The Rohingya might be one step closer to justice

Interesting column by Erna Paris:

Gambia, mainland Africa’s smallest country, took an unprecedented step this week. To everyone’s surprise, it opened a lawsuit against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague – the tribunal that adjudicates disputes among states – accusing Myanmar of genocide against the Rohingya Muslims.

Gambia is operating within the larger auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, but as is often the case, the impetus came from one individual. Abubacarr M. Tambadou, Gambia’s justice minister, visited a Rohingya refugee camp where he saw a parallel with the violent past of his own country. Importantly, he had been a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the 1990s and recognized genocide when he saw it. That court was the first to convict an individual of ordering mass rape as a tool of war. Significantly, the Myanmar perpetrators have also been accused of this crime.

Although they had lived in Burma/Myanmar for centuries, the Rohingya were incrementally dispossessed of their rights by the Buddhist majority and an authoritarian regime. Eventually, in 1982, they were deprived of full citizenship. In August, 2017, some Rohingya pushed back, giving the military an excuse to force them from the country. It is estimated that the military and their Buddhist allies killed at least 60,000 people and committed sexual violence against 18,000 women. Today, most of the survivors are in Bangladesh refugee camps, but Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth and is complaining about the burden. Something had to give.

One remedy may be international justice. Push back against those who believe they can commit major crimes with impunity.

It’s not as though the world hadn’t noticed their plight. Rights groups have expressed outrage. In 2017, Archbishop Desmond Tutu called on State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s civilian leader, to respond appropriately. (She didn’t.) The parliaments of several countries, including Canada, have called the situation a genocide. In 2018, an independent United Nations fact-finding mission concluded that Myanmar’s military acted with “genocidal intent” and recommended that six individuals be prosecuted. Reports of risk assessment have concluded that genocide remains a risk for those Rohingya who remain in Myanmar. But if too little happened until Gambia decided to act, it is because reality – and realpolitik – got in the way.

First, reality. Last year, a ruling from the International Criminal Court said that tribunal could investigate the case of Myanmar – but in a limited way only. The problem was the court’s statutory jurisdiction: Myanmar is not an ICC member country. Bangladesh, however, is a member, which makes it possible for the tribunal to investigate the cross-border ethnic expulsions as a crime against humanity. Not perfect, but a start.

Second, realpolitik. Had the UN Security Council decided to refer the Myanmar case to the ICC for investigation, the tribunal would, according to its statute, have had full jurisdiction. China and Russia did not prevent a Security Council briefing on the UN inquiry accusing Myanmar’s military of genocide, but their subsequent obstruction meant no referral. Still in the realm of realpolitik, there might have been pressure from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but Myanmar is a member of that organization, complicating matters. So, although it can prosecute only states, not individuals, the ICJ looked like the best route.

Support from other countries will be critical and Canada is already engaged. Along with the European Union, this country has imposed sanctions on individuals linked to the military operations of August, 2017, and has since stepped up its involvement. The legal case will need funding; the refugees need more help, as does Bangladesh; and Canada is well positioned to intervene in the case, should it decide to do so.

Given worries over diminishing respect for international institutions and the rules-based global order, it is important that the world’s liberal democracies buttress the case against Myanmar. There is already encouraging momentum. In the aftermath of the Gambia lawsuit, Rohingya and Latin American human-rights groups opened litigation in Argentina under the principle of “universal jurisdiction,” a legal concept based on the premise that horrific crimes, such as genocide, can be tried anywhere.

The Gambia case has rightly revived the doctrine called “The Responsibility to Protect”. To demand accountability for the world’s worst crimes is in everyone’s self-interest.

Source: The Rohingya might be one step closer to justice Erna Paris

Myanmar’s irrational denial of citizenship to Rohingyas

Hard to justify and a reminder that all religions, including Buddhists, have their extremists, unfortunately in the form of a government:

The exodus of Rohingyas, one of the most persecuted minorities in the world, from Myanmar to neighbouring countries is not a new phenomenon. Historically, Rohingyas have been fleeing to Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, and other neighbouring counties to escape serious repressions in Myanmar. One of the key issues of contention regarding the Rohingya crisis is the question over their citizenship. Denial of citizenship poses serious obstacles in achieving a durable solution to the Rohingya refugee flows.

There are two schools of thought that analyse the controversy related to the existence of Rohingyas in Myanmar. One of these perspectives comes from the proponents of the government of Myanmar and its Buddhist-led population. They consider Rohingyas as “outsiders” and “foreign residents of Myanmar”. According to this perspective, Rohingyas are the direct descendants of immigrants from Chittagong of East Bengal, present-day south-eastern region of Bangladesh. Rohingyas are, thereby, referred to as “Bengali” in Myanmar’s state media, official policy documents, and school textbooks as well. They are also portrayed as a threat to Myanmar’s national security.

The “1982 Citizenship Law” enacted by Myanmar’s military government refer to “Nationals such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan and ethnic groups as have settled in any of the territories included within the State as their permanent home from a period  prior to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D. are Burma citizens”. It clearly denotes that Myanmar’s citizens are those persons whose ancestors settled in the country before 1823, the beginning of British occupation of Arakan, present-day northern Rakhine State. Myanmar authorities claim that Rohingyas settled in Arakan after its annexation by the British in 1824.

On the other hand, the stance of Myanmar’s Buddhist majority and its authority is strongly contested by the government of Bangladesh, the Rohingya themselves, foreign governments, international organisations and scholars. Bangladesh claims that Rohingyas are Myanmar nationals and they have reportedly entered the territory of Bangladesh through illegal means. Rohingyas are the Muslims of Myanmar who have lived in Arakan for a long period of time.

As far as the debate is concerned, there is a question that needs to be answered: whether Rohingyas are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh or not. How plausible are the arguments proposed by the government of Myanmar? In this regard, it is important to re-examine the history of Rohingyas’ settlement in Arakan.

If we look at the first claim projected by Myanmar’s military junta about the “illegal immigrants from Bangladesh”, the evidences accumulated from historical facts and scholarly documents do not comply with this proposition. The clarification of this non-compliance can be reiterated from in-depth observation.

Historical evidence show that Rohingyas are Muslims whose settlements in Arakan date back to the 7th century C.E., long before the British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent. Some scholarly documents mention that Rohingyas have been living in the Rakhine State since the 8th century. The Human Rights Watch traces the well-established presence of Rohingyas in the Mrauk-U (Mrohaung) kingdom in Arakan, now Rakhine State. It has also been mentioned that Rohingya Muslims had ruled over Arakan for more than 250 years until Burmese invasion and occupation of Arakan in 1784 C.E. Such evidence can also be found from the records of Francis Buchanan. He wrote, “I shall now add three dialects, spoken in the Burma Empire, but evidently derived from the language of the Hindu nation. The first is that spoken by the Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves ‘Rooinga’, or natives of Arakan.”

At that time it was not only the Bengalis who entered into Arakan for better livelihood opportunities;  the Arakanese arrived in Chattogram, the then Chittagong, as well. When the Burmese invaded and conquered Arakan in 1784, Rohingyas were conquered and incorporated into the majority Buddhist kingdom of Burma. As a result, considerable numbers of Rohingyas sought refuge in Chattogram and Cox’s Bazar. Some Rohingyas assimilated into the Bengali community because of their cultural and linguistic similarities with the people living in Chattogram.

It is also important to note that during the British rule of the Indian subcontinent and Burma, movement of people was considered as “internal movement”, from one district to another within the same political entity. Chattogram came under the British rule in 1760, while after the end of three Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824-1826, 1852-1853, and 1885), Burma became a part of British India (1886-1937). The borders of the British Indian Empire were extremely porous prior to the colonial period and during its initial phases. Consequently, people could easily move across the region without permission or legal documents. In addition, it was British policy to move populations between the then East Bengal and Burma to suit their labour needs that triggered intra-regional labour flows. As a result, a considerable level of movement occurred across the region during that period, mostly for economic purpose which was considered as normal seasonal migration.

It is, therefore, meaningless to term people’s movement as well as their settlements at that time between the two parts—Arakan of Burma and the then Chittagong Division of Bengal in British India—as illegal. The question of illegal immigration only comes after the demarcation of borders among independent states.

Given this above-mentioned analyses, it is no longer rational or reasonable to claim Rohingyas as “Bengalis” or “illegal immigrants from Bangladesh”. Rather they have historically been living in Arakan. Unless their status of ethnicity is recognised or resolved, the long-term solution of the Rohingya crisis will remain questionable.

Source: Myanmar’s irrational denial of citizenship to Rohingyas

Myanmar: Annan report calls for review of 1982 Citizenship Law 

Ongoing issue, one that reflects poorly on Myanmar:

An advisory commission tasked with finding sustainable solutions in Rakhine State has submitted its final report to the government, where it called for freedom of movement for all people in Rakhine and a review of the controversial 1982 Citizenship Law.

The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, was formed by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in September 2016. It was formed by the October 9 attacks in northern Rakhine State, which led to a military crackdown that has come with allegations of human rights violations.

An estimated 1.1 million Muslims – many who identify as Rohingya, a term the government rejects – are denied access to citizenship in line with the citizenship law, which was enacted by former dictator U Ne Win. The law does not recognise the Rohingya as one of the country’s 135 recognised ethnic groups.

The commission’s report, released on Thursday, urged the government to bring the law in line with international standards and abolish “different distinctions between different types of citizens”. The law currently recognises full citizens, associate citizens and naturalised citizens.

The report also urged the commission to begin a process to review the citizenship law “to ensure the equitable treatment of all citizens”.

Many of the Rohingya in the state face severe restrictions on movements, and while the commission acknowledged recent efforts by the government to improve freedom of movement in the north of the state, it said it had only effected those holding the correct identification.

“To have greater impact, freedom of movement should be delinked from the citizenship verification process, meaning that all individuals in Rakhine State should be able to move freely irrespective of whether they hold an NVC [National Verification Card], NRC card [National Registration Card] or citizenship documentation, consistent with the basic right of all people to free movement,” the report said.

An estimated 120,000 Muslims are confined to IDP camps in Rakhine, many without access to basic livelihoods such as education, healthcare and livelihoods. The report said that efforts to allow the return of people home has “shown little progress”, and called on the government to develop a “comprehensive strategy towards closing all IDP camps” in the state.

It said the process should be developed through consultation with affected communities and should have clear timelines, adding that all returns and relocations must be voluntary and should allow people to return to their place of origin as a priority.

In the interim, it suggested improving shelter, water, sanitation and livelihoods in the IDP camps.

In northern Rakhine State, humanitarian and media access has largely been cut off since the October attacks, and the commission urged the government to ensure full and regular access to all parts of the state.

The military has been accused of using disproportionate force in its operations, including allegations of mass rape, extrajudicial killing and torture. The government and military have continuously denied all charges.

In March, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution to form an investigation team to probe rights abuses in Myanmar, with a particular focus on Rakhine. However, the Myanmar government has denied visas to its members.

The commission called for an “independent and impartial investigation” into the facts on the ground in order to ensure that those who conducted violations are held accountable.

Additionally, the commission called on the government form a ministry tasked solely with implementing its recommendations. It said the appointment should inintially be a one-year appointment and deliver public quarterly reports.

“The secretariat’s staff should be in permanent consultation with groups in Rakhine State in the implementation of its work,” the commission said.

Source: Annan report calls for review of 1982 Citizenship Law | Frontier Myanmar

Myanmar’s ‘national races’ trump citizenship | East Asia Forum

Interesting article and explanation by Nick Cheesman regarding the status of the Rohingas in Burma:

Taingyintha, or ‘national races’, is among the most important political ideas in Myanmar today. Although the term is not well recognised or readily translated in English-language scholarship on Myanmar, it lies at the heart of the country’s contemporary politics. It also helps to explain the so-called ‘Rohingya problem’ on which so much has been written in recent times. So how did the idea of taingyintha become politically salient? And what is its relationship to state formation and national identity?

Rohingya refugee workers carry bags of salt as they work in processing yard in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, 12 April 2017. (Photo: Reuters/Mohammad Ponir Hossain).

To answer these questions requires a little bit of digging into the recent past. As a term, taingyintha has neither a long nor glorious history. It was not a significant idea in colonial-era politics, where it seems to have been a signifier of ‘native’ identity. At the end of World War II, taingyintha featured in negotiations on the country’s draft constitution, which was ratified in 1947, but it got only two modest references in the chapter on citizenship, where it is translated as ‘indigenous races’. It wasn’t mentioned in the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which is mythologised as laying the foundations for national unity, and it remained peripheral to politics in the country prior to a military coup in 1962.

But on 12 February 1964, taingyintha went from having limited political salience to becoming a centrepiece in the project for military-dominated statehood. The junta leader, General Ne Win, used the Union Day address to urge ‘national races’ to come together for the good of the nation. In so doing, he inaugurated a new programme of action based on a state-sponsored conception of taingyintha as political community. Within the same year, the government had set up an Academy for the Development of National Races. The following year, staff from universities around the country began state-directed fieldwork to document and publish authoritative studies on national races’ culture.

Although Ne Win’s one-party state collapsed under the weight of nationwide protests in 1988, the idea of national races not only prevailed, but also emerged stronger than ever. A newly comprised military junta that seized control of government announced that ‘non-disintegration of national [taingyintha] solidarity’ was the second of its three main causes. For want of any other unifying motif, national races were invoked on every broadcast and publication, and at every major event.

The new military junta used the term to mean different things. On the one hand, ‘national races’ was used to describe the members of a single political community, united in struggle against common enemies inside and out. On the other, it was used to denote people living in remote parts of the country who had failed to progress due to civil war and ignorance. Between them, these usages worked to justify relentless military campaigns against armed groups operating under the banners of multitudinous national races.

Today, Myanmar’s 2008 constitution cements national races in the country’s formal institutions. It establishes a conceptual relation between taingyintha and citizenship, such that the former is irreducible to the latter. Legally and by definition, national races trump citizenship. To talk of the political community ‘Myanmar’ is to talk of taingyintha, and to talk to that community is above all to address its members not as citizens but as national races.

Because taingyintha identity had trumped citizenship, the place of people belonging to groups not recognised as national races, like people identifying or identified as Rohingya, is precarious. The only means available for the Rohingya and other excluded groups to achieve any political recognition within Myanmar is to submit to the politics of domination and insist that they too are taingyintha.

This means that Rohingya advocates must also engage with and support the idea of national races. That is, they must reproduce the idea in order to make a claim for political identity and membership. They must give assurances that if included in the schema of national races, they would be committed to the idea of taingyintha; that, ironically, they would be the most vociferous defenders of ‘national race’ identity.

Myanmar’s problem is not a ‘Rohingya problem’, but a ‘national races’ problem. The idea of taingyintha obligates groups wanting political recognition — like the Rohingya — to acquiesce to its terms as the price demanded for admission to the ‘Myanmar’ political community, only to expose them to the ire of the members of other groups already recognised as national races.

Source: Myanmar’s ‘national races’ trump citizenship | East Asia Forum

ICYMI: Myanmar Begins Controversial Citizenship Verification Process

Disturbing. Linking citizenship to ethnicity and religion in Myanmar:

Many Rohingyas are skeptical that a government that already classifies them as Bengalis will grant them citizenship based on the testimonies of village elders.

Washington has, in the past, pressured the Myanmar government on the 1982 Citizenship Law. And in its 2014 report on religious freedom, called on authorities to promote the rights of Rohingya Muslims and provide “durable solutions” for refugees outside the country.

Matthew Smith, director of the international human rights group Fortify Rights, says giving Rohingya equal access to citizenship rights is crucial to preventing the conflict in the future. He says foreign nations should press the government more on the issue.

“The fact that the immigration department is handling this issue is indicative of the perception that all Rohingya come from Bangladesh,” Smith said. “Immigration is an issue on all of Myanmar’s borders, but the wholesale denial of Rohingya citizenship, Rohingya ethnicity, has contributed to these abuses that we’ve been documenting now for two years.”

Have not seen much Canadian government representation on the citizenship issue although Andrew Bennett, the Ambassador for Religious Freedom, routinely mentions Rohingyas in his speeches.

Casts a blemish on Aung San Suu Kyi and Myanmar’s democratization.

Myanmar Begins Controversial Citizenship Verification Process.