait dans un chaos indescriptible un pays déjà considéré comme l’homme malade de l’Europe et déclassé par les agences de notation. L’arrivée d’un premier ministre comme Jean-Luc Mélenchon apparaîtrait comme un coup fatal. D’autant que le pays devra justifier dès l’automne des compressions de 20 milliards d’euros dans ses budgets.

Avec 168 élus, l’ancienne majorité présidentielle évite la déroute, mais à quel prix ? Le président a peut-être démontré son habileté tactique, mais, dans son camp, son autorité est plus qu’émoussée. Même son premier ministre, Gabriel Attal, a pris ses distances, affirmant n’avoir pas choisi cette dissolution et avoir « refusé de la subir ». Les électeurs n’auront finalement accordé à Emmanuel Macron qu’une forme de sursis, alors qu’il s’apprête à présider un pays qui ressemble plus à la IVe République qu’à celle voulue par le général de Gaulle en 1958. De triste mémoire, cette IVe République avait connu 22 gouvernements en 12 ans, dont 9 avaient duré moins de 41 jours.

Au fond, le portrait qu’offre cette nouvelle Assemblée est à l’opposé de celui que dessinent les suffrages exprimés. À cause du front dit « républicain » contre une « extrême droite » à laquelle les Français croient de moins en moins, le parti le moins représenté à l’Assemblée se trouve être celui qui a recueilli le plus de voix. Avec ses 8,7 millions de voix (contre 7,4 millions à l’alliance de gauche et 6,5 millions à celle du centre), le RN est le champion toutes catégories du vote populaire. Sa progression depuis 2022 est historique. C’est de plus le seul parti qui progresse avec l’apport de voix propres et non d’alliances circonstancielles.

Force est pourtant de constater que le « cordon sanitaire » — que l’ancien premier ministre Lionel Jospin avait lui-même qualifié de « théâtre antifasciste » — fonctionne toujours. Avec pour conséquence que la France se retrouve dans la situation absurde d’un pays qui n’a jamais été aussi à droite, alors même que le résultat de dimanche pourrait entraîner logiquement un tour de vis à gauche et la nomination d’un premier ministre de gauche.

Plus grave encore, les Français ne cessent de répéter qu’après le « pouvoir d’achat », l’immigration et l’insécurité sont leurs principales préoccupations. Deux mots qui figurent à peine dans les programmes du centre et de la gauche. Les idées du RN n’ont jamais été aussi populaires — et sa représentation, si élevée — , mais le parti n’a toujours pas le droit de s’approcher du pouvoir. Lundi, l’ancien conseiller de François Mitterrand Jacques Attali faisait le parallèle avec les élections législatives de 1978, où le Parti socialiste avait lui aussi remporté le premier tour, mais perdu le second. Trois ans plus tard, il entrait à l’Élysée.

Tout cela n’est peut-être que partie remise. En attendant, ces élections ne pourront qu’accentuer le ressentiment. Un ressentiment qui, contrairement aux scrutins précédents, risque de s’exprimer dans une forme de chaos non plus seulement dans la rue, mais aussi à l’Assemblée.

Nous n’avons encore rien vu.

Source: Chronique | Victoires à la Pyrrhus

Bill C-71 opens up a possible never-ending chain of citizenship

My latest:

Bill C-71 sets out to allow Canadians to pass on their citizenship to any of their children born abroad past the first generation and expands “Lost Canadians” to cover a much larger number than before.

It is fraught with potential unintended consequences.

The bill is in response to a ruling by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 2023, which declared previous limitations for citizenship transmission unconstitutional. Essentially, the court objected to a limitation inherent in previous citizenship laws that prevented Canadian citizens born outside Canada from passing on citizenship to a child also born abroad, or for an adopted child born outside Canada.

To remedy the issue, Bill C-71 uses residency as the “substantial connection test.”

However, the new standard in Bill C-71, which requires a foreign-born Canadian parent to have spent a total of 1,095 days in Canada prior to the birth or adoption, differs significantly from what is required of new Canadians.

Specifically, while in both cases the parent must have spent 1,095 days (the equivalent of three years) in Canada, new Canadians must have done so within a five-year time limit.

Bill C-71 places no such time limit to accumulate 1,095 days of residency in Canada for foreign-born Canadian citizens in the same circumstance.

This lack of a timeframe for meeting the critical requirement for passing on citizenship to descendants suggests the government has failed to fully consider the implications of such an open-ended condition.

The number of people potentially affected is significant.

There are an estimated four million Canadians living outside Canada. About half of them were born abroad.

As of 2017, two-thirds of them lived in the U.S., with another 15 per cent in the U.K., Australia, France and Italy – the total living in all other countries has unsurprisingly risen from 14 per cent in 1990 to 20 per cent in 2017.

This trend is significant in the context of Bill C-71: for second- and subsequent-generation expatriates in the U.S., EU and other politically stable places, seeking Canadian citizenship may not be a priority. It is likely a higher priority for those in other countries with less secure conditions.

Fueling the issue triggered by Bill C-71, expatriates as a whole are older than Canadians living in Canada – 45.3 years old compared to 41.7. Citizens by descent are much younger, at an average age of 31.7.

Without an established timeframe, it will be challenging or impossible for the federal government to accurately predict citizenship acquisition year over year.

Same rights, divergent pathways

Consider these scenarios:

My grandson was born in Europe. He cannot pass down Canadian citizenship to any future child. Under C-71, he would have that right, but only after first spending 1,095 cumulative days in Canada. One strategy would be to attend a Canadian university and accumulate most or all of the 1,095 days while getting a degree.

Consider a Canadian born abroad who maintains a cottage in Canada and spends summers there. Spending eight weeks a year in Canada, it would take nearly 20 years to acquire the right to give their descendants Canadian citizenship.

For second-generation Canadians who spend most of their life abroad, the road is even longer. Perhaps they make occasional trips to Canada, accumulating days to meet the 1,095-day requirement. But they would not likely meet the threshold unless they choose to return permanently in retirement.

Many descendants who are temporary residents either through a job transfer or as spouses of skilled workers or students would likely meet the physical-presence requirement. Temporary foreign workers on seasonal or short-terms contracts, on the other hand, would likely not meet the requirement.

The first two scenarios are manageable given that the physical-presence requirement for most would be met within a defined time period. In the latter situations, it is impossible to forecast if or when descendant citizenship rights would eventually be required.

Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) needs to determine and share estimates for the approximate number of new citizens expected under the change, along with the incremental workload and resources that are required before the bill goes before committee.

Media in India are characterizing Bill C-71 as legislation that “will open up the chain of citizenship without end as long as the parents have spent at least 1,095 cumulative days.”

Arguably, this change moves Canada closer to a hybrid jus sanguinis/jus soli regime, as it will make it possible for families to maintain intergenerational Canadian citizenship through different scenarios, which currently is not possible.

It may also provide opportunities for longer-term sophisticated foreign-interference efforts by countries like China and India by exploiting descendants who can acquire Canadian citizenship in their recruitment strategies.

Another question that remains unanswered is how many “Lost Canadians” want to be found. As seen in previous efforts to respond to public pressures, the actual number of those who request citizenship proofs is relatively small, at an average of just 1,500 per year between 2009 and 2022. (Similarly, the low number of expatriates who register and vote is another indicator that interest may be limited.)

However, the potential impact of Bil C-71 could be potentially large. So, before the government enshrines a new pathway to citizenship for some, all of the facts need to be properly considered.

Canadian citizenship is a precious gift. At the committee stage, members of Parliament must be able to fulsomely examine the implications of an open-ended residency requirement and consider establishing a specific time frame of five or 10 years.

Source: Bill C-71 opens up a possible never-ending chain of citizenship

Meggs: Changing Course on Immigration

Good long assessment by Meggs:

…So what can we expect as a result of these multiple announcements designed to convince us that the Liberals can bring order to the immigration system and get numbers under control?

I tend to agree with Tony Keller, who pointed out in an opinion piece in the Globe and Mail following the March 21 press conference that the target of 5 per cent of the population for temporary residents, if accomplished, would bring us back, in three years, to where we were in July 2023. Keller concluded, “What Miller served up should not be consumed without first adding many large grains of extra-coarse salt.” Henry Lotin, a research economist in this field, agrees that “given our immigration and entry laws, these targets will be almost impossible to achieve, certainly not by 2027.”

If we don’t notice much of a change by election time in 2025, whose fault will it be?

Miller provided the government’s answer in his March statement, identifying the culprits as well as the circumstances which were beyond the government’s control. Of course, there’s the pandemic: “Provinces and businesses needed us to bring more workers.” Also, “The chronic underfunding of post-secondary education and unscrupulous actors looking to profit off of vulnerable individuals – among others – led to exponential growth.” Not to be ignored, international conflicts are responsible: “Unprecedented levels of conflicts, economic and political upheaval, human rights abuses and climate change” left the government with no choice but to use temporary public policies to respond to these crises.

This government started out blindly inspired by Century Initiative siren calls that a bigger population is better for the economy and will set Canada up on the international scene, confident that Canadians would embrace the idea. Ignoring its own Advisory Council recommendations regarding highly skilled immigration, it responded willingly to “needs” expressed by the business community by providing cheap labour from foreign students and low-wage foreign workers and families. It has encouraged and accepted more applications than it can process for all types of visas and permits.

Instead of optimizing its permanent immigration system to respond more effectively to a rapidly evolving context, the government used temporary permits to entice people to the country, creating a vast class of residents who live here for years in precarious situations leading to exploitation and abuse by criminals, recruitment agencies, employers and landlords.

Had they known what was happening, Canadians would never have agreed to this kind of immigration structure. Have we really gotten to the point where our political system precludes, on issues as critical as how we welcome people into our society, a common political will to engage in a serious social dialogue for the benefit of all?

Source: Changing Course on Immigration

Yukonomist: The future of the Yukon’s low-wage immigration program

Good analysis of how one jurisdiction is focussing its Provincial Nominee Program on the lower skilled and paid:

Last month’s pause in the Yukon Nominee Program highlights a classic trade-off.

On one hand, the Yukon government wants to help Yukon businesses import workers to fill labour shortages. Without fresh workers, businesses would have to jack up wages — digging sharply into profits — to lure workers away from government or other employers. Some businesses would have to shrink or close.

On the other hand, the government also wants to help Yukon workers get higher wages as housing and food prices spiral.

The Yukon Nominee Program brings fresh labour to the Yukon as follows. The feds tell the Yukon they will give us so many spots for foreign workers to come to the Yukon under certain conditions. The Yukon government then takes applications from local employers.

This year we get 430 spots. Remarkably, that’s about seven times more than Ontario on a per-resident basis.

There are four streams: critical impact workers, skilled workers, Express Entry and Yukon Community Program. There are complicated rules categorizing workers and eligibility. For example, “skilled workers” requires the job to be in National Occupation Classification category TEER 0-3; bakers are an example. “Critical impact workers” are in categories TEER 4-5, such as landscapers and retail sales people.

There are also wage restrictions, but they are limited. Employers must pay at least the Yukon minimum wage, and the job’s annual income must exceed Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cut Off. For a single person in 2022, this was $20,333 per year.

The program hit the news recently when the premier put a pause on accepting new applications from employers in Whitehorse, since the territory has already received 590 applications for this year’s 430 spots.

The Yukon government will prioritize existing applications in four waves: work permit holders with approaching expirations, visitor visa holders already in Canada, work permit holders with expirations within a year and workers outside Canada.

An economist would note that these criteria have nothing to do with economic value. A skilled mining engineer in India who would make big bucks and pay lots of taxes would be at the bottom of the list.

Where you stand on all this depends, as the cliché says, on where you sit.

Suppose you own a labour-intensive small business. In this case, the nominee program is critical to keeping wage costs down and finding staff to keep the operation humming. Otherwise, with our labour shortage, wages might have to rise dramatically to attract Canadians already working to leave other jobs and come work for you.

This would eat into profits, and probably require closing some unprofitable locations.

At the other end of the spectrum, workers do not want to be competing with imported labour in the job market.

If you are neither an owner nor a low-wage worker, you probably enjoy the lower prices that low-wage workers enable at shops and restaurants.

In the old days, before left-versus-right economic issues were overshadowed in our politics by culture war conflicts, you might have expected all of this to be a big political issue pitting unions and social justice groups against chambers of commerce.

However, we have a centre-left government in the Yukon, backed by the NDP, running the nominee program. It seems strange to write this, but if a Martian political economist beamed down they would say there appears to be a broad political consensus in the Yukon behind importing hundreds of low-wage workers each year to keep wages at the bottom end of the wage spectrum lower than they would be otherwise, even during a housing shortage.

One reason for this is that the nominee program was overshadowed for many years by Canada’s traditional immigration program. This “points-based” system has broad support and has served the country well. In this system, foreign applicants earn points based on their youth, education, job experience and language skills. It serves to admit immigrants who can contribute quickly and substantially to the economy, even though there are ongoing issues with immigrants getting their skills recognized here.

The use of the nominee program for workers at or just above the minimum-wage level contradicts this logic. People used to talk about it as a temporary fix for episodic labour shortages, but now it is an ongoing feature of our labour market.

Some economists debating Canada’s poor productivity performance have hypothesized that such programs — by boosting the supply of low-wage workers — have disincentivized business investment in labour-saving technology.

I have seen this framed best by Harald Eia, the Norwegian equivalent of comedian-pundit John Oliver. In his segment “Rich and Equal,” Eia compares car washes in Norway and the United States. In Florida, he says, your car is washed by a team of people who are not paid very much. In Norway, you don’t see a human as you tap your card and drive through an automated car wash.

Union agreements cover much more of the economy in Norway than in Canada. Eia says these tend to have high minimum-wage floors, and have for years been pushing Norwegian employers to invest in automation.

Despite this, Norway currently has a lower unemployment rate than the Yukon.

Meanwhile, Germany has made a major revamp of its immigration policy to attract more skilled workers. If your job pays at least $60,300 (Canadian), then a wide range of occupations such as nurses, tech workers, teachers and engineers can be fast tracked. This also applies to recent university graduates who have a job offer above that amount.

If the Yukon Nominee Program switched to this system, the impact would be dramatic. Tax revenues would go up as higher-paid immigrants paid more income tax. Wages would rise at the lower end of the scale, forcing business owners to raise their prices and close some locations.

That kind of change would be too shocking to do all at once. But the Yukon government could raise the floor wages for the program and prioritize applications by economic contribution rather than freezing out nurses and engineers stuck in the government’s low-priority bucket for the rest of the year.

Keith Halliday is a Yukon economist and the winner of the 2022 Canadian Community Newspaper Award for Outstanding Columnist. His most recent book Moonshadows, a Yukon-noir thriller, is available in Yukon bookstores.

Souùrce: Yukonomist: The future of the Yukon’s low-wage immigration program

Alicia Planincic: We know the one thing Canada could be doing to select better economic immigrants. So why aren’t we doing it? 

Some useful ideas but all ranking systems are imperfect predictors of success. And wages only work for two-step immigration as numbers from other countries are not easy to compare. And there are risks in changing criteria and priorities too quickly without sound evidence and data:

…Candidates receive CRS points for things like language abilities, number of years of schooling, and whether they have a sibling in Canada. But factors like what their degree was in, or where they got it from, are not reflected. Meanwhile, the biggest limitation of the points system is that it ignores labour market information. It therefore tells us little about how valuable someone’s skills are to the Canadian economy.

To go back to hockey analogies, this way of assigning CRS points is like ranking players based on the number of games they have played in the NHL, whether they have a brother in the league, and whether they speak French—while neglecting things like how many points they tend to get every year. The evaluation would not be meaningless, but it’s easy to see how some of the best players wouldn’t be ranked at the top.

To improve the CRS, Canada needs to better capture the value of the skills a candidate brings. As it turns out, the best-known way to do so is pretty simple: have the points system reflect their current earnings.

Why is that? Wages reflect both the needs of the economy (demand) and the relative availability of labour (supply). Generally speaking, if demand for a certain occupation or skillset is strong, or few are willing or able to do this work, wages will be high.

There are other ways to improve the CRS, too.

One is to remove the variables that don’t influence an individual’s economic potential. These factors not only muddy the ranking of candidates but also can unfairly bias certain people or groups. For instance, individuals can earn points for having a sibling in Canada even though the math shows this has no direct impact on economic success. Family in Canada may be a legitimate reason to consider someone for immigration, but is not an economic one, and it is being used in the economic stream. At the same time, favouring people who already have family in Canada puts individuals from smaller countries, or those with less immigration to Canada, at a disadvantage.

Another way to improve the CRS is to regularly refine it as new and better information—including the type and quality of skill (e.g., field of study, program of education) most highly valued—becomes available and can be incorporated. The CRS cannot reflect the economy of 50 years ago. It has to be the latest and greatest of today.

The recruitment of skilled talent globally is big, exciting, and holds much potential. But Canada should not lose sight of the power of the points system, nor the talent that is in plain sight. Before marketing the country to individuals around the world, Canada should do more to select the best among those who have already put their name in the hat—to support greater prosperity for all.

Alicia Planincic is the Economist & Manager of Policy at the Business Council of Alberta. She regularly provides insight and analysis on the Canadian economy, public finances, labour markets, equity and social mobility, and public policy.

Source: Alicia Planincic: We know the one thing Canada could be doing to select better economic immigrants. So why aren’t we doing it?

Muslim votes: Australia’s larrikin egalitarianism is more appealing than tribalism

New word for the day: larrikin or maverick. The latest in Australian discussion of multiculturalism and identity:

The great test of multicultural nations is to create a broad inclusive identity, but not so broad that tribalism seems to keep its attractions in comparison. It’s a critical time once more for Australian multiculturalism, requiring Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to highlight Australia’s broad civic identity and its larrikin egalitarianism that applies to everyone ahead of the tribal markers that are flaring up again.

Australia’s relative youth as a nation and a population gives it advantages in building multiculturalism. We have the highest proportion of overseas-born people in the developed world.

European cultures such as France and Germany with large Muslim populations are grounded in long ethnolinguistic traditions that make it harder to integrate new migrants.

It is easier to feel Australian as a non-white migrant than it is feeling German as a second-generation Turk, or French if you’re born from Algerian parents. While our Anglo-Celtic roots remain strong, there’s a much more accessible civic-based identity that is mingled with a laconic, egalitarian mateship.

The driving psychological current of the times is that of “thymos”, or the urge to seek dignity in the public sphere. This encourages the seeking of membership of groups deemed vulnerable. The proclamation of suffering confers immediate status.

The same people then attempt to win group privileges as part of a political accommodation with them. But that challenges the individual rights that are central to the system of liberalism.

The Voice referendum was a key example, but the rise of a Muslim vote is another.

The era of terrorism highlighted how significant portions of the Islamic community were prone to conflating their own personal feelings of disenfranchisement with global Islam and in particular its historic humiliations.

Palestine has always represented the apex of this trend, allowing ordinary Muslims to channel their personal failures and grievances into a grander historical narrative. I can remember, while growing up, relatives yelling at the television news when pictures of Gaza were aired, linking the conflict to why they didn’t get a promotion at work.

Barely two years ago, Muslim groups celebrated the ascent of three Muslim MPs elected to parliament, including cabinet minister Ed Husic. Only two years later the newly elected senator Fatima Payman has quit the Labor Party, claiming she was marginalised.

In parallel, something of a Muslim movement has emerged, with potential Muslim candidates for the federal parliament who may run primarily on the issue of justice for Palestinians in the Middle East.

It has already happened in the United Kingdom. A BBC analysis confirms that areas with large Muslim populations saw large drops in their traditional Labour Party vote at last week’s election, instead electing five independent MPs running on the issue of justice for Palestinians.

George Galloway of the far-left Workers Party won a byelection earlier this year running on such a single issue. Despite losing this time, he captured the primacy of the conflict in the minds of many.

“We’re not single issue, but if we were, Gaza is the mother of all issues.” Galloway told the BBC on the eve of the election.

The rise of the far right across Europe has led many European-based Muslims to also feel increasingly alienated. Even parties of the left that are strong supporters of a Palestinian state, and sympathetic to claims of Islamophobia, also support policies of marked social liberalism, especially on issues linked to homosexuality or feminism.

In France, for example, most left-wing parties are also staunch secularists against wearing religious markers such as the hijab in public. This is in keeping with the anticlerical strand in European socialism, especially anti-Catholicism.

Likewise, the local Australian Greens are unattractive given their views on issues like transgenderism, homosexuality or parenting. Muslim communities were the primary group who voted against the successful same-sex marriage referendum.

Muslims in Australia have very broad origins, from the former Yugoslavia and Lebanon through to South Asia. The proportion of highly skilled migrants is also greater, the result of our immigration policies, and different again from Europe. In fact, a curious feature of Australia is that darker-skinned Muslim migrants, primarily from parts of Asia, are more likely to belong to higher socioeconomic groups.

Political scientist Peter Chen of the University of Sydney points to European studies suggesting that as Muslims become older and moderate, they are more likely to vote along socioeconomic lines. It is those who identify as strongly religious, are younger and see themselves as Muslim first and foremost, who are likely to see Gaza as a meta issue, encapsulating not just a local injustice but a worldview around anticolonialism, Western dominance and American hegemony.

Outwardly, any so-called Muslim vote in south-western Sydney would seem to disadvantage Labor most of all. But Peter Dutton and the Coalition should be wary of harping upon any kind of ethnic tribalism.

The critical Chinese community across Sydney and Melbourne don’t need to be reminded of Dutton’s hawkish foreign policy sentiments in the 2022 election that, to them, didn’t adequately differentiate the Chinese Communist Party from local Chinese-Australians. The Albanese government has since then had success in stabilising tensions with China.

Anthony Albanese now has a great opportunity to be prime ministerial, to underscore Australia’s unique civic identity planted in historical egalitarianism not tribal membership.

Source: Muslim votes: Australia’s larrikin egalitarianism is more appealing than tribalism

A common vision for tackling antisemitism, Islamophobia?

Good long read and discussion. While a logical first step is to have separate discussion groups for each, the next step is to have the more challenging conversations between the two groups and others. Some encouraging signs from the respective chairs and co-chairs:

Despite philosophical differences, the authors of two separate reports emanating from Stanford University in the United States on ways to address antisemitism and Islamophobia on campus say they believe there is enough overlap between the two documents on which to found a common vision for the institution.

The reports released last month by committees at Stanford University, one charged with studying antisemitism and the other Islamophobia on campus, paint pictures of a university where both Jewish and Muslim, Arab and Palestinian (MAP) students, faculty and staff feel physically and psychologically unsafe, and abandoned by their university’s administration.

Both reports charge that the elite university has forsaken its raison d’être: the impartial search for truth.

Among the dozens of recommendations – some of which, were they to be implemented, would discomfit the other group – are some that would lower the temperature on a campus that is presently under investigation by the Department of Education for violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (The latter is the Federal law that prohibits universities that accept federal funds from discrimination based on race, religion, shared ancestry, ethnicity or national origin.)

Stanford’s President Richard R Saller and Provost Jenny Martinez commissioned the reports on 13 November 2023 following the establishment of a pro-Palestine encampment on the university’s quad, and an upsurge in Islamophobic and antisemitic actions – in the wake of Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October and Israel’s military response in Gaza two weeks later.

“Members of our community,” Saller said when announcing the two committees, “have been feeling pain, fear, anger, and invisibility as they have confronted the ugliness of antisemitism, Islamophobia, and other expressions of hatred, both here on our campus and in the wider world.”

Speaking directly to the purpose of the committees, he continued: “The steps we are taking are intended to respond to specific needs of our communities, to support the wellbeing of community members, and to foster the atmosphere of open, civil, deeply informed discussion that is important for Stanford and our educational mission.”

An emphasis on recommendations

Each report states outright that its goal is not to outline what a Middle East peace might look like. Rather, in addition to placing on public record instances of harassment, physical threats, silencing in classrooms and dorms, and ‘othering’ of Jewish and MAP students, respectively, each report provides recommendations.

Such recommendations include educating the wider Stanford community on antisemitism and Islamophobia, improving dealing with antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents, and clarifying the university’s rules around protests. Each report proposes strategies to foster dialogue across religious and ethnic lines in order to build a more cohesive community.

However, evidence of harassment is offered in both reports. The MAP report, titled Rupture and Repair: A Report by the Stanford Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian Communities Committee (Rupture and Repair), for example, notes a 900% increase, to 50 incidents, of anti-Palestinian/anti-Arab bias or Islamophobia on Stanford’s campus between October 2023 and May 2024.

Among these incidents were a least two physical assaults, intimidation of a woman wearing a hijab, online harassment, and a professor who told a student: “I think you do work with Islamic jihad and Hamas and Iran – people that murder and torture gays, women, and you are their useful idiot.”

Rupture and Repair further charged Stanford’s administration with weaponising the university’s rules against encampments by, for example, threatening to issue trespass notices against the encampments.

Likewise, in ‘It’s in the Air’. Antisemitism and Anti-Israel Bias at Stanford and How to Address it (It’s in the Air), the subcommittee, co-chaired by political science professor Larry Diamond, Mosbacher Senior Fellow of Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (both at Stanford), found that “antisemitism exists today on the Stanford campus in ways that are widespread and pernicious”.

It cited examples of vandalism, including the sacrilegious act of ripping mezuzahs off Jewish students’ door frames and the drawing of swastikas.

In one freshman class – “COLLEGE 101 Why College? Your Education and the Good Life” – the professor asked Jewish students to raise their hands if they were Jewish and said “he was simulating what Jews were doing to Palestinians” by taking a Jewish students’ belongings and moving it to the edge of the room while the student was turned around and looking out the window.

In another class, after a student said that six million Jews died in the Holocaust, the professor responded: “Yes. Only six million” and said 12 million had died in the Congo during Belgian colonisation.

The committee documented cases of Jewish students feeling so unsafe they had to hide their Stars of David, and the creation of a new epithet, ‘Zio’ used, Diamond said, in sentences like, “She’s a Zio [meaning Jew], so you can’t trust her.”

At times, protestors at encampments on the university’s Quad chanted threats: “We know your names, we know where you work and soon, we are going to find out where you live” and “Go back to Brooklyn” – Brooklyn being that part of the United States with the highest Jewish population.

In sum, during the fall of 2023 and winter of 2024 quarters, there were 146 events reported to Stanford’s Department of Public Safety (DPS), 75 (or 51%) of which targeted either Jewish or Israeli students who make up 10% of Stanford’s total enrolment of 17,529.

Yet, despite such content, neither Diamond nor Professor Alexander Key, professor of comparative literature with expertise in Arabic literature, and co-chair of the committee that wrote of Rupture and Repair, view their reports as “duelling”, as The New York Timescharacterised them on 20 June.

Rather, as Key underscored: “You can’t threaten people with discriminatory hate; we should all be treating each other with respect because we’re all members of one university community.”

Speaking directly about swastikas, he added: “That’s what’s so frightening about the stuff that Jeff [Kosof, co-chair of the committee that wrote the It’s in the Air report] and Larry [Diamond] reveal in their report: if people are invoking the Nazis to target Jewish students on social media, this is antisemitism, it needs to be stopped. It’s not acceptable at the university.”

For his part, Diamond told University World News that his committee was not interested “in an Olympics of suffering”.

He said his committee does not have to say that what Jewish students are experiencing is “equivalent to, or greater than what Arab students are experiencing, or Palestinian students, or black students, or Hispanic students, or Pacific Islander students. It’s not a contest. You look at each form of discrimination, marginalisation, and injustice. And each one needs to be addressed”.

Interestingly, both reports were critical of how Stanford’s DPS dealt with reports filed through the Protect Identity Harm (PIH) system. Jewish and MAP students had so little faith that a report would lead to action that many told the committees they didn’t even bother to file reports, while some MAP students said they feared that filing reports would be singling themselves out before the administration.

Accordingly, each report called for revision of the PIH system and for the DPS to be more responsive.

Policies for residences

More than half of Stanford’s students live in campus housing, including 97% of its 7,207 undergraduates. While Diamond stressed that many resident assistants (RAs) were supportive and fair minded, and supervised dorms in which Jewish students felt safe, there were others where Jewish students did not feel safe.

“In some instances,” notes It’s in the Air, “RAs posted antisemitic or threatening content on social media, for example [saying] that Jews don’t need protection because antisemitism isn’t real. In others, they abused their role to advance divisive political agendas that left their Jewish residents feeling that they could not trust or approach them.”

The MAP students’ experience with RAs parallels that of Stanford’s Jewish students. Some were responsive to MAP students in distress and pointed them towards helpful resources. In other cases, the report notes, students were “fearful of communicating with their RAs due to the general silence on Palestine and-or specific real or perceived political misalignment”.

MAP students who were RAs found themselves “caught between being genuine and their fear of being punished, with one noting that she tried to keep her activism separate from her role in the dorm and said, ‘I felt very othered in a position where I was supposed to help people not feel othered and it’s hard to do that. I felt it was unclear what could get me fired. As I look back, I realise what lengths I went to [in order] to dehumanise parts of my identity because I didn’t want to get fired’.”

Both committees called for better training for RAs, though each proposed a different curriculum. Diamond told University World News that the training must focus on what’s permissible.

“It involves clarity that you cannot use any official channel of communication, anything related to your role as an RA, the dorm, mobile phone, text messaging network, a Slack channel to the dorm, or anything else to push political and divisive views that will leave some students feeling like they’re not part of the community,” he said.

The report calls for the training of RAs (and teaching assistants) to include education into the history and forms of antisemitism and anti-Israel bias.

The MAP committee calls for “training on anti-Palestinian and anti-Arab bias and Islamophobia, as well as mental health training related to these communities” and for clarification on the “policies around student rights to political expression: detailing specifically the hanging of banners, flyers, etcetera, in rooms, doors, shared spaces, etcetera and ensure all residential staff (RFs [resident fellows] and RAs along with professional staff) have adequate training around those policies and their application.”

Further, the committee says Stanford must “[e]nsure the consistent application of those policies across political issues and not just with respect to pro-Palestine support”.

Philosophical differences

The different emphases in each report in regard to RAs and other issues stem from basic philosophical differences between the two committees.

Central to the MAP analysis is what is called the ‘Palestine exception’, which Key explains as “a real epistemological problem. This is the one thing you can’t talk about. Talk about Ukraine, who cares? Talk about Palestine? Nudge, nudge, wink, wink, bad for your career. Better to keep quiet; this could be bad for your job. Let’s just not talk about Palestine”.

To counter this silencing, the MAP committee calls for a 10-year commitment to hire 10 new tenure track positions in Arabic and Palestinian studies in order to build the university’s capacity in these areas and make Stanford a destination choice for students interested in studying these areas.

(While he did not specifically agree with the MAP committee’s proposed number, Diamond told University World News that he was sympathetic to this argument.)

Exploding the ‘Palestine exception’ is also why Key and his colleagues write in support of the “People’s University for Palestine” (PUfP), a kind of ‘university’ set up by students as part of the second encampment that began last April.

As did hundreds of similar encampments across the United States and, indeed, in Canada (where some are still in place) Stanford’s students called for the divestment from corporations that supply weapons and surveillance technology to the Israeli government.

Additionally, according to the MAP report, the PUfP hosted presentations on Palestine’s intersection with other causes, film screenings and it “raised awareness on the Palestinian issue by embracing intersectionality and connected struggles”.

It also “shed light on how the ongoing war in Gaza is part of and intertwined with larger global oppressions against Indigeneity, Muslim identity, the environment, and the Global South”.

Among other topics, the PUfP covered “From Vietnam to Falastin: Intertwined Histories and Futures”, “Bringing Indigenous Revolution to Campus: Lessons from Palestine, Kurdistan, and Wallmapu”, “Asian American Organising and Solidarity with Palestine”, “Spirituality, Buddhism, and Non-Violence”, “Lunch & Learn: Bridging West Oakland and Gaza”, and “‘The Palestine Problem’: Black & Palestine Solidarity Teach-in.”

The PUfP did not adhere to what most American professors consider the sine qua non of academic freedom: their control, as experts, of the curriculum.

Accordingly, when Key was asked to square the MAP committee’s support for a ‘university’ outside of professors’ academic control, he said that the kind of centralised control of syllabi that exists at the University of St Andrews (where he took his undergraduate degree and later did some teaching) or even at Harvard (where he did his PhD) “is just not the Stanford way for good or ill”.

“It’s a much more laissez faire attitude here,” he said, adding that students did not receive credit for whatever work they did in the PUfP; the structure was wholly separate from Stanford’s accredited units.

The most important point about the PUfP, he explained, is that it is a flashing red light that the university is not doing its job.

“If it were, we wouldn’t have needed the People’s University for Palestine, because we would have had a university, Stanford, in which these discussions and these varying epistemologies and political analyses could have been argued about and processed in our university,” he said.

The Palestine exception also explains the MAP committee’s opposition to a normative definition of antisemitism (or, for that matter, Islamophobia) – because any such definition could impinge on pro-Palestinian advocacy.

The committee rejects “attempts to revise university policy in any unit to limit opportunities for speech expression in response to Palestinian advocacy”, he said.

Accordingly, the MAP committee rejects the idea of “civil discourse” in favour of “vibrant discourse”.

“Civil discourse,” Key explained, is problematic because, in North America, it has a “long history of being mobilised against interest groups that are committed to political change. ‘Can you be more civil? You need to be more civil.’ We have serious concerns about that.

“We don’t think it’s an effective approach. We don’t think it’s appropriate. We don’t want to repeat the same mistakes. We want a situation in which people are able to feel like they are able to bring their commitments to the discourse, their ideas to the table.

“And civil discourse, whilst in the abstract its definition says that people can do this, the history of civil discourse in North America has done the opposite. And we don’t want to do that,” he said.

By contrast, Key continued: “vibrant discourse is a world in which you don’t have to sign up for a specific epistemological project in order to take part in the discourse. In anticolonial and decolonial work, for example, a lot of people have done a lot of useful theoretical work that contests framings based on liberal understandings of reason.

“In fact, what worries us about some framings of civil discourse is that they appear designed to exclude some knowledge production, in favour of a certain kind of knowledge production, which is itself contested.

“Liberal reasoning, for example, could be thought of as contingent on belief in the existence of abstract universal reason or on the denial of experience and tradition; all such claims need to be engaged and contested rather than one of them being accepted as the prior conditions of discourse”.

Defining antisemitism

It’s in the Air calls for Stanford to introduce time and place restrictions on protests on the quad as well as banning loudspeakers blaring protest messages into classrooms. Further, it calls on university leaders to “exercise their own free speech right to call out and condemn antisemitic and anti-Israel speech on campus”.

One thing the report does not do is provide a definition of antisemitic speech. Instead of endorsing, for example, the International Holocaust Remembrance Association’s definitions endorsed by the United States State Department and House of Representatives, the committee proposed a framework consisting of two questions to determine if a speech act is antisemitic.

First, “Does the objectionable act employ antisemitic sentiment in its substance? In other words, does it “rely on specific examples of antisemitic belief such as blood libels or claims about Jewish avarice?” Or does it embody tropes like the Jews control the media or banks?

Second, “Does the objectionable act rely on antisemitic logic in its structure?”, for example, by asking if the speech act “blur the lines between the Jewish people and a concept of ‘The Jews’ as a nefarious and perhaps hard to identify cabal?” Does the statement rely on the “structure of antisemitism [which] figures Jews as a kind of universal unwelcome guest and a source of eternal trouble?”

This question would not prevent criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war aims in Gaza but would identify when and how such criticism tips over into antisemitism.

For, under the structure of antisemitism, “Blaming Jews does not mean holding actual Jewish people responsible or accountable but, rather, using the figure of ‘the Jews’ or ‘the Zionists’ as a necessary feature of a larger explanatory argument.”

Examples of this is the statement, “You are Jewish; therefore, you are to blame for Israel’s policies”, or when, as the report documents, Jewish students were pressed in class to declare whether they were Zionists or not.

Common ground

Despite these philosophical differences, both Diamond and Key told University World News they believe there is enough overlap on which to find a common vision for Stanford.

An important part of this re-imagining of Stanford is the recognition that both Jews and the members of the MAP community are minorities that are not recognised as such by the existing framework of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI).

While both reports call for these groups to be included in the existing DEI structure, It’s in the Air goes further and suggests radical reorganisation of what Diamond explained was the faulty binary DEI model of oppressor-oppressed or coloniser-colonised, under which Jews are first identified as ‘white’ (which, especially in Israel, is not always the case) and are always placed on the left side of the binary.

Diamond and his co-authors point to Stanford’s Graduate School of Business (GSB) – which they found to be relatively free of antisemitism – as having a different DEI model.

In the GSB, “faculty, staff and students are trained in the importance and methodology of perspective taking and the complexity of identity. Employee training is buttressed by staffers whose role is not only to advocate for DEI but to facilitate discussion and understanding of how identity influences people’s opinions, experience, and information processing.

“Rather than being siloed in their own DEI infrastructure, staff members who are charged with overseeing affinity groups (whether students or alumni) integrate into the various student and alumni services”, they state.

At the centre of both Key’s and Diamond’s belief that their reports can chart a way forward for Stanford (and, by implication, for other colleges and universities) is their common emphasis on the university being the “site of knowledge production”, as Key called it.

“We think that part of the solution to the problems we identify is a substantial and substantive investment by the university in scholarship in these areas. It’s not going to fix everything, but we’re a university and producing knowledge is what we do.

“And if we have an asymmetry between the knowledge that’s being produced on campus [because of the Palestine exception], this has kind of a trickle-down effect into the classroom, into different spaces, into increased pressure on specific faculty, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera,” he said.

“We want the big investment. We don’t think that, you know, a couple of lines in the next few years, maybe replacing some existing faculty who leave, is going to cut it. Right?

“This kind of investment needs multiple stakeholder communities invested; it needs the donor community invested, the faculty invested, the academic leadership invested. It needs the development office keyed in; it’s a big … multi-stakeholder push to have this kind of investment,” he explained.

‘Vibrant and civil’ conversations

Diamond told University World News that while it was important to recognise the different emphases in the two reports, it was “important to emphasise” that the two sets of co-chairs had had “vibrant and civil” conversations with each other as they were preparing the reports.

“I think we can say: ‘We like and respect each other.’ I think we share a common vision of the university where nobody will be discriminated against on the basis of identity: not students, not faculty, not staff; where people can sit in auditoriums, in classrooms and talk about issues that are very divisive, very painful – and listen to the other side.

“I think that these conversations about identity in the United States, about exclusion, about the Israel-Palestine conflict, about the war in Gaza, about the massacre on October 7, about what the future of this profoundly precious territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea should look like – two states – how might it be achieved, or the articulation for why there should be one state, can be made,” he said.

“There’s no way you can have the conversations that need to be had without them being robust and vibrant, which are the two adjectives they use,” Diamond said.

By way of example, he invited the pro-Palestinian side to explain how the chant “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” means something different to how most Jews and Israelis interpret it.

“There’s going to be passion. There’s going to be conviction. There’s going to be emotion. There’s going to be anger expressed.

“But in the university, the anger, the passion, the conviction, you know, has to be tempered by evidence, by a willingness to submit one’s arguments to the test of logic and historical accuracy, by a willingness to listen to the other side, and by some underlying social fabric, of mutual respect for the equal dignity of all of the individuals participating in these conversations.

“I think there’s a lot of common ground there [between the two reports] that we can work with. I should really love our peers and the other committee to speak for themselves, and I’m sure they have asked the same question,” said Diamond.

Source: A common vision for tackling antisemitism, Islamophobia?

Regg Cohn: Clearing protesters from university campuses won’t end their chilling effect on free speech

Good column:

It’s all about free speech. But for whom?

For those who oppose Israel, yes. For those who support or come from Israel, not so much.

On campus, protesters demand an untrammeled right to trespass, occupy and speechify. But it’s seemingly a right reserved only for them, as pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist protesters — not their opponents.

Think about that one-sided argument. All along, many protesters have tried to restrict the rights of their opponents — other students and professors — to speak or exchange ideas.

Now, time’s up for the campus occupation. But speech suppression will continue on campus in other ways.

Two months after pitching their tents at the University of Toronto, protesters were ordered to pack up this week by a judge who ruled their occupation illegal. In granting the university’s request for an injunction, the court pointed out a peculiar contradiction plaguing the movement:

While the protesters continually claimed a right to free speech, they adamantly refused any reciprocal right of free assembly — even a right of entry — to anyone opposing their encampment on the university’s main grounds. Free speech for me, no speech for you.

Turns out that the protesters were turning logic and the law upside down — not merely trespassing, but trampling on the rights of others on U of T grounds. That’s why the court cleared the way for police to clear them out if they refused to fold their tents.

Superior Court Justice Markus Koehnen stressed he wasn’t denying their right to assembly. For his ruling drew a distinction between daily protesting (permitted and protected) versus perpetual occupying (trespassing and illegal).

Put another way, Canadians have the right to squawk, not squat. If that sounds like a victory for free speech, don’t be so sure.

Here’s an afterthought in the aftermath of the protest: Long after it’s gone, its legacy will live on — in the worst way.

No, I’m not talking about the crusade against divestment, which gets disproportionate coverage in light of the university’s minimal and indirect investments in Israel (a rounding error). Given the ink devoted to divestment, you’d think the U of T’s endowment was single-handedly bankrolling the Israeli war machine.

Divestment is a distraction that detracts from a more insidious objective that motivates the movement.

Listed among the top demands is an “academic boycott,” which is a polite way of describing the blackballing of the other — the other side, which means the other person.

In his ruling, the judge calls it a demand to “suspend all partnerships with Israeli academic institutions that either: operate in settlements in occupied territories, or; ‘support or sustain the apartheid policies of the state of Israel and its ongoing genocide in Gaza.’”

That may sound principled to some, but it violates and vitiates the protesters’ own stated commitment to free speech, inevitably serving to intimidate and silence scholars by virtue of their national identity and, ultimately, their religious, racial, ethnic identity.

It means banning Israeli students and professors, and slowly silencing many Canadian supporters of Israel’s right to exist — also known as Zionists. Make no mistake, the protest movement on campus is aimed not merely at divesting but disinviting and decoupling from the other.

That’s the perverse paradox that undermines the campus protest movement. For it opposes any opposing voices — not just in encampments but elsewhere on campus.

The movement seeks to constrain the unencumbered right to study, speak or teach by the other by virtue of their national origin (Israel) or religious and political beliefs (Zionism). Whatever the intent, this would amount to fewer Jews admitted to study or invited to speak on campus, just decades after the notorious “Jewish quota” restricted admissions on campus.

To be sure, protesters occasionally (but inconsistently) draw an apparent distinction between universities that operate in the “occupied territories” versus those confined solely to Israel’s internationally recognized borders. In reality, the question of settlement activity is hard to delineate (who decides?); in any case, the protesters lump all universities together when talking about institutions that “sustain the apartheid policies of the state of Israel and its ongoing genocide in Gaza” — which potentially captures all of them.

If someone at some university has tangential ties to some settlement, by what logic must the entire institution be banned? How does any university defend itself against the blanket allegation that it helps to “sustain” a state?

Why should any professor be held accountable for the actions of their fellow professors, let alone the decisions of politicians they may very well oppose (in Israel as in Canada)? Why should Israeli professors be banned, but not academics from other countries accused of genocidal actions, from China to Sudan?

That’s not whataboutism, it’s a glaring contradiction in a protest movement that wraps itself in the flag of free speech. It’s also a double standard — one for Jews, one for everyone else in the world.

U of T president Meric Gertler has rejected the recurring demand to boycott Israeli universities as a non-starter. But long after the fighting stops in Gaza, long after the U of T occupation is forgotten, the academic boycott will have the effect of delegitimizing, demonizing and dehumanizing the other.

The challenge is not merely formal academic bans but the informal — and far more insidious — exclusion of Israelis and “Zionists” that will creep into campus life. Instead of free speech, there will be speech chill.

Professors will be interrupted, lecturers will be disrupted, guest speakers will be disinvited. Sound far-fetched?

More in my next column about free speech — not just for protesters but professors.

Source: Clearing protesters from university campuses won’t end their chilling effect on free speech