Don’t want to pledge allegiance to the Queen? Seek comfort elsewhere: Macleans editorial

More commentary on the recanting of the reference to the Monarchy in the citizenship oath:

It would be easier to be annoyed with Bar-Natan’s hypocrisy if he was less effusive in his praise for his new homeland. “I’m definitely proud to be a Canadian,” he told the Canadian Press after the ceremony. “It’s a wonderful country, a truly wonderful country, with one small iota that I disagree with.” That said, Canada is not an à la carte proposition in which new citizens should be encouraged to sign up for the bits they like and ignore the rest. Anyone who finds the totality of Canadian democracy repulsive is welcome to seek comfort elsewhere. Perhaps in time Bar-Natan will come to realize the bothersome oath to Queen Elizabeth the Second that irks him is actually an essential component of Canada’s remarkable tradition of freedom, tolerance and diversity.

When Britain took control of Quebec following the 1759 Conquest, Canada’s “citizens”—the 70,000 or so habitants who suddenly found themselves British subjects—were initially required to take an anti-Catholic “Test Act” oath to vote or hold public office. Concern for the rights of his French-speaking, Catholic citizenry led Quebec governor Guy Carleton to replace this offensive religious obligation in 1774 with a uniquely Canadian compromise: a secular oath pledging allegiance instead to the Crown. This early expression of Canadian constitutionalism allowed the Canadiens to participate fully in society and guaranteed their freedom of religion.

Today’s oath is a direct descendant of Carleton’s innovation. It is a deliberate effort to mould an inclusive society out of diverse parts—and the very reason Bar-Natan can become a Canadian while at the same time expressing dissent, however sanctimoniously. We should be celebrating this remarkable history of toleration, not disavowing it.

Source: Don’t want to pledge allegiance to the Queen? Seek comfort elsewhere

Review: Robin Higham’s What Would You Say? … as guest speaker at the next Canadian citizenship ceremony

what would you saysRobin Higham, my helpful ‘trusted reader’ for my book, Policy Arrogance or Innocent Bias: Resetting Citizenship and Multiculturalism, has written What Would You Say? … as guest speaker at the next Canadian citizenship ceremony, an anecdote-based approach to understanding the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

His latest book develops further his thoughts on integration, first expressed in his earlier work, Who Do We Think We Are, which focussed on reasonable accommodation,.

As before, Higham uses archetype-characters both Canadian-born and immigrants to express a range of perspectives, ranging from ‘old-stock’ (indigenous, two francophones, anglophone) to ‘new-stock’ (East European, Latin American, Indo-, and Muslim) Canadians. Higham uses these characters to fashion a conversation regarding the responsibilities of integration and citizenship.

This is an effective technique to outline some of the issues involved and capture different perspectives.

However, like any anecdote-based approach, it has a number of weaknesses, starting from how one frames such discussion, and what assumptions and premises underlie his argumentation.

Higham’s underlying bias and ideology are clear. His choice of Gilles Paquet’s apocalyptic frame — political correctness, reluctance to confront, culture of entitlement, and unreasonable accommodation — and how these are interpreted, reflect a distinctly conservative perspective, focussed on social cohesion more than inclusion.

But this frame is more asserted than demonstrated through evidence, along with his underlying premise that integration is the responsibility of the newcomer. His characters all largely assert this, with the anecdotes selected to buttress his arguments, with limited examples of the more nuanced approach to integration.

In reality, there is a more complex dynamic of integration and accommodation, whereby wider society also plays a significant role in how it adjusts to the needs and requirements of newcomers, within the general framework of Canadian law.

A large part of the relative success of Canadian immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism policies reflects this integration and accommodation dynamic. Canadian society adapts over time as its diversity changes. Integration is not one-way but multi-dimensional, as successive debates over what kinds of accommodation are reasonable and what are not illustrate.

There is an abundance of evidence, ranging from Statistics Canada, OECD and other international organizations, along with and public opinion research and election results, that indicates, overall, that Canada is remarkably successful compared to other countries in building an integrated society that recognizes the diversity of different groups, and one that most Canadians are comfortable with. A large part of this success reflects precisely our ability to be flexible and accommodate difference, allowing integration to take place over time, but within the overall Canadian constitutional and legal framework.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that ‘political correctness’ and a ‘reluctance to confront’ can be seen as civility and that the alternative, as seen in the recent Canadian election (e.g., the wedge politics of the niqab), the USA (e.g., the Republican primary) and Europe is neither helpful to integration and belonging. And while a preference for a more Cartesian approach to accommodation issues may be seductive given greater clarity, society evolves with time, and the more ad hoc approach of (English) Canada has arguably proven more effective.

This is not to say that Canada is without challenges, whether it be with respect to the persistence of poorer economic outcomes, finding the right balance between integration and accommodation, or the declining rate of citizenship.

But given this, where does Higham end up on citizenship rights and responsibilities for newcomers?

  1. Be mindful of what wasn’t working when you left home – emigrated – and also remember why you chose to come to Canada. Many newcomers probably arrive here with valuable citizenship lessons for us all.
  2. Exercise civility … even towards the ‘others’ in your community. You should also find that there are many fewer ‘others’ around you once you join the ‘otherness community.’
  3. Civics … we need your engagement and investment in our democratic processes and institutions. They are our default complaint-management mechanism.
  4. Strive for low maintenance citizen status, especially, but not only, with respect to government and community-funded, social-support programs.
  5. Build trust amongst citizens, all citizens. Always talk to strangers. Seek to minimize ‘transaction costs.’
  6. Be sensitive to the package of those obvious un-Canadian transgressions. Know what kinds of things it is best to avoid.
  7. At home, be alert to your responsibility to respect and protect each of your family members’ rights. You will have to both monitor and coach the youngsters in your entourage.
  8. Accept that there are limits to the capacity of your community to accommodate new expressions of values, beliefs and traditions. Expect to have to make adjustments of your own in order for you and your family to develop and to prosper.

To Higham’s credit, these are expressed with respect, modelling how one can overcome the ‘reluctance to confront’ in a manner that encourages dialogue rather than shutting it down.

But it does beg the question: how would one construct such a list that applies to all, both old and new Canadians? My take, drawing on Higham’s list, suggests that this is not difficult:

  1. Be mindful of what wasn’t working when you or your ancestors left the country of origin and chose to come to Canada.
  2. Exercise civility towards all, whether new or old Canadians, whether from one’s ethnic or religious group or not, whether male or female, whether gay, straight or transgendered, etc.
  3. Engage and participate actively in wider Canadian political life and debates, not just ones of immediate interest to you.
  4. Our social safety net is to be used when needed, not abused.
  5. Be trustful of others and forgiving of misunderstandings.
  6. Be understanding of others and their sensitivities, whether cultural, religious or other. Accommodate where feasible and treat accommodation requests with respect.
  7. Be mindful of one’s biases and prejudices before acting or opining.
  8. Apply these in the home, workplace and wider society.

Returning to a theme that I have explored in my own writings, the relative strengths and weaknesses of evidence and anecdote, I think it important to underline that while both have their place in terms of policy development, assertions and anecdotes are invariably more susceptible to bias and ideology.

Evidence may not be bias-free — how one chooses which evidence to cite and how one constructs an evidence-based narrative — but is more constrained than relying on pure anecdote. With Ottawa returning (thankfully) to more evidence-based policy making, public servants nevertheless must be mindful of the risks of such bias in their choice of evidence, particularly since it may be less challenged by the political level.

I encourage those interested in citizenship and multiculturalism issues to read Higham’s book for his modelling of respectful dialogue. But I would also encourage all to consider how to frame such discussions in a manner that includes old and new Canadians alike, and offer my list above to continue the conversation.

A slightly condensed version of this article appeared here: Integration Not Sole Responsibility of Newcomers – New Canadian Media

Lulu Book Sale – 35 percent off, today only

Lulu 3 DecFor those interested in the print version of Multiculturalism in Canada: Evidence and Anecdote or Policy Arrogance or Innocent Bias: Resetting Citizenship and Multiculturalism, one of Lulu.com’s regular sales.

The direct link to my book page is: My Author Spotlight.

New Canadian renounces oath to the Queen, pledges ‘true’ loyalty only to Canada – Toronto – CBC News

Further to my earlier post (Man set to recant oath to the Queen right after #citizenship ceremony). He did make his allegiance to Canada clear, limiting the issue to the Monarchy.

Highly unlikely that changing the oath will be a priority for the government given so much else on their agenda, including changes to the Citizenship Act:

At a citizenship ceremony in east Toronto, Bar-Natan first swore the oath along with some 80 others and then, while being handed his citizenship certificate, informed the citizenship judge of his intent to disavow the portion of the oath pledging allegiance to the Queen.

He formally recanted that part of the oath following the ceremony and handed the judge a letter explaining his decision.

“I wish to affirm my allegiance, my true allegiance to Canada and the people of Canada, but also to disavow the royalty part and only the royalty part of the citizenship oath,” Bar-Natan told the judge as others looked on.

“I hear you sir. And I thank you for your honesty,” said citizenship judge Albert Wong, who shook Bar-Natan’s hand. “I welcome you to Canada and I look forward to the contributions you will make.”

Bar-Natan later said he had felt “somewhat humiliated” at having to say the oath at all, despite being able to disavow the part of it he disagreed with later.

“I do feel that it is comparable to hazing, the fact that you are required to stand up and express views that are opposite to yours,” he said. “I don’t think it is a part of Canada to impose political speech on others. To impose opinions on others.”

Bar-Natan added that a website he has set up — disavowal.ca — will allow other Canadians to publicly disavow their pledge to the Queen, regardless of when they took their oath.

Bar-Natan’s controversial decision sparked some strong reactions on social media.

“Strip him of citizenship the moment he disavows the oath. If he doesn’t want to keep the oath, he shouldn’t be made a Canadian,” tweeted one person.

“Why do people come here if they have no intention of following the basic requirements,” said another.

Bar-Natan’s lawyer said he hoped his client’s actions would draw the new Liberal government’s attention to re-evaluating the wording of the citizenship oath that deals with the monarchy.

“He underlined how silly it is to require somebody to say it,” said Peter Rosenthal. “I hope that will contribute to the public debate about this and the present Liberal government will do what the Chretien government almost did in 1994.”

In the 1990s, former Liberal prime minister Jean Chretien was set to scrap the oath to the Queen but got cold feet at the last minute, then-citizenship minister Sergio Marchi has told The Canadian Press.

Source: New Canadian renounces oath to the Queen, pledges ‘true’ loyalty only to Canada – Toronto – CBC News

Man set to recant oath to the Queen right after #citizenship ceremony

While I am no fan of the current citizenship oath and its reference to the Queen (even if the reference refers more to the institution of the Crown, rather than the Queen personally), I find these kinds of cases silly.

The proper way to change the oath is not through the courts but rather through Parliament.

And it does beg the question, whether recanting should be viewed as renouncing citizenship?

A soon-to-be Canadian has served notice that he plans to recant the mandatory Oath of Allegiance to the Queen immediately after he becomes a citizen.

In a letter sent to the citizenship court judge earlier this month, Dror Bar-Natan states his opposition to the oath, which he calls “repulsive,” and his plan to renege on the pledge following his citizenship ceremony on Monday.

The Queen is a symbol of entrenched and outdated privilege and the pledge is tantamount to a “hazing” ritual, Bar-Natan said in an interview.

“To become a Canadian citizen, I am made to utter phrases which are silly and ridiculous and offensive,” he said. “I don’t want to be there.”

Bar-Natan, 49, a math professor from Israel who has been in Canada for 13 years, was one of three longtime permanent residents who challenged the constitutionality of making citizenship conditional on promising to be “faithful and bear true allegiance to Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, her heirs and successors.”

In upholding the requirement, Ontario’s top court said the Queen remains Canada’s head of state and the oath was a “symbolic commitment to be governed as a democratic constitutional monarchy unless and until democratically changed.”

The court also found that all citizens have the right to espouse anti-monarchist views and new Canadians could “publicly disavow what they consider to be the message conveyed by the oath.”

Source: Man set to recant oath to the Queen right after citizenship ceremony – Macleans.ca

Black Friday: 30 percent off print books

Lulu 27 NovFor those interested in the print version of Multiculturalism in Canada: Evidence and Anecdote or Policy Arrogance or Innocent Bias: Resetting Citizenship and Multiculturalism, one of Lulu.com’s better sales, 30 percent off.

The direct link to my book page is: My Author Spotlight.

European Union Democracy Observatory on #Citizenship Revocation Workshop papers

An extensive series of papers on the issue of citizenship revocation and banishment. For the cognoscenti given the amount of the material.

Audrey Macklin’s rebuttal of those advocating revocation (Kay HailbronnerChristian Joppke and Peter Schuck) is, no surprise to those who follow my blog, convincing:

Ultimately, arguments about citizenship revocation turn on underlying conceptions of what citizenship is for, and expectations about what citizenship as legal status can achieve. Citizenship signifies membership, but beyond that general descriptor, citizenship inhabits multiple registers across many disciplines which are not reducible to or fully commensurate with one another. Citizenship as legal status is powerful because it carries the force of law, but also limited in what it can achieve for precisely the same reason. It is enabled and constrained because it is citizenship law and because it is citizenship law.

States can and do use law to promote and endorse commitment, patriotism and active citizenship. They do it through public education, programmes for social inclusion, support and assistance, support for the arts and recreation, and other policies that build solidarity and encourage ‘good citizenship’. These various spheres of public activity are enabled through legal frameworks, and so law plays an important role here. Citizenship law’s chief constructive contribution lies in imposing (reasonable) requirements for naturalisation (such as residence and language acquisition) that genuinely facilitate integration and commitment to the national community.

The state must also be concerned about ‘bad citizenship’ and it falls to the criminal justice and national security regimes to address the most egregious conduct that endangers or harms the national community. To conclude that contemporary citizenship law is ill-suited to advancing punitive goals does not deny that some people are very bad citizens, or that law plays a crucial role in addressing that fact. It simply opposes the recruitment of citizenship law to punish bad citizens by demoting them to non-citizens[9]. A man who attacks his mother may be a terrible son who deserves to be prosecuted for his crime, but it is not the job of family law to disclaim him as the son of his mother. Citizenship law is not criminal law. Nor is it national security law. Nor should it be rigged to open up a trap door that shunts citizens to immigration law.

Accounting for citizenship status’ specific legal character also guides us toward what law can (and cannot) achieve. A number of plausible accounts of citizenship’s normative foundation circulate in political theory. They typically involve some idea of commitment or allegiance, whether to the state, the constitution, or democratic self-government. I do not here express a preference among them, but rather observe that they tend to focus on the internal relationship between state and citizen, and the grounds upon which the relationship may be properly said to have ruptured. They do not attend to the external dimension of legal citizenship, namely the role of nationality in stabilising the international filing system for humanity, and they do not furnish a satisfactory normative explanation for why the ‘bad citizen’ should be assigned to another state.

Citizenship law cannot subject to legal regulation the myriad values, practices and aspirations ascribed to citizenship-as-belonging. This is unsurprising: Citizenship status enfranchises citizens above the age of majority, but there is no legal compulsion to vote (except in Australia. Belgium, Brazil and a few other states) and citizenship law does not purport to penalise those who never exercise their right or duty of active citizenship. Citizenship law does not purport to regulate access to most types of civil and social citizenship (in Marshallian terms).

Nevertheless, defenders of revocation insist that citizenship law can and should regulate ‘loyalty and allegiance’ of citizens. The criminal law can punish people for intentionally committing wrongful acts, including treason, murder, and all other forms of horrific violence that concern us here. Some assailants may openly express contempt for their country of citizenship, while others (like the Ottawa shooter Joppke cites) display a messy history of mental illness and petty criminality preceding recent conversion to Islam. The putative value added by citizenship revocation is precisely that it makes lack of allegiance and loyalty the central element in defining crimes against citizenship. But to paraphrase Aldous Huxley, loyalty and allegiance are like happiness. They are byproducts of other activities. Fostering love of country is a valid aspiration of states and worth cultivating. But it cannot be manufactured by the carrot of a citizenship oath (as Joppke has elsewhere acknowledged), nor will it be conjured by the stick of revocation. Law is not adept at producing sentiment on command.

Space constraints have led me to focus on those submissions that directly challenge my own position, and I have not responded to the cogent, provocative and creative insights offered by so many contributors. My own thinking has been deepened and provoked by them, for which I express gratitude and appreciation. I admit that I took as my remit citizenship revocation only in the literal, legal sense. I also acknowledge the criticism that confining my focus to citizenship revocation does not pay due regard to the claim that deportation of non-citizens may also constitute banishment in some circumstances, with attendant human rights implications. I hope that nothing I have said here gives the appearance of foreclosing or prejudging broader or different conceptions of banishment. There is always more to be said, and much to be done.

Source: EUDO CITIZENSHIP

Inside the $100 Million Scheme to Send the Middle East’s Most Unwanted People to Africa | VICE News

More on how the Gulf states use citizenship policy:

El-Baghdadi’s experience isn’t new or uncommon for Middle East’s large and rapidly growing community of exiles and refugees. Palestinians have been expelled in large numbers from both Jordan and Kuwait in the past when they’ve rubbed those countries’ rulers the wrong way.

What is new, however, is the way the Gulf States, intolerant even of critical tweets, are now punishing their own citizens by rendering them stateless. This, el-Baghdadi says, is part of a new, harsher interpretation of the social contract among the region’s oil and gas rich monarchies. “Being a citizen or a ‘local’ can potentially make you a lifelong recipient of government largess,” he says. In return for a cradle-to-grave welfare system “you just need to be completely apolitical and quiet.” Rocking the boat has become an increasingly risky business.

Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, three of the Gulf states have revoked the citizenships of hundreds of people, the majority of them advocates for political reform or democratization. Bahrain has revoked the citizenship of 159 people since 2012; Kuwait made about 100 of its citizens non-Kuwaitis with the stroke of a pen in 2014 and 2015. The UAE stripped seven of its citizens of their nationality in 2011; in July 2014, the regional Al Sharq newspaper claimed that hundreds more had been secretly rendered stateless. Amnesty International has independently made a similar claim — that Emerati authorities planned to revoke the citizenship of “scores” of nationals.

Abu Dhabi. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

In 2014, Oman passed a law allowing the government to arbitrarily revoke the citizenship of anyone working “against the interests” of the state, and Bahrain passed similar legislation allowing the state to strip the citizenship of anyone who failed “the duty of loyalty.” Saudi officials have publicly mulled following suit.

This January, Kuwaiti authorities arrested Saad al-Ajmi, the onetime director of the Kuwait office of the Saudi Arabian television channel Al-Arabiya, as he was about to board a flight to Saudi Arabia with his family. His arrest — for skipping out on a short jail sentence that he says he was not aware of — surprised many in Kuwait who knew al-Ajmi as the well-regarded spokesman for the Popular Action Bloc, a parliamentary coalition that is vocally critical of the government appointed directly by the Emir of Kuwait. Surprise turned to shock when, three months later, al-Ajmi was stripped of Kuwaiti citizenship and deported from the country.

When the head of a household loses citizenship in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE, their families are often also stripped of their citizenship, creating a multiplier effect: Hundreds of people may have ultimately lost their status as Kuwaiti citizens due to the purge of 2014, according to human rights researchers tracking their cases, while more than 1,000 Bahrainis may have been plunged into the administrative void. These are people who learn that they and their loved ones have gone from being citizens of some of the world’s wealthiest countries — and most comprehensive welfare states — to being outcasts and exiles without a home.

Source: Inside the $100 Million Scheme to Send the Middle East’s Most Unwanted People to Africa | VICE News

”Global citizenship is essentially a branding exercise” and passport shopping is big business – Quartz

Interesting and relevant interview with the author of The Cosmopolites: The Coming of the Global Citizen (Columbia Global Reports, Nov. 2015), Atossa Araxia Abrahamian. Worth reading in its entirety in its discussion of citizens of convenience as well as those without citizenship rights. Two of her responses:

QZ: But in between this global jet-set demographic, either the very rich or the very politically connected, and people at the other end of the spectrum—Syrian refugees, the bidoon, which you’ve written about in The Cosmopolites, people who are just trying to get documented so they can participate in a society and survive—is there a middle ground? Would an ordinary person want multiple passports?
AAA: Totally. I’m sure you have friends, and I have tons of friends who are now trying really hard to find an Italian grandparent or a German grandparent to get that extra passport. And it’s a great thing to have, it gives you so many opportunities and makes life so much less of a bureaucratic pain in the ass.
Some people are deeply offended by nationality of convenience, but it’s not insidious. You’re just trying to live and work in another country. What’s wrong with that?

QZ: There are also security reasons for obtaining multiple passports, right?

AAA: Yes, if you’re from a place that’s kind of politically unstable. Take for example, if you’re Egyptian or Libyan, a place in the world that’s a little volatile, politically, and you’re rich, and you can afford to have an escape route, it seems pretty wise. You don’t necessarily need another passport to do it, but if it’s an issue of “we need to leave now,” it’s a pretty great thing to have.

QZ: So, you can be a global citizen and still have love for one country in particular. You can be a nationalist and an internationalist?

AAA: The Stoics and the ancient Greeks imagined cosmopolitanism as concentric circles of belonging. You have yourself and your family, your town, your kingdom. You can extrapolate to a circle that’s a nation, and maybe the EU, or if you’re Pan-Africanist, you have an Africa circle, and then the whole world.

 I think that, for me, the biggest political question is, okay, if we’re global citizens, how do we manage redistribution. Where do we pay taxes? For what, to whom, to what end? I think nobody’s really figured that out yet. Piketty talks about a global wealth tax, but it’s unclear how that’s actually going to happen.

One way to do it might be taxing financial transactions—but I don’t even know! That’s way above my paygrade. But I think that’s the central issue as markets become more global and people become more global, you still need some mechanism of redistribution. Libertarians love global citizenship because you’re off the hook for it, right? If you’re not rooted, you’re like, “Well, I don’t have to pay taxes.” That was the whole reason for Gerard Depardieu not wanting to pay taxes in France was, “I’m a global citizen.”

So, I think that’s the essential question for me. Right now, we do need countries and democracies to implement this. Because no one else is doing it. No one’s come up with anything better.

Source: ”Global citizenship is essentially a branding exercise” and passport shopping is big business – Quartz

Seeing the Same Canada? Visible Minorities’ Views of the Federation

IRPP - Visible Minorities and the Federation.001A useful report by IRPP researchers Antoine Bilodeau, Luc Turgeon, Stephen E. White and Ailsa Henderson on the views regarding the federation of visible minorities, divided into both immigrants and second or more generations.

These regional differences, while not terribly surprising, nevertheless are revealing in that they reflect the overall regional perspectives (similarity between visible minority and majority population in Ontario, weaker regional grievances in the West among visible minorities, and greater support for national institutions in Quebec among visible minorities).

While the authors note that the federal model of multiculturalism is attractive to visible minorities is not new, it highlights the failure of Quebec’s efforts to create an alternative interculturalism narrative, along with the all too often exaggeration of the nuanced differences between the Quebec and federal approaches).

As to their recommendation that the Quebec government should adopt a formal interculturalism policy, while sensible in some respects, this would likely reopen some of the less productive debates of the past (e.g., the PQs Quebec Values Charter). Ironically, it also might undermine the rhetoric of the Quebec model of interculturalism, given its subtle differences with multiculturalism.

One of the weaknesses of CIC/IRC citizenship program was precisely its lack of stronger citizenship promotion in Quebec, which reflected more processing and efficiency concerns rather than reinforcing Canadian identity. This will likely continue, even if it is one of the few IRC programs in Quebec, one that can play an important role in reinforcing the federal presence in Quebec.

The transfer of multiculturalism back to Canadian Heritage will provide scope for more multiculturalism programming in Quebec and thus reinforcement of Canadian identity.  (Within CIC, there was a feeling that under the Cullen-Couture agreement, which transferred immigrant selection and settlement services to Quebec, that multiculturalism program funding for Quebec was not needed – missing an opportunity to assert federal presence.):

The authors show that, compared with the majority population, members of visible minority groups as a whole have a stronger sense of loyalty to the federal government than to provincial governments, express greater support for Canada’s national policies, and are less inclined to endorse historical grievances about the Canadian federation. As for competing national and provincial visions of Canada, members of visible minority groups embrace a national vision more strongly than the majority population.

However, the extent to which members of visible minority groups hold distinctive views about the Canadian federation depends on the province they live in and whether or not they were born in Canada. In Ontario, visible minorities’ views are almost indistinguishable from those of the majority population. In Alberta and in British Columbia, visible minorities born abroad hold somewhat weaker regional grievances than the majority population. However, those born in Canada see the federation in similar terms as the majority population.

The greatest difference between visible minorities and the majority population is in Quebec, where visible minorities born abroad and those born in Canada express considerably stronger support for a national vision. The differences in outlook on the federation between non-French speaking members of visible minority groups and the rest of the Quebec population are particularly striking.

The findings suggest that the federal government’s multiculturalism policy offers a model that appeals to members of visible minority groups. Its highest level of support is among visible minorities in Quebec, whose government has never supported multiculturalism policy and has yet to offer a formal and official alternative.

[conclusion] … If the attractiveness of the federal model appears to exert an influence over visible minorities in Alberta and British Columbia, it might be enhanced in Quebec because of the alternative narrative proposed by the Quebec government. The Quebec government has never officially supported the federal multicultural model and has instead proposed a model of interculturalism that has yet to be stated formally in an official policy and remains unfamiliar to most Quebecers (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). Our findings thus lend support for those arguing for the Quebec government to adopt an official policy of interculturalism (Rocher and White 2014). A formal policy positioning of the Quebec government on matters of ethnocultural diversity would stand as a symbolic gesture recognizing the contribution of diversity within Quebec society and would promote increased interaction between minorities and the broader population. By so doing, the government could favour a rapprochement between the narrative adopted by visible minorities in Quebec and the dominant one found in Quebec and hence appease some of the tensions that have marked Quebec society over the last few years.

Our final observation concerns an exception to the patterns for all four provinces just discussed. Visible minorities in all four provinces are substantially more prone to see a positive impact of the policy of multiculturalism on Canadian identity than the majority population. This finding is not necessarily surprising considering that, more than any other issue examined in this study, the policy of multiculturalism speaks to the contribution of ethnocultural minorities to the construction of Canadian identity. Moreover, as we argued, the federal government’s multiculturalism policy might be the pivot around which the more federally oriented narrative of visible minorities is structured. Should the growing presence of visible minorities have one significant and consistent impact, it may well be to further strengthen acceptance of the country’s multicultural heritage — in the process further strengthening this pillar of Canadian identity.

http://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/study-no56.pdf?mc_cid=7023dd89ad&mc_eid=86cabdc518