When liberal institutions fail us: “Envious reversal” and the Hamline …

Bit of an overlong read but raising some uncomfortable realities:

Everywhere we look, we’re being failed by institutions that are “supposed” to protect us — and not just those, like the police, that progressives have good reason to distrust.  Take the recent example of Hamline University in Minnesota, which firing an adjunct art professor, Erika López Prater, for showing her class a famous medieval Islamic painting of the Prophet Muhammad. Hamline failed both the professor and its Muslim students, though in different ways.

As was widely reported, López Prater gave both written and verbal advance warnings for devout Muslim students who may regard such images as sacrilegious — a widely-held view today that was not so dominant in the past. But one student who disregarded the warnings complained afterwards, leading the school’s administration to label López Prater’s actions as “Islamophobic” and terminate her promised future employment — a decision move vigorously opposed by the Muslim Public Affairs Council as well as the University of Minnesota’s Department of Art History.

“The painting was not Islamophobic,” MPAC wrote. “In fact, it was commissioned by a fourteenth-century Muslim king in order to honor the Prophet, depicting the first Quranic revelation from the angel Gabriel.” This reflects the diversity of the Islamic tradition, the group explained:

“As a Muslim organization, we recognize the validity and ubiquity of an Islamic viewpoint that discourages or forbids any depictions of the Prophet, especially if done in a distasteful or disrespectful manner. However, we also recognize the historical reality that other viewpoints have existed and that there have been some Muslims, including and especially Shīʿī Muslims,  who have felt no qualms in pictorially representing the Prophet (although often veiling his face out of respect). All this is a testament to the great internal diversity within the Islamic tradition, which should be celebrated.”

This episode rapidly gained momentum on the right as an example of “wokeness” and diversity run amok, but it’s important to understand that Hamline’s decision was opposed to the diverse traditions found within Islam.  In the lawsuit López Prater filed against Hamline, she stated that the student in question, Aram Wedatalla, “wanted to impose her specific religious views on López Prater, non-Muslim students, and Muslim students who did not object to images for the Prophet Muhammad — a privilege granted to no other religion or religious belief at Hamline.”

So the university clearly failed to protect everyone involved as well its principles. It obviously failed to protect López Prater and academic freedom (leading the faculty to call for the president’s resignation). But it also failed Wedatalla, president of the school’s Muslim Student Association, and the rest of its Muslim community in at least three ways: it failed first at its core mission to educate, as well as at its mission to educate about education. It clouded people’s understanding of actual Islamophobia, making it more difficult to combat, and well before the incident in question, it created conditions where Muslims didn’t feel included. These ancillary or earlier failures didn’t get much attention, but are equally important in appreciating how badly Hamline failed.

Mark Berkson, chair of the Department of Religion, shed some light on this in a letter to Hamline’s student newspaper: “First, a majority of the world’s Muslims today believe that visually representing the prophet Muhammad is forbidden,” he wrote. “And yet here is another fact — Muslims have created and enjoyed figural representations of Muhammad throughout much of the history of Islam in some parts of the Islamic world.” He also touched  on the second failure, observing that to label López Prater’s presentation as Islamophobic was “not only inaccurate but also takes our attention off of real examples of bigotry and hate.”

MSNBC’s Mehdi Hasan put it more directly: “There’s a reason right-wing media have been all over this story. Because they don’t want to admit that there is a real problem with anti-Muslim bigotry in this country. And now they can say, look, look, it’s those Muslim bullies and censors on college campuses and those liberal cowards in charge of colleges who have invented the whole thing, who’ve taken offense of things they shouldn’t be offended by.”

Perhaps most importantly, Berkson implicitly addressed Hamline’s third failing by explicitly drawing on Islamic thought: “Intention is a key concept in Islam,” he noted, “and the Prophet Muhammad himself said that people will receive consequences for actions depending on their intentions. … When, as in the case here at Hamline, everyone involved has good intentions… and is doing their best to honor principles (religious and academic) that are important to them, we can find our way forward in open conversation and mutual respect.”

Ironically enough, Berkson’s letter was taken down two days later, supposedly because it “caused harm.” What’s more, Wedatalla’s supporters were not receptive to his message. The school newspaper reported another Muslim student saying, “Hamline teaches us it doesn’t matter the intent, the impact is what matters.”

It’s peculiar but instructive to hear students in this case rely on a liberal arts college, rather than the Prophet Muhammad, in arguing their case. This feels like an obvious contradiction — but why did they respond that way? There are hints of earlier incidents in the campus newspaper’s story: When the dean of students sent out an email, Muslim students “had hoped that the email would include reference to past Islamophobic incidents,” and several students at a later meeting “expressed frustration at repeated incidents of intolerance and hate speech in recent years, and asked about new forms of intervention.”

With an institutional track record of mistrust and alleged inaction, it’s less surprising that Berkson’s words fell on deaf ears. Islamophobia is widespread in America today, and anyone subjected to systemic attack becomes traumatized by it, perhaps especially when a “liberal” institution like Hamline purports to oppose such abuse, but repeatedly fails to address it. So it would be misguided to attack Hamline’s Muslim students for this incident. The contradiction in their response mirrors the contradictions they’ve likely lived with all their lives — contradictions that Hamline had a responsibility to address.

Berkson could well be right about eveyone’s good intentions, but Hamline’s institutional failures managed to thwart or misdirect them. Even the suppression of Berkson’s letter was presumably the result of “good intentions,” however misconceived and poorly applied.

Blaming the liberals

“Everyone blames the liberals,” John Stoehr argues, reflecting on what happened at Hamline, and how it’s been received. “No one blames the institutions for getting the liberals’ ideas wrong.” That’s really the point made above. It’s easy to say that academic freedom is a core liberal value, and that violating it is a major failure. But religious freedom, non-discrimination and pluralism are liberal values too, and Hamline had systematically failed on all those counts already.

Liberalism is the force in politics and society that aims to flatten entrenched hierarchies of power in order to advance liberty, equality and justice for all, not merely the few,” Stoehr writes, linking to Rick Perlstein’s essay on right-wing education panic, “They Want Your Child!

“Public schools are where young people encounter ways of being and thinking that may directly contradict those they were raised to believe; there really is no way around it,” Perlstein writes. “Schools are where future adults receive tools to decide which ideas and practices to embrace and which to reject for themselves. Schooling, done properly, is the opposite of conservatism. So is it any wonder it frequently drives conservatives berserk?”

Note carefully what Perlstein is saying: “[T]he opposite of conservatism” doesn’t mean that education is leftist indoctrination, but rather that students are given a choice to “decide which ideas and practices to embrace and which to reject,” given tools to decide for themselves. They are free to choose “conservative” values and ideas, of course — but that act of choice is the essence of liberalism.

Returning to Stoehr’s article, his central observation is that “the illiberals blame the liberals for the institutions that get the liberals’ ideas all wrong. By getting the liberals’ ideas all wrong, the institutions end up affirming what the illiberals say about the liberals.”

Three things strike me here: First, the initial problem was institutional conservatism, that is, the fact that Hamline cared more about its institutional image than its actual mission. Second, this enabled a dynamic of “envious reversal” (which I wrote about here in 2015), which allows illiberal forces to portray liberals as intolerant and oppressive and portray themselves as heroes of freedom, exposing liberal hypocrisy. Third, the problem is far more general, and goes well beyond the Hamline incident or the educational realm.

Image is everything

First, we need to be clear that an educational institution’s mission is inherently liberal, in the sense described above: It’s about empowering autonomous individual development, and in many cases about a long-term commitment to flattening hierarchies as well.

Of course all institutions want to survive and care about their images. But healthy, vibrant institutions don’t need to focus on those things. If their mission is successful, then image and survival will take care of themselves. Now, the neoliberal era hasn’t been kind to educational institutions, and there aren’t nearly as many healthy, vibrant ones as there used to be. That’s my deeper point: Our institutions are failing because of deep systemic problems, most fundamentally the neoliberal abandonment of public goods of all kinds, as described in the recent book, “The Privatization of Everything.”

In his commentary on the Hamline incident, historian David Perry wrote that rather than viewing this through a campus culture-war lens, we should “instead look at two issues: labor rights and the exercise of power”:

“In this case, López Prater was an adjunct, a gig worker with no guarantee of future employment. This is a massive problem in academia, of course, where there has been a generational shift from stable, full-time employment to contract work. That’s been bad for those of us who work in higher ed. It’s been bad for students, too.

As a full-time professor, I built infrastructure to support student learning year after year after year. A gig worker can’t do that. But it’s been good for the bosses. It saves them money. And it lets them dispose of workers when messy situations — such as a student complaining about blasphemy — arise.”

Perry goes on to note that “the power dynamics on college campuses are happening everywherethroughout our economy, and no one is safe when it’s easier for the bosses to wash their hands instead of getting down into the dirt with the rest of us doing the work.” Neoliberal capitalism normalizes this, not just for businesses, but for all institutions. (“Running government like a business.”) It’s tragic and wrong that Hamline cared more about its institutional image than its actual mission, but it’s also the fundamental logic of today’s neoliberal gig-work world.

“Envious reversal”

This comes from British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein. Most people understand the concept of projection: The pot calling the kettle black, which tends to happen when something we don’t like about ourselves leads us to point fingers at somebody else. In Freudian psychology, it’s considered a primitive form of ego defense. Klein perceives a more complex process starting in infancy, well before the ego (according to Freud) is even formed. This involves both projecting what is unwanted and “introjecting” what is wanted. Klein introduced the term “projective identification,” which has taken on a variety of meanings, but “envious reversal” refers to something quite specific. To quote from the website of therapist Chris Minnick:

“In this envy driven “role reversal” (or “envious reversal” for shorthand), two processes take place instantaneously and simultaneously. The first is that the projector rids himself of the unwanted baby state, by projecting it into the “container” [the recipient of the projection]. Simultaneously, the projector steals the desirable state of affairs (i.e., some aspect of the “container’s” identity) from the container and takes it in for himself.”

Conservative attacks on liberals often involve envious reversal, as when conservative Republicans attack Democrats as the “party of slavery” and the “party of Jim Crow.” That’s technically true as a matter of history, but it’s envious reversal in its effort to erase history — that is, the 60-year history of Republican attempts to gain and hold power based on white supremacy, racism and the lingering legacy of the Confederacy.

It’s particularly striking when conservatives try to claim democratic socialist Martin Luther King Jr. as one of their own, based on a single out-of-context sentence about hoping for a future in which his children “will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character,” as if King’s idea of character were not radically different than theirs and as if King had never criticized racism as a systemic, institutionalized evil, along with militarism and excessive materialism. King’s systemic analysis of America’s moral, racial and political problems was squarely in line with a broad range of other Black activists, academics and theologians whom conservatives now demonize as exponents of “critical race theory” — another manifestation of envious reversal.

Another example can be seen with Christian nationalism. While nationalism based on some form of ethnic or racial exclusion is a nearly universal phenomenon, America was explicitly not founded on religious or ethnic grounds, but based on aspirational universal principles derived from philosopher John Locke and other secular theorists. Andrew Seidel’s “The Founding Myth: Why Christian Nationalism is Un-American” stands as the definitive refutation of the Christian nationalists’ bogus claims. When Christian nationalists cast themselves in the image of the founders, and depict secular liberals as alien corrupters, that’s a classic example of envious reversal. The battle to reclaim the true meaning of Religious Freedom Day, which I’ve written about multiple times, is all about combating that specific envious reversal.

What happened at Hamline was only one example of another long-standing trend in envious reversal: portraying liberals as intolerant and close-minded and conservatives as the opposite. That’s a tough sell when it comes to religious conservatives with their constant public bullying and censorship campaigns, but libertarians love this, particularly on higher education. Conservatives pour a lot of money into the narrative of a left-wing campus free speech crisis which is largely imaginary, as described in this 2018 analysis. It was largely imaginary at Hamline, too, as Perry notes: “If this story is a sign of ‘political correctness run amok,’ isn’t it odd that all these liberal professors are clearly on the side of the instructor here?”

Contrast what happened at Hamline with another small liberal arts college in the news in January: New College, in Sarasota, Florida, where Gov. Ron DeSantis staged an institutional coup, installing a slate of right-wing trustees to change the nature of the school, which has been described as “a beacon of shining success… ranked at or near the top of college listings nationwide on multiple measurements” including “74 Fulbright Fellowships over the past 15 years” and “more scholars per capita than Harvard and Yale.” Those are the words, by the way, of state Sen. Joe Gruters, a Republican, opposing a 2020 proposal to merge New College into Florida State University.

For DeSantis, this was just a low-hanging piñata, a small school with a small alumni community and an ideal target for to push his “war on woke” presidential propaganda campaign. His field general on this front is Chris Rufo, whose master plan for destroying public education was described by Salon’s Kathryn Joyce last April. She noted that Rufo’s framing narrative was a variation on the “cultural Marxism” conspiracy theory I’ve written about previously. By attributing changes in public education to a sinister leftist conspiracy, Rufo justifies the right’s conspiratorial takeover.

This is all delusional, of course. For one thing, multiculturalism — a key element in the “cultural Marxism” narrative — owes nothing to the oft-vilified Frankfurt School. As David Neiwert notes, it “has much deeper roots in the study of anthropology,” going back to Franz Boas and his students Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. “It became ascendant as a worldview in the post-World War II years,” he writes, “after it became apparent (especially as the events of the Holocaust became more widely understood) that white supremacy — the worldview it replaced — was not only inadequate but a direct source of wholesale evil.”

So what conservatives really fear is power-disrupting change — just as Perlstein describes — and that change came first from scientific inquiry, and then from a recognition of the horrors produced by white supremacy produced. Of course white supremacy has always been a key thread in American politics, but so has multiculturalism, at least in embryonic form. Thomas Jefferson, that master of contradiction, reflected both sides: a slaveowner who was also the father of religious liberty in law. As he wrote about the 1777 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, it contained “within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mohametan, the Hindoo and Infidel of every denomination.” The flowering of multiculturalism over the last several decades thus represents the realization of something always present in the promise of America. When conservatives like Rufo try to portray it as an alien evil, and present themselves as true Americans, they’re engaged in a particularly perverse form of envious reversal.

Addressing systemic institutional failure

Let’s return to Stoehr’s observation that in “getting the liberals’ ideas all wrong, the institutions end up affirming what the illiberals say about the liberals.” This is reflected, I would argue, in all our institutions. We can see it most vividly in the lack of justice: in the persistent police killings of unarmed black men three years after George Floyd’s murder on the one hand, and in Donald Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign despite his public crimes too numerous to mention.

Put simply, our institutions as a whole have ceased to work as they’re supposed to. Everyone realizes this, but we disagree about what’s gone wrong and how to fix it. Conservatives have a simple story to tell: Things used to work, but liberals screwed it all up. Get rid of the liberals and “woke ideology” and we can “Make America Great  Again.” Liberals, by their very nature, see things in more complex fashion and vigorously dispute amongst themselves. But they all more or less agree that things didn’t use to work ideally in some idyllic past. Some things were better for some people, certainly, but others were much worse. It’s a complicated history, and it’s going to be a complicated story as we move forward. Multiple perspectives will be necessary.

But there is a simple guidepost available: reclaiming the meaning of freedom, itself a core liberal value that conservatives have stolen in a masterstroke of envious reversal. In 2020, I wrote about George Lakoff’s book “Whose Freedom?: The Battle Over America’s Most Important Idea,” which described two models of freedom in America, the essentially dynamic liberal model and the conservative model trapped in the past:

“Progressive freedom is dynamic freedom. Freedom is realized not just in stasis, or at a single moment in history, but in its expansion over a long time,” Lakoff writes. “You cannot look only at the Founding Fathers and stop there. If you do, it sounds as if they were hypocrites: They talked liberty but permitted slavery; they talked democracy but allowed only white male property owners to vote. But from a dynamic progressive perspective, the great ideas were expandable freedoms.”

On the other hand:

“What makes them “conservatives” is not that they want to conserve the achievements of those who fought to deepen American democracy. It’s the reverse: They want to go back to before these progressive freedoms were established. That is why they harp so much on narrow so-called originalist readings of the Constitution — on its letter, not its spirit — on “activist judges” rather than an inherently activist population.”

Conservatives want to keep us tangled in the contradictions of the past, in the supposed name of  “freedom.” But real freedom comes through freeing ourselves from those contradictions, even if new contradictions arise. Once we understand freedom as dynamic, the prospect of new contradictions need not deter us from moving forward. It simply presents new challenges for us to meet.

Source: When liberal institutions fail us: “Envious reversal” and the Hamline …

Ibbitson and Bricker: Population decrease is irreversible. How will we manage the decline of humanity?

In contrast to previous articles and participation in events in favour of increased immigration in Canada, a more public acknowledgement of the longer-term reality as well as the more immediate impacts on housing, healthcare and infrastructure that impact on the quality of life of Canadians.

Decline in population does not necessarily mean a decline in society and well-being but the philosophical and practical challenges of a shift from growth to stability, let alone regrowth, are substantial as they note:

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had a grim message. The country’s extremely low birth rate had placed the nation’s future in peril.

“Japan is standing on the verge of whether we can continue to function as a society,” he declared in a speech in January to the country’s national legislature, the Diet.

“Focusing attention on policies regarding children and child-rearing is an issue that cannot wait and cannot be postponed.”

Japan is not alone. Using United Nations data, we have identified 36 countries that are losing population right now, with more set to join them. The population explosion is ending, to be replaced by a global implosion.

More than 30 countries, from China to Italy to Japan, are expected to lose half their population, or close to it, over the course of this century. That number will likely increase as the years go by.

When our book Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline came out in 2019, we were derided in some quarters for predicting that the challenges of population decline, not population growth, would dominate this century.

Today, though different analysts offer different projections, the best-researched studies predict that the planet’s population will start to decline some time around or soon after mid-century.

The revelation that China, the world’s most populous nation, started losing people last year brought the issue into sharper focus.

In Empty Planet we wrote: “Population decline is not a good thing or a bad thing. But it is a big thing.” Four years on, we’ve changed our minds. We believe that population decline is a very bad thing, one that could define our future. If, that is, we have much of a future left.

How bad is it?

In the past few years, a number of countries have posted shocking population data. South Korea now has the world’s lowest total fertility rate – 0.8, more than one full baby shy of the 2.1 children per woman, known as the replacement rate, needed to sustain its population. China’s fertility rate has declined from 1.8 in 2017 to 1.0 or 1.1last year. The total fertility rate (TFR) in the Philippines has plummeted from 2.7 in 2017 to 1.9 in 2022, the equivalent of almost one full baby. Italy, with the fastest shrinking population in Europe, has so many old people and so few young people that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has warned “Italy is destined to disappear.”

Many people celebrate the environmental benefits of declining fertility. Fewer people on this Earth will ease the stress on the planet, helping to reduce carbon emissions and promote biodiversity. We celebrate this, too.

But a society in which fewer children are born each year than were born the year before, even as people overall are living longer, suffers the economic consequences of aging: fewer and fewer workers whose taxes support pension and health care systems; fewer young consumers to purchase the cars and houses and appliances and clothing that drive economic growth; fewer creative young minds to help us innovate our way out of pressing problems.

As societies age, problems multiply. They become collectively more vulnerable to infectious diseases, because immune systems are, on average, weaker. Infrastructure must be rebuilt to accommodate a frail population.

As older people seek to preserve their quality of life, younger people – especially younger women – struggle to meet the needs of their own families while looking after older relatives, even as they seek to preserve and advance their careers. “It’s a mental-health issue. It’s an infectious disease issue. It’s an aging-in-place issue. It’s a geriatric care issue,” Ellie Graeden, research professor with the Georgetown University Center for Global Health Science and Security, told us.

Facing the prospect of losing more than half its population over the next 70 years, Mr. Kishida announced the creation of a new agency tasked with arresting, or at least slowing, the loss of Japan’s population. That agency will confront three possible solutions, none of which offers long-term relief from population decline.

The Canadian solution

Countries that don’t have enough babies to sustain their population can turn to immigrants. Canada leads the Group of Seven in population growth despite having a fertility rate of only 1.4 because, since 1990, both Conservative and Liberal governments have recruited immigrants aggressively, with 465,000 expected to arrive this year and a target of 500,000 set for 2025.

Many countries, including Japan, don’t permit widespread immigration, preferring to preserve their cultural homogeneity. But immigration is an imperfect solution even for countries that welcome large numbers of them.

For one thing, we may soon start to run out. In 2001, China was the No. 1 source country for immigrants to Canada, and had been for a decade. Today it is a distant second thanks to declining fertility and a rising standard of living. India, which will overtake China this year as the world’s most populous country, now accounts for almost 30 per cent of all immigrants to Canada. But India’s fertility has been dropping rapidly and now sits at 2.0, below replacement level. The Indian government now expects that in about 30 years the country will be losing population.

Apart from sub-Saharan Africa, there are few places on Earth with fertility rates well above replacement rate, and even in that region birth rates are coming down faster than just about anyone expected. Kenya, for example, has gone from eight births per woman in 1973 to 3.3 last year, as African society urbanizes, girls receive more education and women have greater access to birth control. In the country’s capital, Nairobi, the total fertility rate is now down to 2.5, which is at or close to replacement rate for countries with higher levels of infant and child mortality.

And robust immigration comes with its own challenges. While they sustain economic growth and fill job shortages, the 500,000 immigrants who will arrive in Canada in 2025 will need somewhere to live, contributing to the shortage of affordable and available housing in the cities where they tend to congregate. They will also need a family doctor, increasing pressure on overburdened health care systems.

Thus far, Canada has integrated hundreds of thousands of new arrivals every year with little social strain. But if resources fail to meet demand, the strain could increase.

The Hungarian solution

A few countries with low birth rates and an aversion to immigrants are trying to pay women to stay home and have more babies. Hungary is the best-known example.

To reverse four decades of population decline brought on by low fertility, outmigration and anti-immigrant policies, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government has greatly expanded financial supports for large families.

A woman with four children pays no income tax for life. There are also housing supports, child-care supports, SUV subsidies and other incentives. In January, the government unveiled a new program that would offer a lifetime income tax exemption for any woman who has a child in her 20s.

The program is hugely expensive: Five per cent of Hungary’s GDP goes to supporting families with children. And although the fertility rate ticked up in the past decade as the measures were introduced, last year it fell back from 1.6 to 1.5.

The most important reason, by far, not to emulate Hungary’s example is that it seeks to reverse decades of effort by women to achieve greater equality.

The Orban government has been steadily imposing limits on abortion. One recent report by the State Audit Office, titled Signs of Pink Education in Hungary? warned that highly-educated women had trouble attracting men, thus reducing fertility, and a preponderance of female teachers might be feminizing society, leaving people ill-equipped to deal with “a frozen computer, a dripping tap, or furniture that has arrived flat-packed and there is no one to put it together.”

The Hungarian Solution might better be called The Handmaid’s Tale solution.

The Swedish solution

Sweden offers the flip-side of Hungary’s approach. As with a number of other European countries, the Swedish government offers strong support for women who wish to have children without sacrificing their career.

Parents receive 480 days of parental leave. In a traditional arrangement, the father must take at least 90 of those days. Parents are paid 80 per cent of their salary to look after a sick child. Almost all children age 1 and older are in preschool. As a result of these and other supports, few Swedish parents say affordability is an issue when choosing how many children to have.

The downside? These policies are expensive, contributing to a personal income tax rate of more than 50 per cent. And they are only partly effective. While Sweden’s total fertility rate peaked at 2.0 in 2010, by 2020 it had dipped to 1.7 and the pandemic pushed it down to around 1.5 or 1.6.

The lesson is clear: Spending a great deal of money to support couples with children is partly effective, but not sufficient to create enough babies annually to sustain a population without immigrants, although Sweden accepts a large number of immigrants.

So how can countries increase fertility rates and reverse their population decline without relying on dwindling sources of immigrants? The short answer is: they can’t.

The low fertility trap

In the Pew study, of the 43 per cent of childless adults who cited a reason other than simply not wanting to have kids, one-fifth cited “medical reasons.” This is most likely due to the medical challenges resulting from the increasing trend among couples to delay childbirth until women are in their 30s and 40s. But it could also allude to chemically influenced declines in male fertility.

Simply put, once a society gets used to low fertility, it becomes irreversible. The phenomenon is known as the low fertility trap. A Pew Research study reported that between 2018 and 2021, the share of childless adults under 50 who said they were likely to remain childless increased from 37 per cent to 44 per cent.

Those surveyed cited medical concerns, financial concerns, environmental concerns and the lack of a partner as reasons they were childless. But 56 per cent said they “just don’t want to have children.” A large number of young people today enjoy the freedom of remaining childless and plan to keep it that way.

China has moved so far from its Draconian one-child policy, abandoned in 2016, that men are now encouraged to donate semen and women to give birth even if they are not married, which still carries a deep stigma in Chinese society. But the experience of other countries suggests these and other methods will fail.

There could also be an environmental component to the dearth of births. The environmental and reproductive epidemiologist Shanna Swan has been chronicling a steady decline in the sperm count of men – 1 per cent per year since 1972 – and an increase in miscarriages in women – 1 per cent per year over the past five decades – which she attributes in large part to an “alphabet soup” of chemicals in products used in everyday life that are impairing reproductive ability.

The latest research of her team, which includes data on sperm counts in men in developing as well as developed countries, reveals that the rate of decrease in sperm counts has increased to 2 per cent a year.

“We are seeing an acceleration in the decline,” Dr. Swan said in an interview. “The data is more alarming rather than less alarming.

For all these reasons, then, we need to prepare for a future in which the elderly will steadily grow as a percentage of the population even as the percentage who are young steadily shrinks.

To address workplace shortages and protect pension funds, governments could raise the retirement age and introduce mandatory long-term-care insurance, with workers and employers contributing to funds that would sustain the elderly in their final, frailest years.

We might also need to start means-testing public pensions, with the affluent obliged to contribute to, but not eligible to receive, the Canada Pension Plan and other supports.

Some contemplate more drastic solutions. Yusuke Narita, an economics professor at Yale University who is of Japanese descent, has caused a furor by suggesting that mass suicide or mandatory euthanasia might be the best solution to societal aging in Japan. “I feel like the only solution is pretty clear,” he said in 2021. “In the end, isn’t it mass suicide and mass ‘seppuku’ (ritual disembowelment) of the elderly?” Prof. Narita later told The New York Times that his remarks had been taken out context, but he has repeatedly spoken of mandatory euthanasia as a possible solution to Japan’s large cohort of elderly citizens.

While that may seem shocking, Canada’s Parliament is examining legislation that would expand the grounds for medical assistance in dying (MAID). The Quebec government is planning legislation that would permit people who have been diagnosed with conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease or other dementias to provide advanced consent for MAID when their condition deteriorates to a certain point. In Canada, being able to provide prior consent to be euthanized is only a matter of time.

Degrowth?

The long-term solution might be even more drastic: adopting policies of degrowth. This economic and social philosophy, which has been growing in popularity since the early 2000s, seeks to respond to global warming and other environmental challenges by abandoning growth-oriented policies.

In the introduction to a recently released book, Degrowth and Strategy, several of the book’s contributors defined their movement as one that “strives to reorganize societies to make them ecologically sustainable and socially just,” through “a deliberate reduction of material and energy throughput.”

In terms of personal lifestyle, that could mean anything from adopting veganism to eating only locally grown food to avoiding air travel.

In terms of economic and political systems, it could mean an end to capitalism, although such an outcome is not inevitable.

It does mean “addressing the growth dependency of contemporary economies, understanding those dependencies and then understanding how we can manage and reduce them,” Anders Hayden, a political scientist at Dalhousie University who researches growth and sustainability issues, told us.

This must mean “much more equity in distribution, more equity in ownership, so that people have enough to live on and states have adequate revenues to fund necessary programs,” Prof. Hayden said.

“It would require a radically reformed capitalism, and then we can question whether we would call it capitalism or not.”

This is not our way. We believe any shift to degrowth would be socially destabilizing, at the very least.

Yet some version of degrowth may be inevitable, as low levels of fertility start to undermine the foundations of growth. The massive population explosion between the end of the Second World War and today was unpredictable and disruptive; the implosion is bound to be unpredictable and disruptive as well.

We are confronted with this truth: Most societies are no longer able to sustain their population level, and the remainder are headed quickly in that direction. Unless and until future generations choose to reverse that trend, decline will define us.

John Ibbitson is writer at large at The Globe and Mail. Darrell Bricker is CEO of Ipsos Public Affairs. They are the authors of Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline.

Source: Population decrease is irreversible. How will we manage the decline of humanity?

Clarkson: If Canada loses its citizenship ceremonies, we risk losing ourselves

Calls out the efforts by the government and IRCC to diminish the value and meaningfulness of citizenship and highlights their lack of understanding of the fundamental meaning and belonging of ceremonies (disclosure I am providing citizenship and related data to the ICC).

To date, op-eds from the left (Toronto Star), centre (Globe) and right (National Post). Tenor of reader comments is against the proposed change but how many will submit written comments through the Gazette process and will the government listen.

And will either the NDP or CPC deem it important enough issue to raise given the understandable fixation on the government’s handling (or mishandling) of Chinese government foreign interference allegations:

One of the most wonderful things about becoming a Canadian is the citizenship ceremony.

There, new citizens are surrounded by a little crowd of other people who want to become Canadian too. It might be held in a federal citizenship office or in some other location that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada has found that can accommodate people, though at the Institute for Canadian Citizenship, we try to hold our citizenship ceremonies in public spaces: libraries, city halls, university campuses, places we hope these new citizens will return to. Always, there is incredible joy – the kind that comes with recognizing that something special is happening. Wearing a head scarf or a beard, or an embroidered vest in brilliant colours, these about-to-become citizens know that they are doing something meaningful.

When I became an Officer of the Order of Canada in 1992, I was told that I would be able to preside over these ceremonies in the way a citizenship judge does. I was delighted by the idea: For my family and me, who arrived as stateless refugees during the Second World War, the precious gift of Canadian citizenship that we received in 1949 was something we cherished and celebrated.

The first ceremony over which I presided was overwhelming: there was such excitement and warmth among people of different backgrounds – even though the whole thing was taking place at the Metropolitan Toronto Police headquarters!

When my husband John Ralston Saul and I founded the Institute for Canadian Citizenship, one of the first things we wanted to do was to have special ceremonies to acknowledge how important this moment is in people’s lives. For six years, as Governor-General, I presided over citizenship ceremonies, and invited people who already had Canadian citizenship to come specifically to meet the new citizens, to sit at roundtables with them and have discussions before the formal ceremony. Everyone shared coffee and doughnuts afterward. It wasn’t elaborate, but it was congenial and hospitable.

When I left Rideau Hall, I decided that this would be a feature of the institute, and for 16 years we carried this on with the wisdom and guidance of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. With their help, we have ceremonies in which we have Indigenous speakers and music, and roundtables where people can share their experiences of Canada up to that point.

It’s not a big deal. But it is important. And everyone who is sworn in across the country as citizens recognizes that the others around them are people who, like them, have taken the risk of leaving their own country with the courage to come and make a new life in Canada.

We can’t overstate the significance of being able to be around each other when we take our citizenship vows, or of new citizens receiving the formal and yet warm welcome they get from professional and excellent Immigration officials, who leave no misunderstanding as to what a citizen is and how a citizen can contribute to their country. The citizenship judges, whether they are federal appointees or members of the Order of Canada, always take the ceremonies to heart, and it is so moving to see people from so many different countries at each ceremony joining together and saying that they will become part of Canada.

Now, there are reports that in order to get rid of an administrative backlog, new citizens will be given the option to take their oath online, rather than in a physical ceremony. Frankly, I’m horrified by this. I believe that people want ceremonies to mark important passages in their lives. I think welcoming people in person is the least we can do as a country. I feel that the people who work at the ministry understand that, and that they do put a human face on it as much as they can.

The idea that Canada, which is perhaps the most successful immigrant nation in the world, would resort to a machine-oriented way of saying that you are now a citizen, is egregious. In 2001, on my state visit to Germany as Governor-General, then-president Johannes Rau told me how deeply impressed he was that we inducted people into citizenship personally. He lamented the fact that Germany generally sent out citizenships by some form of registered mail.

I can’t help feeling very emotional when I talk about this, because I do believe that ceremonies are important stages of every human being’s life. There is a reason why we have birthday parties, for instance, or why co-workers often share a cake when someone leaves for another job. There is a reason why people go to city hall or to a religious institution to bring meaning to their marriage. There is humanity in marking milestones in each other’s company; it is the mark of a civilized society. And Canada should always think of itself as a society which not only knows how to welcome people, but shows that a personal welcome is only the beginning of belonging.

Adrienne Clarkson was Canada’s 26th Governor-General and co-founder of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship.

Source: If Canada loses its citizenship ceremonies, we risk losing ourselves

Yuan Yi Zhu: Canadian citizenship is embarrassingly cheap and online oath makes it cheaper

Apart from the unnecessary snark and playing to the gallery if the comments on Zhu’s article are any guide, he nails the substance of this misguided change. But hopefully he and others will take the time to file their objections to the proposal through the Canada Gazette process (I will share my input in a future post):
Newly published figures by Statistics Canada revealed that fewer than half of permanent residents now take Canadian citizenship within 10 years, a 40 per cent decline over two decades.
Cue soul-searching among the usual Ottawa think tankers, wondering why the world’s denizens no longer wanted to be on “Team Canada.” Why did so many recent immigrants, arriving in record numbers, refuse the citizenship we hand to them practically for free and after as little as three years’ residence, or 1,095 days spent within the country out of the last five years?

Source: Yuan Yi Zhu: Canadian citizenship is embarrassingly cheap and online oath makes it cheaper

In Niagara Falls, Roxham Road asylum seekers find less space and more strife as tourist season nears

Not all that surprising:

It had been a long time since Marie Saintil had last been to church, when she found herself at the pulpit of the Faith Tabernacle in Welland, Ont., on a recent Sunday evening.

“Est-ce que tout le monde parle Créole?” she asked the small Haitian congregation, a half dozen or so of whom had been shuttled to the service in their Sunday best from the various hotels in nearby Niagara Falls where they are living. The congregation nods in unison – yes, they all speak Créole.

Ms. Saintil, a lawyer of Haitian background herself, was there that evening to deliver not a sermon, but a primer on the refugee claims process.

When she took a job with the Niagara Community Legal Clinic in January, she was looking for a change of pace after two decades of practising immigration law in Toronto. Instead, she has found herself in the throes of a migration crisis, with thousands of asylum seekers unexpectedly placed in a tourist town that is not equipped to absorb them, transferred by the federal government from Quebec after crossing at Roxham Road.

More than 2,841 asylum seekers have been transferred to Niagara Falls by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada since last June, spread across more than 1,400 hotel rooms in the city after being shuttled on from their arrival in Quebec.

Another 702 have been placed in Ottawa, 618 in Windsor, and 1,396 in Cornwall, according to the IRCC. They began transfers to Atlantic provinces at the end of last month, with 63 so far transferred to Halifax and 30 people transferred to Fredericton.

But nine months in – as understaffed settlement and social services scramble to support the newcomers, and with as many as one in 12 hotel rooms occupied as the city’s tourism season looms – tensions are starting to build.

“These people are taken from Roxham Road in Quebec, and they’re put into a bus, and they’re dumped. And the word is dumped – they’re dumped here,” Ms. Saintil said.

“And now they’re being told, you’re not really wanted because we have tourists coming … It was fine to have them here during the slow season, in the wintertime, but now that the tourists are coming, you’re not wanted.”

Ms. Saintil cannot represent them, she told the congregants at the church, as she handed out information packets and business cards. This has not been her clinic’s mandate, but she feels compelled to help given how few lawyers in the area do this work.

The migrants did not choose Niagara Falls. They ended up here after being repeatedly shuffled along by American and then Canadian authorities – perpetually treated as someone else’s problem. Regardless of where their journeys began, these migrants have often crossed several borders before arriving in Canadain an effort to flee violence, persecution and poverty – and have faced hostility along the way.

At the Mexico-U.S. border, thousands of people are crossing each day. And once in the United States, they have faced increasing hostility, including from political leaders in southern states such as Texas and Florida, whose Republican governors have transported thousands of asylum seekers to places such as New York, Washington and Martha’s Vineyard in Massachusetts.

In New York, Democratic politicians have responded to an influx of migrants by offering one-way tickets to Plattsburgh, N.Y., a short distance from the Canadian border at Roxham Road.

Under the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the U.S., asylum seekers must file their claims in whichever country they arrive in first, which means they will be turned back if they attempt to get into Canada at official border crossings. Because that agreement covers only official border points, crossings at the unofficial Roxham Road entry have risen sharply.

Now in Canada, the migrants are finding themselves unwelcome in Quebec, too. With the numbers at Roxham Road continuing to rise – close to 40,000 migrants entered Canada there last year – Quebec’s Premier François Legault has protested the “strain” the influx has put on his province’s social services and urged Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to shut it down, or send them elsewhere.

“Everybody is sending the ball to somebody else,” Ms. Saintil said. “It’s a blame game.”

With a population of 95,000 people, Niagara Falls depends heavily on tourism and is known as much for the massive falls that straddle an international border as it is for the garishness of its main drag, lined with haunted houses and wax museums. The city has upwards of 16,000 hotel rooms, Mayor Jim Diodati said, and at first the IRCC contracts seemed like welcome news for hotels that have been struggling after three years in a pandemic.

“We’ve got lots of rooms, we’ll do our part and help out as much as we can – that’s kind of the attitude as it started,” he said. But as the numbers began to grow, he said the mood has shifted. “They went from 87 to 300, to 687, to 1,500 … And then we were told 1,700 and 2,000 were the next steps,” he said. “And, you know, we weren’t really sure how much we can handle, and at what point it would become disruptive, because we’ve never been through anything like this before.”

After a video call with Sean Fraser, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, and his staff last month, the mayor said he still doesn’t know how long the hotel rooms are booked for. He said he’s concerned about the impact on the coming tourism season, which he describes as the “the goose that lays the golden eggs here.”

“A tourist is going to spend money in restaurants, the attractions, the casinos, the wineries … whereas these folks are just staying in the rooms,” he said. “A lot of people are counting on it to feed their families and pay their mortgages and pay their rents. So we’re asking, ‘What’s the plan?’ ”

IRCC spokesperson Jeffrey MacDonald wouldn’t provide a timeline on how long the hotel rooms have been leased, citing confidentiality. In an e-mail, he said the department takes into account availability, cost, transportation and access to support services.

Mr. Diodati said he was told numbers were likely to peak in the coming weeks, as they began to transfer people to other areas, including the Atlantic provinces. But in the meantime, he warns the mood of the town has begun to shift. “Most conversations that people have with me start off with ‘I don’t want to be insensitive, and I’m not complaining … but where are we going with this?’ ” he said. “And we’re trying to get answers.” The mayor said he has asked the federal government for more money to help the city and local organizations keep up with demand. IRCC said in a statement that it was working with the local government to ensure they are prepared and to respond any concerns.

On a Friday evening almost one week after the mayor’s meeting with the immigration minister, the lobby of the Ramada hotel on Lundy’s Lane was crammed with 100 or so people lined up for dinner.

This type of scene, Ms. Saintil believes, is the real unspoken concern. “It just doesn’t look good to see all these refugee claimants in the hotels. That’s what it is,” she said. “It doesn’t look good in pictures with American tourists.”

On a frigid Sunday afternoon, Henry Carmona and a group of fellow Venezuelan migrants headed down from their hotel to take in the icy view of the falls.

The economic collapse and rise of political violence in Venezuela have led to one of the largest displacement crises in the world. It is a mass exodus that has sent a quarter of the country’s population – more than seven million people – fleeing to neighbouring Colombia and then onward.

It took these men years to get here. They each show off photos of the families they had to leave behind because of the dangerous nature of their journeys.

Truck drivers by trade, the men are eager to get their work permits, learn English and begin to find work. But they landed in Niagara only a few days earlier, bused in from Quebec after their arrival at Roxham Road.

They have appreciated their treatment in Canada so far, they said. They laughed as they took in the various gimmicky attractions on Clifton Hill. Next door to the Museum of the Stars, a stiff-moving dinosaur head called out to them from the Looney Tunes-esque Bone Blaster Shootin’ Gallery.

And though they’d expected to be in Quebec, they are content in Niagara for now; whenever their work permits are ready, they plan to go where the work is. Other asylum seekers who spoke with The Globe and Mail, some from Colombia and others from Haiti, said the same.

At the YMCA of Niagara, Deanna D’Elia, manager of employment and immigrant services, has scrambled to move some part-time workers to full-time in an effort to address the spiralling need.

Of their 65-member team, 25 or so are focused specifically on settlement. Others work on helping them find employment, though a major part of that process depends on work permits – which, given the backlog, can take many months or even years to be issued.

“Individuals and families have come to Canada to seek a better life and they are eager to work,” Ms. D’Elia said. In the meantime, many must rely on social assistance, which in today’s rental market can barely cover a room in the city. It’s a situation that she says has “amplified” discussions about the housing crisis, both regionally and across the province and country.

It’s a pressure that is being felt in social services across the region, which were under pressure even before the asylum seekers arrived.

On a recent Friday morning, Pam Sharp and her team at Project SHARE were preparing for a busy day at the largest food bank in Niagara Falls. They’d had to close the day before for an ice storm, and knew it was likely to be busier as a result.

Demand in the community was already very high. In addition to the food bank, they also provide homelessness prevention supports and other services, and served the equivalent of one in 10 residents last year, she said.

They see, on average, 100 families a day, and the infusion of 3,000 new vulnerable people is stretching them to their limits. Both the regional and city council have declared a state of emergency on homelessness, mental health and opioid addiction.

Ms. Sharp has noticed more and more asylum seekers coming in – for example, of the 157 families they served one day this week, 60 identified as asylum seekers –and the team has on occasion done outreach at the hotels directly.

“We want to make sure that anyone coming into our city is able to meet their basic needs,” she says.

Janet Medume, executive director of the Welland Heritage Council and Multicultural Centre, which is leading the local settlement efforts. said they weren’t told in advance about the asylum seekers’ arrivals but began to hear word through community networks last summer. Since then, more than 20 community organizations have banded together to develop a strategy, but she said they need both funding and staffing boosts from all levels of government to keep up.

“Let’s inject more resources so we can focus on ensuring individuals get the help they need, and hopefully get employment quick enough, so we can get them out of there as soon as possible,” she said. “Give us those resources and we’ll be okay.”

At the church Sunday evening, Ms. Saintil lingered after the service, passing out information pamphlets and business cards. She wore a sad smile as she watched a trio of siblings – ages 8, 7 and 1 – playing in the foyer. The older two, sisters, showed off cartwheels and boasted about their favourite school subjects.

She urged their father to get them scarves for the cold weather, and he nodded enthusiastically. They’ve been here eight months in a hotel, Ms. Saintil said, after they waved goodbye. The parents were only recently able to meet with a lawyer for the first time.

“Everybody’s doing their best,” she said. “But if they’re hoping this is not going to be a crisis in a month or two, they have to start acting now.”

Source: In Niagara Falls, Roxham Road asylum seekers find less space and more strife as tourist season nears

How should we think about implicit biases? 

Good discussion of the strengths, limits and how they should be used:

A couple of years ago, during Merrick Garland’s confirmation hearing for becoming the attorney-general of the United States, one of the senators questioned him about implicit bias: “Does it mean that I’m a racist … but I don’t know I’m a racist?” he asked Mr. Garland, who responded by saying, no, everyone has biases, and this doesn’t make you a racist.

This is a reasonable answer, but others would give a different one. Some people think research on implicit bias shows that, yes, in the words of the famous Avenue Q song: “Everyone’s a little bit racist.” The conclusion that everyone-is-racist (or at least every-majority-group-member-is-racist) is part of the public conversation, taught in schools, and pressed into employees during diversity training.

Which side is right? Well, it’s complicated. We need to think about what these tests are really measuring.

The most famous implicit bias test is the Implicit Association Test – the IAT, which was developed by the psychologists Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji. To get a sense of it, I encourage you to go online and try it out yourself. Here’s­­ how it goes, taking as an example a test that’s developed to explore implicit attitudes toward the young and the elderly: The subject watches a screen as either words or pictures flash by. The pictures are of either old faces or young faces, and the words are either positive (like “pleasant”) or negative (like “poison”). Then, for one set of trials, subjects are asked to press one key for either a young face or a positive word and another key for either an old face or a negative word. For another set of trials, it’s reversed: one key for a young face or a negative word and another key for an old face or a positive word.

The logic here is that if you have a positive association with youth and a negative one with the elderly, then your performance on young-positive/old-negative trials will be quicker than young-negative/old-positive. And, in fact, people do find it more natural to associate young with positive and old with negative than the other way around.

Such studies have been done with millions of people and have found the same pattern of negative associations when tested on attitudes toward gay, overweight and disabled people, and, most relevant to the question of racism, Black people. These effects are present even when questions about explicit attitudes find no bias and are often present even in subjects who belong to the group that is less favoured. People who take this test are often shocked, and their takeaway is often something like “I’m racist against Black people and never knew it.”

There is a lot of value to this work. It’s worth knowing that someone might not want to be biased, might wish to treat people equally, but nonetheless be influenced by psychological forces that are beyond their control.

But do measures like the IAT tap racism in a real sense? Here are three big qualifications to keep in mind:

First, these methods get a lot of play in the popular media, where they are often portrayed as racism-detectors. The worst example I ever saw was on the television show Lie to Me, where a crack team of investigators uses a muddled version of the IAT to determine which of a group of firemen has committed a hate crime. They find that one firefighter is slower than the rest to associate positive words such as principled with Black faces such as Barack Obama’s, and this settles it. “I’m not a racist,” he later protests. His interrogator snaps back: “You don’t think you are.”

In fact, the test is too unreliable to be used this way. Your score on the same test taken at different times can vary, and so the same person might prefer white people when tested on Monday and have no bias when tested on Tuesday. If you take the test and don’t like the result, just take it again.

Second, it’s unclear that your score on the IAT can predict your actual behaviour. One meta-analysis finds that one’s score on the IAT provides very little insight into how you act toward people of other races. This is no surprise given the problem above – if your IAT score bounces around depending on when you take the test, how can it do a good job at predicting your behaviour in the real world?

Third, these biases might be unconscious in the sense that we don’t know how or when we are influenced by them, but it’s not like people don’t know they exist. When I list certain groups – Black people, the overweight and so on – nobody is surprised to hear that people (perhaps not themselves, but people in general) harbour biases against them.

So how should we think about implicit biases? One theory is that they might have nothing to do with negative attitudes toward a group – something which many people see as constitutive of racism. Instead, as the psychologists Keith Payne and Jason Hannay argue, measures such as the IAT tap our appreciation of regularities in the environment, including regularities in how people think about other people. In other words, tests like the IAT don’t measure attitudes, let alone bad attitudes – they pick up associations.

Such associations are everywhere: Given the environment I was raised in, I associate peanut butter with jelly, Ringo with George, O Canada with hockey games. I also associate airplane pilots with men and nurses with women. And I associate some groups, such as the young, with mostly good things and other groups, like the elderly, with mostly bad things. If my world were different, I would have different associations. Dr. Payne and Dr. Hannay conclude that we should think of implicit racial biases as “the natural outcome of a mind that generates associations based on statistical regularities, whenever that mind is immersed in an environment of systemic racism.”

Regardless of whether we see this recording of statistical generalizations as racism, we are left with a problem here. This is the tension between how we believe we should act and how we actually act. The first arises through reflection and is our considered view as to how we should treat people. The second is influenced by all sorts of forces, including all the associations, explicit and implicit, we carry about in our heads.

For some people, there is no clash at all. Consider certain findings about bias, such that bidders on eBay tend to offer less money for a baseball card held by a Black hand than by a white one, or that judges are more likely to give a scholarship to a student who is a member of their political party. Some people, learning that they are biased in this way, will shrug and say it’s fine. It’s okay to discriminate. But some of us are at war with ourselves. We don’t want to be swayed by our associations and stereotypes. We want to be fair, and we see this as requiring us to treat people as individuals and ignore the categories they fall into.

You might think that the solution here is to try hard to be unbiased. Perhaps learning about and thinking about implicit biases can help us override them, just through force of will. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. We are good at self-justification. We make choices that are shaped by prejudice and bias and convince ourselves that we were being fair and impartial.

My own view is that we do better when we construct procedures that override the biases we don’t want to have. If you’re choosing who to hire and don’t think that race should matter, set up the situation in such a way that you don’t have this information about the people you are judging. This is the logic of procedures such as blind auditions. Or, from a different moral viewpoint, set up diversity requirements that explicitly take into account factors such as race so as to override the prejudices you’re trying to overcome. These are different solutions – and people have strong views about which is preferable – but the impetus is the same: to engineer processes to eradicate bias where we think that bias is wrong.

This is how moral progress happens more generally. We don’t typically become better merely through good intentions and force of will, just as we don’t usually lose weight or give up smoking just by wanting to and trying hard. But we are smart critters, and we can use our intelligence to manage our information and constrain our options, allowing our better selves to overcome those gut feelings and associations that we believe we would be better off without.

Paul Bloom is professor of psychology at the University of Toronto, and the Brooks and Suzanne Ragen Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale University. His latest book is Psych: The Story of the Human Mind.

Source: How should we think about implicit biases?

Biden administration releases first-ever report on diversity in federal government 

Of note, embryonic to Canada’s tracking diversity for close to 30 years. USA data is hampered by the limited groups captured in the USA census.

Canadian numbers for comparison purposes (core public administration) are in the table below:

2021 Census2021 EE ReportPopulation BenchmarkCitizenship Benchmark
GroupPopulationCitizensAllEXGap AllGap EXGap AllGap EX
Total VisMin population26.5%19.6%18.9%12.4%-7.6%-14.2%-0.7%-7.2%
South Asian7.1%4.9%3.3%2.8%-3.7%-4.3%-1.5%-2.1%
Chinese4.7%3.6%3.2%1.5%-1.6%-3.2%-0.4%-2.1%
Black4.3%3.3%3.8%1.9%-0.4%-2.4%0.6%-1.4%
Filipino2.6%1.9%0.7%0.2%-1.9%-2.4%-1.2%-1.7%
Latin American1.6%1.1%0.8%0.4%-0.8%-1.2%-0.3%-0.7%
Arab/West Asian2.9%2.0%2.1%1.9%-0.8%-1.0%0.2%-0.0%
Southeast Asian1.1%0.9%0.8%0.5%-0.3%-0.6%-0.1%-0.4%
Korean0.6%0.4%0.3%0.2%-0.3%-0.4%-0.1%-0.2%
Japanese0.3%0.2%0.1%0.1%-0.2%-0.2%-0.1%-0.1%
Visible minority, n.i.e.0.5%0.4%2.1%1.3%1.6%0.8%1.1%0.9%
Multiple visible minorities0.9%0.8%1.5%1.7%0.6%0.8%0.7%0.9%
Not a visible minority73.5%71.7%75.9%83.2%2.4%9.8%4.2%11.5%
Arab and West Asian2.9%2.0%-2.0%
    Arab1.9%1.4%-1.4%
    West Asian1.0%0.6%-0.6%

The Biden administration has a new warning for private employers: “We are going to start being a competitor of yours,” said Dr. Janice Underwood, director of the Office of Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) at the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in an interview with The 19th. 

The federal government will fight to attract top talent to its workforce. To that goal, OPM, which serves as the human resources arm of the federal government, has released its first-ever report on diversity across the federal workforce. The 31-page document breaks down hiring and retention across agencies and gives a snapshot of the administration’s efforts to remove barriers for applicants from underrepresented communities. It’s an area where the federal government has historically struggled, Underwood concedes. 

In June 2021, Biden issued an executive order directing OPM and other federal agencies to draft a strategic plan for prioritizing diversity in hiring and retention. The February 15 report is a result of that order and offers some of the first simple, publicly accessible demographic data on the federal workforce, with breakdowns by race, gender and disability. 

The numbers reflect a federal government that made marginal gains toward racial diversity between 2017 and 2021. Black employees accounted for 18.15 percent of the federal workforce in 2017 and 18.19 percent in 2021, while the percentage of Latinx employees jumped from 8.75 percent to 9.95 percent. Asian workers went from 5.99 to 6.49 percent, and Native American and Alaskan Native workers dipped in representation from 1.69 percent in 2017 to 1.62 in 2021. Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders made up 0.51 percent of workers in 2017 and 0.59 percent in 2021. 

Women made up 43.38 percent of the workforce in 2017, a number that grew to 44.44 percent in 2021. Nonbinary workers are largely excluded from the tracking, an area that the report and Underwood note will change with future reporting. 

“Having this gender binary doesn’t go far enough [and] is not inclusive for our workforce,” Underwood told The 19th. “So OPM and the office of DEIA in particular are really taking the lead and reimagining what that could look like, everything from what it looks like on forms to what it looks like when you apply for jobs.”

Underwood said the government can’t change what it doesn’t measure. Officials add that the tracking effort, in general, is critical to serving an increasingly diverse public and also competing for the top minds in hiring.

“In order to recruit and sustain the best talent, we must ensure every service-minded individual feels welcome and supported in contributing their talents to the Federal workforce,” said OPM Director Kiran Ahuja in a statement. 

The first-ever report reflects a government in the midst of cultural change. Last September, OPM launched a council of chief diversity officers across federal agencies. The group has been tasked with setting government goals and benchmarks and identifying obstacles that might keep some groups from applying for jobs. 

Among the first changes has been to the federal government’s practices for hiring interns, positions that have historically been unpaid. 

“Everybody can’t afford to move to Washington, D.C., for an unpaid internship, and we have amazing talent all over this nation that does not have proximity to Washington, D.C.,” Underwood said. “I’m really excited about the launch of the paid internship guidance that all of our federal agencies have received.”

While the report does not track employees’ LGBTQ+ status, it does emphasize the expansion of LGBTQ+-friendly practices, including increased use of pronouns throughout government to affirm trans and nonbinary colleagues, as well as reiterating that all contracted insurance carriers cover gender-affirming care. 

It also offers data on disability hiring for the first time. Efforts to increase disability employment in the federal government are long-standing. Since the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the federal government has been obligated to hire people with disabilities, although the law did not set any particular numbers or benchmarks. 

In 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order stating that the federal government, as the nation’s largest employer, must “become a model for the employment of individuals with disabilities.” The order directed federal agencies to improve efforts to recruit, hire and retain workers with disabilities, with the goal of hiring 100,000 more people with disabilities into the federal government over five years. 

According to a 2015 report from the OPM, the government slightly exceeded that goal, at 109,575 new hires. However, the federal government has struggled with retention. People with disabilities working for the government are three times more likely than their non-disabled colleagues to quit. 

In January 2017, before President Donald Trump was sworn in, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission released a rule to amend regulations related to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that set a goal for 12 percent representation of people with disabilities among the federal workforce. At that time, 11.1 percent of federal employees identified as disabled. 

According to the latest report from OPM, 16.6 percent of federal employees identify as having a disability, surpassing the benchmark set under the Trump administration. The report did not include information on disability representation in leadership.

Biden’s executive order requiring a government-wide strategic plan brought disability employment under the same umbrella as other diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility efforts. 

The report is expected to have broad implications because the federal government often sets a standard for the private sector in business practices. 

“We endeavor to be the model employer for the nation,” Underwood said. “But we have a lot to learn as well.” 

Source: Biden administration releases first-ever report on diversity in federal government

Record year for EU countries granting citizenship to foreigners

Some useful data here even if 2021, not 2022. By way of comparison, the Canadian figure, in terms of total population in 2022 is higher, about 9.3 per thousand:

In total 827,300 people acquired citizenship in EU member states in 2021, an increase of around 98,300 (14 per cent) over 2020, when the number was 729,000, according to the latest data published by the EU statistical office Eurostat.

Although the figures are likely to see a ‘pandemic effect’ compared to 2020 when many countries shut down or severely restricted administrative processes during the lockdowns, the figures also show a rise compared to 2019. In that year 706,400 people were granted citizenship in EU countries.

Around the EU countries, the administrative process of getting citizenship takes an average of two years, so most of the people getting their citizenship in 2021 would have applied for it in previous years.

Largest growth in France

The largest increase in absolute terms was recorded in France (+43,900 compared to 2020), followed by Germany (+18,800), Spain (+17,700), Sweden (+9,200) and Austria (+7,200).

In 10 countries, however, the number decreased, with the largest decline in Italy (-10,300), Portugal (-7,600) and Greece (-3,200).

Among new citizens, the proportion of women was slightly higher than men (50.2 over 49.8 per cent), especially for the age groups above 30. The median age of persons acquiring citizenship in the EU was 32.

About of quarter, 25 per cent, were children between 0 and 14 years old, with the highest proportions in Slovenia (35 per cent), Latvia (34 per cent) and France (33 per cent), according to the data, which Eurostat collects from national statistical offices.

Highest naturalisation rate in Sweden

In relation to the total population, the highest number of citizenships were granted by Sweden (8.6 per thousand persons), followed by Luxembourg (7.8) and the Netherlands (3.6).

Sweden also topped EU countries for naturalisation rate, the proportion of persons who acquire citizenship in relation to all non-national residents.

Sweden granted 10 citizenships per 100 foreign residents in 2021, followed by the Netherlands (5.4), Romania (4.6), Portugal (3.7) and Belgium and Spain (both 2.7). The lowest naturalisation rate was in the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all below 0.5, while the EU average was 2.2.

Non-EU citizens most likely to naturalise

Similar to the previous year, the vast majority of people who obtained citizenship of an EU member state were from non-EU countries: 706,900, or 85 per cent of the total.

The largest group was from Morocco (86,200 people, who acquired citizenship mostly in Spain or France), followed by Syrian (83,500, mostly in Sweden and the Netherlands), and Albanians (32,300, mostly in Italy). Then came Romanians (mostly in Italy and Germany), and Turks (Germany and France).

Among new EU citizens there were also 5,370 US nationals (compared to 3,425 in 2020), with the largest number in Austria, Norway, France, Sweden and Italy.

Naturalisation of British citizens 

The Brexit vote in 2016 led to a big increase in citizenship applications among Brits who lived in the EU, as they faced the prospect of losing their rights to EU freedom of movement.

According to Professor Maarten Vink, Chair in Citizenship Studies at the European University Institute in Italy, since 2016, more than 100,000 Brits have acquired citizenship in EU countries.

The peak for citizenship granted to Brits was in 2019, and since then numbers have seen a decrease. Anecdotally, many of the applications after 2016 were from Brits who had been resident in an EU country for many years, so could have naturalised previously.

Some 10,600 Britons acquired citizenship in EU countries in 2021, ranking 19th among other nationalities. The number decreased by 5,400, or 34 per cent, over 2020.

The largest groups were recorded in Germany (2,345), Austria (1,190), Ireland (1,186), Sweden (1,131), Belgium (1,010), Denmark (546). Only 163 were recorded in France, 343 in Spain and 453 in Italy. UK national acquiring citizenship in Norway were 1,578 and in Switzerland 855.

Source: Record year for EU countries granting citizenship to foreigners

China’s Head of Ethnic Affairs Pan Yue Is Pushing Hard-line Policies

Hard to see any positive changes coming with respect to treatment of minorities:

Last October, China’s top officials convened the once-every-five-year 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to determine the leadership and political trajectory of the country for the next half decade. Xi Jinping secured a precedent-breaking third term as paramount leader of the party, confirming expectations that the congress would cement his authority and concentrate power in a single person to a degree not seen since the era of former leader Mao Zedong. Several high-profile promotions and demotions signaled that officials’ political survival depends on personal loyalty to Xi and that aggressive implementation of his policies is key to career advancement. Among the officials garnering Xi’s support is Pan Yue, who was elected as a full member of the CCP’s Central Committee.

Since last June, Pan has been head of the State Council’s National Ethnic Affairs Commission, which is responsible for policy concerning China’s “minority nationalities,” the 55 officially recognized ethnic groups who collectively represent around 8.9 percent of the total population. For decades, the CCP’s ethnic policies have oscillated between multiculturalism—recognizing and even celebrating distinct ethnic identities—and assimilationism—denying and destroying them—with significant variation at the local level. The Chinese term minzu captures this policy range: It refers both to individual “nationalities” or ethnic groups—like Han, Uyghurs, and Tibetans—and to the overarching “Chinese nation” or zhonghua minzu, which comprises all 56 (55 minorities plus the Han majority) groups.

Pan’s election to the Central Committee suggests that the Xi administration’s hard turn toward assimilationism will likely continue and perhaps intensify. Pan is the second Han official in a row to head the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, which for nearly 70 years had been led by a party member from a non-Han nationality. Since the beginning of Xi’s second term in 2017, measures related to “managing” ethnic minorities have run the gamut, from destruction of what officials deem “foreign” architectural elements such as mosque domes and the removal of Arabic signage on restaurant awnings and storefronts to the imposition of Mandarin as the sole language of instruction for certain subjects in some schools. Repression has been most severe in Tibet and Xinjiang, where local populations have been subjected to extreme restrictions on movement, constant surveillance, mass internment, and—as has been reported of Uyghur women—forced sterilization.

Pan did not initiate these policies, but he is poised to extend and expand them. Over a winding path to the center of Chinese political power—in a career spanning official media, economic restructuring, and environmental policy as well as a stint at the United Front Work Department—he has repeatedly staked out bold policy positions. He is a talented politician and an effective communicator who has long espoused assimilationist views, even before it was politically fashionable to do so. If Xi were looking for a lieutenant with the vision and policy entrepreneurship needed to guide and accelerate assimilation in his third term, then he has found one in Pan.


To the extent that Pan is known outside of China, his renown is due to the public profile he cultivated as an official in China’s environmental protection agency from 2003 to 2016. He won accolades from foreign media outlets and organizations for terminating development projects with powerful political and business support for their violations of environmental standards. He is regarded as the architect of the “Green GDP” system, which incorporated environmental harm into metrics for economic growth. Then-Chinese leader Hu Jintao’s administration endorsed this scheme in 2004 but ultimately abandoned it, reportedly due to opposition from provincial officials who resented the additional performance criteria it entailed. When Pan missed out on a promotion in 2007 and was ousted from his position as spokesperson for the then-Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008, some observers speculated that he was being sidelined due to his zealous regulation policies.

But his stint as an environmental crusader came only after a long and well-connected career in official life. Born a “princeling” in Nanjing, China, in 1960 as the son of a senior military official, Pan began his career with several years of military service. During the 1980s and early 1990s, he held editorial positions at official outlets, including Economic Daily and China Youth Daily. His networks in Chinese officialdom came through his own lineage as well as through a former marriage to the daughter of the powerful Adm. Liu Huaqing. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Pan held posts in the Economic Restructuring Office of the State Council and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, helping manage China’s transition from a planned to a market economy. Like many Chinese officials seeking to distinguish their resumes, Pan pursued an advanced degree, receiving a doctorate in history in 2002 from Central China Normal University.

Pan has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to make a name for himself through bold and controversial policy proposals. After the attempted coup against then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, Pan organized a conference of fellow princelings to formulate a strategy to secure CCP rule. The resulting manifesto, “Realistic Responses and Strategic Options for China After the Soviet Upheaval,” which Pan helped produce, called on the party to focus on ensuring social stability, exert greater control over state assets, and guard against emerging dangers—including radical economic reform and ethnic separatism. Pan elaborated some of these ideas in another piece in 2001, which circulated among high-ranking officials, on the need for the CCP to adapt and evolve from a revolutionary party to a ruling one. Later that year, he penned an essay criticizing the party’s doctrinaire hostility to religion, for which he was censured.

Pan’s tenacity has been politically costly at times but never fatal. His career slumped following the failure of the Green GDP initiative but has bounced back under the Xi administration. In 2015, Pan was again promoted within the then-Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the following year, he became party secretary and executive vice president of the Central Institute of Socialism, a ministry-level department, where he introduced new programming on Chinese civilization and launched a curriculum dedicated to promoting a unified national consciousness. He also held high-level positions in the United Front Work Department, the CCP bureau responsible for building relationships with and controlling groups and institutions outside of the party, as well as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the government agency in charge of cultivating ties with the Chinese diaspora, before his appointment as director of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission last June. Last summer, he joined a handful of other top officials accompanying Xi on a trip to Xinjiang.


We can only speculate as to why Pan’s political fortunes improved so dramatically since Xi came to power. One possible factor is that both men appreciate the political utility of Chinese tradition for constructing a unified and confident national identity. The use of culturally resonant symbols to frame political claims and mobilize the masses has long been a technique of communist power and is common to many political systems around the world. But self-styled revolutionary regimes must balance appealing to tradition and transforming society. Throughout the Maoist period, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, the CCP cast traditional culture as backward and oppressive. Since then—and especially under Xi, however—the party has forsaken much of its older Marxist rhetoric for a discourse of Chinese civilization, rebranding itself as a champion of tradition and celebrating once-abjured icons like Confucius.

Pan was an early advocate of using Chinese tradition to secure CCP control. The manifesto “Realistic Responses and Strategic Options” noted the diminished appeal of communist ideology among the Chinese people and called for the creative adaptation of traditional Chinese culture to safeguard China’s socialist system. In his 2001 essay on reforming the party’s religious policy, Pan similarly advocated harnessing religion to reinforce political control. In addition to theorizing the political utility of engaging with Chinese tradition, Pan has modeled what such engagement should look like. During his years of service in the environmental sector, he wrote extensively on the importance of the environment in classical Chinese philosophy. He synthesized his interpretation of Chinese tradition into the concept of “ecological civilization,” a state of harmony among individual humans, society, and the natural world, which he touts as one of China’s historic contributions to humanity.

But there is a dark side to what often reads as a humane exegesis of Chinese tradition: an intolerance toward local cultures and people deemed alien and resistant to it as well as a corresponding mandate to assimilate them through “ethnic fusion” or minzu ronghe. The term “ethnic fusion” connotes the adoption of Han customs, institutions, and language by other ethnic groups. It has always been part of the CCP’s lexicon but has mostly been understood as an inevitable outcome of long-term socialist development, not the immediate objective of current policy. In important speeches on ethnic work in the 1990s and 2000s, then-Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu both affirmed the “long-term” nature of ethnic identities. In the early 2010s, calls for “ethnic fusion” and “ethnic blending” grew louder in some circles as part of a larger debate on so-called second-generation ethnic policy, which focused on promoting a unified Chinese identity over individual ethnic ones. Since becoming president and leader of the party, Xi has elevated forging a common Chinese national consciousness (in some iterations, “forging a sense of community of the Chinese nation”) as a primary goal of “ethnic work” and more recently has stressed the need to promote “ethnic unity and fusion.”

As with his embrace of Chinese tradition, Pan was early in his unqualified endorsement of “ethnic fusion.” He elaborated this concept in his 2002 dissertation, “Research on the History and Actual Situation of Migrant Settlement of China’s Western Region,” a proposal to settle 50 million Han from eastern and central China into western China over the following half century. Pan argued that large-scale migration would address multiple crises China faces: easing the pressures of overpopulation in the country’s eastern and central regions, facilitating exploitation of natural resources while advancing the country’s sustainable development, and eliminating the national security threat of ethnic separatism by eroding the differences between ethnic groups and promoting “ethnic fusion.”

Pan devoted two chapters of his dissertation to identifying precedents for his proposal. He stressed the need to learn from the experience of other countries, citing the benefits reaped from large-scale migration: anti-desertification in Israel; resource exploitation in Russia; and skyrocketing agricultural production, transportation capacity, and geopolitical power in the United States. “Westward expansion,” he writes, “not only allowed America to tentatively complete its modernization but also led it to become a great power playing an increasingly important role in the world. … We absolutely can draw on some of America’s policies and measures as a reference. … We must, as quickly as possible, formulate a migration strategy with Chinese characteristics.” Pan also found ample precedent for his proposal in Chinese history, from the westward expansion of the ancient Han dynasty to the Qing dynasty’s conquest of Xinjiang. Pan linked his proposal to a longer tradition of Chinese colonization by frequently using the term tunken, a classical reference to settlement through troop garrison and land reclamation.

There is a certain ambiguity to “ethnic fusion” in Pan’s writings. On one hand, it is an inevitable outcome of history. He declares in his 2001 essay on reforming the party’s religious policy that “no matter the strength of foreign religions, whenever they enter China, they will all be integrated [xiang rong] into Chinese culture, without exception.” On the other hand, not all cultural and religious traditions are equally assimilable. On this point, Pan is particularly critical of Tibetan Buddhism and Islam, both of which he describes as “unreformed,” theocratic, and irrational. He sees Islam as especially dangerous. As he writes in his dissertation:

“Religions originally possessed a rather strong exclusionary character. Even today, the exclusionary character of Islam, which has not undergone religious reform, remains extraordinarily fierce. Many practitioners still believe in fundamentalism. From the spiritual to the material, from behavior to appearance, all the way to etiquette, diet, and so forth—many of their standards are completely based on ancient doctrines and admonishments. Many are suspicious of everything, refuse to integrate with other cultures, and do not trust any foreign political authority or external collectivity.”

Many scholars attribute ethnic tensions and unrest in Xinjiang to a combination of factors, including state repression, state-backed Han immigration and settlement, employment discrimination against Uyghurs and other non-Han peoples, and the dominance of extractive industries in the local economy. These factors exacerbate economic inequality and unemployment and, in some cases, may enhance the appeal of militancy and violent extremism against the local security apparatus as well as civilians. For Pan, however, the problem is Islam itself, which he views as stubbornly unreformed. He presents the problem as especially acute in areas where Muslims are highly concentrated—in spite of what he sees as the benevolent policies of Beijing’s leaders. As stated in his dissertation:

“Since China’s founding in 1949, the central government has extended extremely favorable treatment to minority nationalities; however, when it comes to Islam, no matter how many advantages it provides and no matter how favorable its treatment may be, the results have been far from ideal, and ethnic separatist activities remain incessant. Wherever Han people are concentrated in large numbers, there is little unrest, such as in northern Xinjiang; by contrast, wherever Muslims are concentrated in large numbers, unrest is greater, as in southern Xinjiang.”

Pan casts Islam as a spatial and demographic problem as much as a cultural or ideological one. It is unsurprising, then, that his proposed solution involves resettlement on a massive scale.

If Islam and Tibetan Buddhism are problems in Pan’s framework, so too is the system that has permitted them to persist unreformed and unassimilated. In his dissertation, Pan takes direct aim at what he characterizes as the shortcomings of the party’s conventional approach to ethnic affairs. He elaborates the damaging consequences of what he sees as excessive respect for linguistic diversity, criticizing the creation of writing systems for nationalities that previously lacked them—once a point of pride for the party: “Our goal is to strengthen ethnic unity and fusion; rather than spending energy creating ethnic scripts that never existed, it would be better to promote Putonghua [standard Mandarin], which is used throughout the country.” He also warns of the demographic danger posed by the implementation of family planning regulations (such as the one-child policy), which often exempt minority nationalities from limits on childbearing.

Pan saves his sharpest criticism for China’s system of ethnic territorial autonomy. Under this system, minority nationalities ostensibly enjoy representation in local government and certain cultural rights, including the official use of their native language, in areas where they are a local majority or are relatively populous, such as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Tibet Autonomous Region, and Inner Mongolia, among others. The CCP historically has touted the system of territorial autonomy as proof of its egalitarian rule. But Pan regards the institutionalization of cultural and demographic distinctions inherent in autonomous administration as a driver of ethnic separatism and a threat to national security. Although Pan acknowledges the system’s important contributions to ethnic equality and development, he unambiguously affirms the necessity of moving beyond it, stating that “the system of ethnic territorial autonomy is not the optimal system, less still one that can be a permanent system.”


Pan’s appointment to lead the National Ethnic Affairs Commission and his promotion to the Central Committee mark the convergence of his long-stated views on ethnic fusion and the more recent assimilationist turn in Chinese ethnic governance. Of course, what Pan wrote in his 2002 dissertation will not necessarily determine how he will handle ethnic governance today. But there is good reason to believe that Pan remains committed to “ethnic fusion” and is continuing to promote it as he moves toward the inner ring of Chinese political power. In a 2019 speech at the Central Institute of Socialism, Pan reiterated nearly word for word his 2001 assertion of the inevitability of assimilation, stating that “no matter the strength of foreign religions, whenever they enter China, they will all be integrated into Chinese civilization.” In one of his first published statements since the 2022 Party Congress, he called for promoting “contact, interaction, and blending” among ethnic groups, adopting language regarding ethnic policy codified in the CCP’s top journal. Recently, the National Ethnic Affairs Commission has also partnered with the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce to launch the “Private Enterprises Entering the Borderlands” initiative, meant to fulfill the party’s directive of securing China’s frontier by encouraging privately owned companies to invest in the border regions, deepen cross-region contact, and “create a platform and vehicle for promoting contact, interaction, and blending of all nationalities.”

The colonial character of this initiative is stunning yet also familiar in light of Pan’s earlier writing. We must wait to see how the project develops; the ongoing COVID-19 crisis is almost certainly making the implementation of any preconceived plans more complicated. But time and again, Pan has demonstrated a willingness to think big and take bold action—the darker side of the environmentalism that foreign observers have repeatedly praised him for. As we watch him take his next steps, journalists and China scholars need to grapple with the fact that a celebrated environmentalist is now at the center of one of China’s most notorious policy arenas and imagine the chilling possibilities of ethnic governance at an ecological scale.

Aaron Glasserman is a postdoctoral research associate at the Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China at Princeton University.

Source: China’s Head of Ethnic Affairs Pan Yue Is Pushing Hard-line Policies

Marcoux, Corbeil et Piché: Le plurilinguisme des immigrants francophones que l’on ignore

Good discussion of the language realities on Quebec immigrants in contrast to the more simplistic analyses of some:

Favoriser l’immigration francophone semble actuellement faire consensus au Québec comme mesure pour favoriser le maintien du français. Le profil des immigrants que le Québec souhaite ainsi accueillir est et sera largement lié à l’espace international où l’on compte déjà plus de 325 millions de francophones.

On peut par ailleurs se réjouir que la « Loi sur la langue officielle et commune du Québec, le français » attribue à l’Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) un rôle central. L’ISQ dispose en effet d’une expertise importante dans le domaine de la production d’informations statistiques et les problématiques liées à la langue française au Québec nécessiteront des efforts considérables en matière de suivi, de recherche d’informations de qualité et d’élaboration d’indicateurs au cours des années à venir. Relevant ce nouveau mandat, l’ISQ a récemment publié sur son site Web des tableaux détaillés sur les langues au Québec. Le fait que l’on tienne compte parfois des réalités du plurilinguisme des francophones et parfois non nous apparaît toutefois pour le moins étonnant.

Examinons les données présentées pour l’île de Montréal puisque c’est dans cette région que se concentrent les immigrants. C’est à partir des résultats de ces tableaux que plusieurs observateurs ont diffusé l’information selon laquelle moins de 50 % des Montréalais parlaient le français à la maison. Il est vrai que ce seuil de 50 % marque les imaginaires. Mais qu’en est-il exactement ?

On apprend qu’un peu plus de 955 000 personnes déclarent le français comme langue unique parlée le plus souvent à la maison sur l’île de Montréal en 2021. Toutefois, près de 175 000 personnes déclarent parler le plus souvent plus d’une seule langue à la maison, dont 132 000 qui y citent le français. Il serait à notre avis peu approprié de les exclure de la population parlant le français sur l’île de Montréal. Or, la proportion de la population sur ce territoire déclarant le français comme langue le plus souvent parlée à la maison (langue unique ou à égalité avec d’autres) est de 55 % et non de 48 %.

Mais allons encore plus loin. Il faut savoir que le questionnaire du recensement a connu quelques modifications au fil du temps et qu’il permet aussi de saisir toutes les langues parlées régulièrement à la maison. Le problème est que les tableaux rendus disponibles actuellement par l’ISQ ne le permettent pas. En effet, le seul tableau s’intéressant aux « langues parlées régulièrement à la maison » regroupe l’ensemble des personnes qui déclarent parler le plus souvent plus d’une langue, et ce, sans préciser combien parmi celles-ci déclarent le français. Comme il nous l’est d’ailleurs suggéré sur le site de l’ISQ, nous avons exploité les données issues du site Web de Statistique Canada. Résultat : sur l’île de Montréal, on se retrouve non plus avec moins de la moitié des personnes qui parlent le français à la maison, comme il a été rapporté dans les médias, mais plutôt 65 %, soit presque deux personnes sur trois.

Mieux comprendre les réalités des migrants francophones

Nous avons plus d’une fois relevé que « les plaques tectoniques de la Francophonie se déplacent du nord vers le sud avec l’Afrique qui devient le continent-pôle ». Ce continent regroupe en 2022, selon l’ISQ, six des principaux pays de naissance des immigrants récents au Québec, dont l’Algérie, le Maroc et la Tunisie, mais également le Cameroun, la Côte d’Ivoire et le Congo-Kinshasa. Or, la réalité de cette immigration d’Afrique francophone est qu’elle est déjà à l’origine inscrite dans des pratiques plurilingues. Par exemple, à Abidjan, qui compte actuellement plus de 5,6 millions de citadins, le français est utilisé comme unique langue parlée à la maison par 20 % des habitants alors que 70 % déclarent utiliser le français et une langue ivoirienne en famille. Au travail, plus de 90 % des Abidjanais et Abidjanaises déclarent parler le français.

Ce schéma francophone plurilingue, à la maison et au travail, caractérise aussi, avec quelques variantes, les grandes métropoles d’autres pays d’Afrique : Bénin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Congo, Gabon, etc. Ailleurs, le français est moins présent, mais fait figure de langue partenaire, par exemple avec le wolof à Dakar au Sénégal, l’arabe et le tamazight au Maghreb.

En ignorant le plurilinguisme des immigrants francophones, on maintient dans l’angle mort le fait que ces dynamiques linguistiques sont complexes et évoluent lentement et de façon variable. En d’autres termes, pour ces nouveaux arrivants, le français risque fort d’être beaucoup plus utilisé dans l’espace public qu’à la maison. Il pénètre progressivement la sphère privée précisément parce qu’il est utilisé hors de la sphère familiale.

Si on souhaite favoriser l’immigration francophone au Québec, il importe de reconnaître le caractère plurilingue de ces nouveaux arrivants. Il importe surtout et bien évidemment de le reconnaître dans les statistiques produites et dans les indicateurs que l’on nous propose.

Source: Le plurilinguisme des immigrants francophones que l’on ignore