…What has especially caused Ms. Harris – and other moderate leaders after her – to be falsely associated with the far left is the constellation of issues and hysterias known on the right as “gender,” as well as the memory of mass protests and riots against police violence during the pandemic years. Although there definitely are far-left activists on both subjects, Mr. Harris had absolutely nothing to do with them; instead, she said little about either, and quietly took mainstream positions on both issues.
But the mainstream has become measurably more tolerant. Same-sex marriage, for example, has become so acceptable to the majority of voters that even Mr. Trump doesn’t publicly attack it. It’s moderate, centrist views, not far-out radical ones, that have come under attack.
This week a study by Vancouver-based polling firm Research Co. asked Americans and Canadians what they thought about “political correctness.” They weren’t asking about Mr. Trump’s ultra-PC desire to, for example, consider removing mentions of slavery from national parks; rather, they asked about “language and/or behaviour that seeks to minimize possible offences to racial, cultural and gender identity groups.”
The results were very pro-PC: Six out of 10 Canadians, and a majority of Americans, said they support political correctness – and in both countries, the pro-PC proportion of the population has increased since 2022.
That doesn’t mean that middle-of-the-road voters are drifting to the far left. It means that moderate, mainstream political views have become more open and tolerant – and therefore hated by Trump-like figures on the rightward extreme. For all the noise they throw at these normal views, it’s worth remembering that they’re the only ones who are polarized.
Interesting discussion on integration definitions. But I think this relationship model, while important, neglects socioeconomic outcomes (income, employment, scolarity etc). Valid to question whether integration into the “mainstream” remains valid but looking at the data indicates still is relevant.
And there is a risk of dismissing pre-existing norms as it suggests an approach of “anything goes” rather than conforming with Canadian laws and regulations, which of course evolve and change as the population and social norms change:
…Although there is evidence to support both segmented and new assimilation theories, it is also becoming obvious that researchers should pay more attention to the demographic realities in immigrant-receiving countries such as Canada. As some native-born populations shrink in proportion to the whole, it becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint where exactly the process of integration might occur. The sociologist Richard Alba recommends expanding the definition of the mainstream to include more groups. While this is obviously an important step, it maintains an underlying assumption that there exists a core population group. What happens when a city increasingly does not have a majority group?
To this end, sociologist Maurice Crul recommends moving beyond thinking about integration as a minority group’s merging into a majority population and having little to no effect on the mainstream itself. His “integration into diversity” theory posits that the notion of a mainstream is becoming less useful and should be replaced with one of a population marked by diversity.
Drawing on results from the Becoming a Minority project, which collected data from several European cities, he provides a matrix to describe nine outcomes of individuals, each focused on different integration attitudes (see Figure 2). The most integrated individuals will exist in a diverse social network that believes immigration-related diversity is enriching, while the least integrated will be at the opposite end of the spectrum, feeling threatened by immigration and favoring a homogenous social circle.
Figure 2. Integration into Diversity Theory Matrix
Source: Maurice Crul, “Integration into Diversity Theory Renewing–Once Again–Assimilation Theory,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 50, no. 1 (2024): 257-71, available online.
The strength of this approach is that it does not take into consideration individual characteristics such as skin color or first language spoken. According to this theory, these factors do not really matter because there is no expectation of comparing individual characteristics to that of a mainstream population; neither the characteristics of the community nor the person matter. What matters instead is individual actions and attitudes towards diversity. The more tolerant a person is, the more integrated they are into their heterogenous society.
This approach is still rather new and, as such, does not yet explain which identity position a person will take. It is, in fact, only beginning to be used to predict characteristics such as feelings of belonging and perceptions of neighborhood security. Crul is clear in that he does not want his theory to replace new or segmented assimilation theory as an explanation of the integration process (he instead refers to it as an update), but the idea shifts the focus away from that of an individual melding into the mainstream. By positing the existence of nine subgroups, it becomes possible to envision multiple mainstreams with multiple attitudes towards integration. In a country such as Canada, this approach seems rather prescient.
Nonetheless, the utility of a new theoretical framework is best assessed empirically. Canada’s General Social Survey asks individuals how many of their friends are of the same immigrant group, although not about attitudes towards diversity. It would be interesting to add this question and find other ways to analyze integration into diversity theory.
Moving forward, immigration to Canada is only increasing. With extensive efforts to bring in more new arrivals every year, immigrants’ influence on the Canadian population is growing—and appears on course to continue doing so even as public disquiet has caused the government to seek to trim some immigration. Traditional notions of integration are becoming increasingly irrelevant in a country where nearly all population growth stems from immigration. New arrivals find their place in society not by assuming pre-existing norms, but by finding their people and their place and creating their own norms. In this way, Canada’s diversity will only continue to grow over time.
In January 2010, leftist and centrist politicians led three of the largest democracies in the world: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil), Manmohan Singh (India) and Barack Obama (US). In December 2019, all three countries have far-right leaders: Jair Bolsonaro, Narendra Modi and Donald Trump. In Europe, center-left parties have been decimated, while mainstream right parties mainly survive by adopting frames and policies from the radical right. Only Germany still has the same center-right leader, Angela Merkel, but that will probably change in the next year, too.
This political sea change is in large part the (delayed) consequence of demographic, economic and social shifts. After 9/11, the political debate in many countries shifted from socio-economic to socio-cultural issues. Even the Great Recession only changed this temporarily; once the dust over the bailouts had settled, immigration and security quickly replaced austerity and economic inequality as defining issues once again.
The decade started with a concerted attack on multiculturalism by mainstream-right leaders, including the former British prime minister, David Cameron, the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy and even Merkel. But while they pandered to far-right voters, they largely refused to adopt far-right frames and policies. In 2011, for example, Cameron blamed “state multiculturalism” for failed integration and Jihadi terrorism, but, he argued, “instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity, open to everyone”.
This changed fundamentally with the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015, which was a catalyst for the mainstreaming and normalization of the radical right. Immigration and security were now openly linked in the public mind. Mainstream and far right parties shot up in the polls, and radical right frames and policies were broadly shared by mainstream parties, from Austrian conservatives to Denmark’s Social Democrats.
Even politicians who defeated radical right politicians with inclusive electoral campaigns would soon start adopting part of the radical right’s program. Hillary Clinton, who gained 2.5 million more votes than Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election, shamelessly argued that Europe should curb immigration to stop the far right, while Emmanuel Macron, who comprehensively defeated Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election, has played on anti-Islam sentiments, particularly in his foreign policy.
And while the 2019 European elections were largely interpreted as a defeat of the far right, mostly based on exaggerated expectations – the far right actually scored its best result ever – the mainstreaming of far right frames had become so absolute that in September the president of the European Commission, the German Christian Democrat Ursula von der Leyen, proposed a controversial new title for the commissioner that includes immigration: “vice-president for protecting our European way of life.”
Given the successes of rightwing populist parties and politicians in recent elections in Spain and the UK, one might think that the coming decade will see an even bigger electoral and political success for the far right, but I don’t think this will be the case. To be clear, the far right is here to stay, as is the mainstreaming and normalization of radical right ideas (and politicians) that characterizes what I have called the “fourth wave” of far-right politics. However, the far right has been punching politically well above its electoral weight in the past decade.
The main reason for their disproportionate impact is the ideological weakness of liberal democratic parties. While defining themselves as the silent majority, the far right is in fact a shouting minority, which has faced little pushback from ideologically bankrupt mainstream left and parties. Forced by crushing electoral defeats, some center-left parties have started to develop new ideological programs, prioritizing economic inequality over economic growth, sometimes pandering to nativism (like in Denmark), sometimes not (like in UK and US).
Mainstream rightwing parties have so far persisted, but their electoral success on the basis of radical right lite programs will not last forever. In the end, their only chance to sustain the electoral success is by transforming into full-fledged radical right parties, as we have seen in Hungary, Israel and the US. The only other way to survive is to re-establish conservative and Christian democratic programs that do not undermine the liberal democratic system and values.
While still a minority, a growing number of right-wing politicians, including within the powerful European People’s party, are starting to understand that, rather than having played the far right, the far right has played then. To survive, they will have to re-establish their own ideological programs and put the defense of liberal democracy at the center of their political struggle.
Too early to say whether Bernier’s PPC will have a similar impact on the Conservatives:
In the crucial Australian state of Queensland, Arthur Plate says he’ll turn his back on mainstream politics when he steps into the ballot box later this month. Instead, the retired miner will pick between a pair of right-wing populists.
The major parties have lost touch and are just out to “line their own pockets,” said the 76-year-old, taking refuge from the searing 100-degree Fahrenheit heat in Clermont, a small mining and farming community.
It’s a refrain heard frequently in the district — one of a handful of closely-held constituencies across the northeastern state that Prime Minister Scott Morrison must retain to stop the left-leaning Labor party from ousting his center-right Liberal-National coalition.
The growing tide of support for populist, single-issue parties in Australia has already reshaped the political landscape, dragging both Labor and the coalition further to the right over the past two decades. Voters like Plate could prove decisive in determining the outcome of the May 18 election, and affect the next government’s ability to pass laws, ranging from proposed tax cuts to curbing greenhouse-gas emissions.
“Right-wing populists have taken advantage of major parties’ failure to come up with policies that appeal to white voters on low incomes who aspire to the middle-class but feel they’ve missed out due to negative impacts from globalization and multiculturalism,” said Jo Coghlan, a lecturer at the University of New England and co-author of The Rise of Right-Populism.
Queensland has long been a solid base for Morrison’s coalition, which currently has 21 of the socially conservative state’s 30 seats. But eight of those are held by a margin of less than 4 percent, making them key targets for Labor. The main opposition party is leading in opinion polls and favorite to win office.
But it’s not just a two-way fight between the coalition and Labor. The state is also home to the strongest populist forces in Australian politics — the anti-Muslim immigration party One Nation led by Pauline Hanson, and mining magnate Clive Palmer’s United Australia Party.
Hanson and Palmer are both tapping into disaffection among voters who feel left behind despite almost 28 years of uninterrupted economic growth. While recent scandals have seen support for One Nation slip, a Newspoll released on Monday showed support for Palmer’s party more than doubled in the past month to 5 percent.
Adding to the Morrison’s problems is that regional voters are becoming increasingly disenchanted with his junior coalition partner, the Nationals. The rural-based party has been damaged by infighting and disquiet over its support for coal-mining interests on agricultural land.
While Hanson and Palmer are unlikely to win lower house seats, the pair may take spots in the Senate and together with other fringe groups hold the balance of power in the upper house — giving them crucial influence over the legislative agenda.
Populists and single-issue parties have frequently wielded such power in the Senate, with One Nation and other minor parties in August banding together to kill off planned company tax cuts. In February, four independents helped pass a bill against the government’s wishes enabling better medical care for asylum seekers kept offshore.
Hanson, a former fish-and-chip shop owner, rose to prominence in the 1990s with her outspoken attacks on Asian immigration. While she served less than three years in the lower house before her party collapsed, she left an indelible mark on politics as she shaped the immigration debate and dragged both Labor and the coalition to the right.
That’s created bi-partisan support for the nation’s controversial system of transferring asylum seekers arriving by boat to Pacific island camps, with no right to be settled in Australia — a policy opposed by the United Nations and human-rights groups.
The 64-year-old returned to parliament, this time in the Senate, in 2016 and campaigns against Muslim immigration, multiculturalism and free trade. She has another three years before she has to re-contest her seat.
Her party’s brand in this election has been tarnished by revelations One Nation officials last year sought cash donations from the National Rifle Association in the U.S. in exchange for a pledge to help water down Australia’s gun-restriction laws.
Despite winning four upper house seats in 2016, One Nation is now down to two Senate seats due to defections. The party has often under-performed at the ballot box and polls show support may be bleeding away to Palmer’s United Australia Party.
Palmer, 65, is self-funding a $30 million advertising blitz for his party. Hundreds of yellow “Make Australia Great”billboards have popped up across the country, while advertisements have flooded television screens. His thinly articulated manifesto includes cutting taxes and warning that the Chinese government plans a “clandestine takeover of our country.”
Like Hanson, his first foray into politics imploded. He served just one term in the lower house from 2013 to 2016, and two of his three senators in the then Palmer United Party defected. He’s also now embroiled in legal action brought by the government over the collapse of his Queensland Nickel project that left hundreds of workers unpaid.
Nevertheless, Palmer is gaining enough traction for Morrison to take him seriously. The billionaire announced a deal this week that will see the coalition and United Australia back each other’s candidates on how-to-vote cards. That could prove decisive if Morrison continues to close the gap with Labor. The deal may also help catapult Palmer into the Senate.
Australia’s upper house was branded the home of “unrepresentative swill” in 1992 by then-Prime Minister Paul Keating. The most notorious recent example of a fringe populist winning a Senate seat is Fraser Anning, an independent who defected from One Nation. He’s riled mainstream lawmakers by claiming he wants a “final solution” to Australia’s “immigration problem” and blaming New Zealand’s mosque massacre on the nation’s intake of “Muslim fanatics.” Polls show he’s unlikely to retain his Senate seat this month.
If Palmer does win an upper house seat, he’s unlikely to form a voting bloc with One Nation. He and Hanson have often criticized each others’ policies and personalities.
Compared with the populist sentiment that swept Donald Trump to power in the U.S. or delivered the Brexit referendum in the U.K., the power of fringe parties remains muted in Australia by a lack of organizational skill and competence, according to University of New England’s Coghlan.
But their influence remains pervasive.
“The faces in right-wing populism may come and go,” she said. “But the changes they’ve made to Australia’s social agenda seems permanent.”
Multicultural Meanderings 