Hijab controversy and multiculturalism: Lessons from Canada

One Indian perspective, further to my earlier post on the Essential Religious Practice (ERP) India: Why is Karnataka HC deciding if the hijab is an ‘essential religious practice’ in Islam?:

India has traditionally been recognised as a country where “unity in diversity” reigns supreme. Food, festivals, attire, language, religion, and other aspects of culture are all diverse throughout. In his classic poem, Bharat Tirtha (Indian pilgrimage), Rabindranath Tagore echoed the same philosophy where the fundamental belief underlying the definition of Indianness is its assimilative, cosmopolitan, and compassionate nature. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote about this diversity extensively in his book, The Discovery of India. Winston Churchill had commented: “India is not a country or a nation; it is rather a continent inhabited by many nations.”

Although it is true that there is no explicit provision in the Constitution of India recognizing this multiculturalism, it is spread across implicitly. The Preamble, the Equality principle, the right to Freedom of Religion, protection of Cultural and Educational rights of the minorities, recognition of 22 official languages under Schedule VIII – all bear testimony of the same.

Unfortunately, we have been forced to believe in the notion of ‘uniformity’ in the recent years – the imposition of one culture, one religion, and so on. As the hijab debate rages across the country in the name of school ‘uniform’, I prefer to look into the matter through the lens of the multicultural ethos, rather than the Essential Religious Practice (ERP) test. And here I will be speaking about Canada, which has placed a strong focus on equality and inclusion for all of its people.

With 37 million inhabitants, Canada is the world’s second-largest country geographically. It is ranked 16th in the Human Development Index (India is ranked 131st) and has one of the fastest growth rates of any G7 country. While ethnic Canadians account for 32.3 percent of the population, other prominent ethnic groups include English, Scottish, French, Irish, German, and Chinese. Between 1971 and 2011, immigration expanded in Canada as a result of the modification of the Immigration Act. On one hand, 4 percent of the population is aboriginal; on the other hand, 60 percent of new immigrants are from Asia, mainly China and India.

While the majority of Canadians (67 percent) are Christians, a significant proportion (24 percent) declares that they have no religious connection. Muslims account for 3.2 percent of the minority, while Sikhs account for 1.4 percent. Sikh migration began in the early twentieth century, and they now wield significant political power. Notwithstanding the fact that Sikhs make up 1.7 percent of the Indian population, just 13 Sikh MPs have been elected to India’s 543-seat Lok Sabha, compared to 18 in Canada’s 338-seat House of Commons.

Canada is a liberal democracy having a Charter of Rights and Freedoms under the Constitution Act of 1982 (analogous to ‘Part III: Fundamental Rights’ of our Constitution) where it is explicitly noted that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (Section 27).

The judiciary in the country has jealously preserved this heritage while upholding the Charter rights for various minority groups.

Similar to the current hijab controversy, an orthodox Sikh student once intended to wear a kirpan to school. The school and his family agreed that he would seal the kirpan in his clothing while at school. However, the school board’s council of commissioners objected that he could not wear it to school because bringing dangerous objects to school was against the school’s code of conduct.

In Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (2006),the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the council’s decision infringed Multani’s religious freedom. School board members failed to demonstrate that a complete prohibition is a reasonable limit on religious freedom. The kirpan had never been involved in any violent incidents at school and there was no evidence that it was a symbol of violence. The total ban of wearing kirpans in schools ignores the value of respecting minorities and tolerance in Canada’s diverse culture.

Gobinder Randhawa, a Sikh immigrant from India and former Ontario Sikhs and Gurdwara Council president, tells Ashleigh Stewart of Global News that turbans were uncommon when he arrived in Toronto in 1972. Toronto’s public transit agency, the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), faced confusion over its dress code after he applied for a job there. TTC modified the uniform code to accommodate him. He spent 31 years working there.

Canada has given equal powers to exercise one’s religion to all sects and cultures and diverse religious ethnicities. Stewart reports instances of Syrian immigrants narrating as to how the country has allowed them carry on their Islamic lives, e.g., school principals arranging prayer halls for their kids.

In another instance, a lady who had been sexually assaulted was testified during her accused attackers’ preliminary inquiry. She was ordered by the judge to remove her niqab, a head scarf covering her face except the eyes. She argued that doing so would violate her religious freedom.

In R. v. N.S. (2012), the SC ruled that if wearing the niqab does not significantly impair trial fairness, the witness may do so. The case highlights the need for public institutions to accommodate religious differences as much as possible while upholding other Charter-protected rights and freedoms.

Earlier in R. v. Big M Drug Mart (1985), the police charged a store for violating the Lord’s Day Act because it refused to close on Sundays. That law prohibited conducting business on Sunday as it reflected the Christian tradition of reserving Sunday for rest. The SC found that the Act violated the Charter’s fundamental freedom of religion by forcing all Canadians to follow one religion – Christianity.

Quite surprisingly, unlike ours, the Canadian Constitution allows suspension of the Charter rights and freedoms even without an emergency being declared (Section 33). Yet the federal Parliament has never utilised this power till date. No wonder that Canada has remained a preferred destination for many Indians migrating abroad in search of prosperity. They have truly nurtured the philosophy of “live and let live”.

Hijabs (or kirpans) did not compromise the sanctity of the education but the nefarious acts that followed certainly did. The fervour and severity with which the hijab issue has being tackled, I wish the concerned individuals had responded in a same manner in relation to the quality of education imparted in those institutions in Karnataka and elsewhere. Our educational institutions would have been substantially superior.

When people are forced to refrain from selling or eating non-vegetarian food in the name of religion (read here), to remove hijab, and to abandon religious norms of offering prayers, we are not only interfering with individual choices/freedoms, we are also denying the diversity that exists in this country and embarking on an elusive quest of uniformity. We yearn for a “universal civil code” for all religions, when there is no uniformity of civil customs among Hindus across the country! We should aspire to be equal rather than identical.

Multiculturalism has always been a source of pride and strength for us. For heaven’s sake, let’s not demolish it, regardless of the Karnataka High Court’s verdict!

Source: Hijab controversy and multiculturalism: Lessons from Canada

India: Why is Karnataka HC deciding if the hijab is an ‘essential religious practice’ in Islam?

Very different approach from Canada where the basis is “sincerely held” religious beliefs, not pronouncing on the religion itself:

As the Karnataka High Court hears petitions by Muslim women seeking wear the hijab to college, the case has included debates about whether the headscarf is an essential religious practice of Islam.

Senior advocate Devdatt Kamat, who is representing a petitioner, has argued that the hijab is indeed an essential religious practice. But the Karnataka Advocate General, Prabhuling Navadgi contesting the claim.

While the Constitution does not draw a distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” practices of a religion, courts have formulated this test starting from the 1950s in cases involving disputes over religion. They have held that the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of religion applies only to practices that are essential to that religion, conventions without which the nature of the faith would be transformed.

As a result of this emphasis, in cases involving the freedom of religion, parties often argue on whether a practice is essential to a religion or not.

What is the essential religious practices test?

Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to practise religion. Article 26(b) also gives religious denominations the right to manage their “own affairs in the matters of religion”.

Over the years, the courts have held that only the practices that are essential to a religion will be protected under these provisions. Thus courts are often called to test whether something is an essential religious practice or not.

While there is no precise definition of what constitutes essential religious practice, courts have laid down some principles. The Supreme Court has held that the essential part of a religion refers to the “core beliefs upon which a religion is founded”. The test for essential religious practice is to see if the “nature of the religion will be changed without that” practice.

The Supreme Court has said that if taking away that practice results in a “fundamental change in the character of that religion”, then that practice is an essential practice.

The Supreme Court has also said that the determination of what qualifies as essential has to be made “according to its tenets, historical background and change in evolved process etc”.

How did the essential religious practice test start?

Initially, essential religious practices were bought in by courts in order to distinguish between what is secular and what is religious. Since Article 25(2)(a) gives the government power to enact a law to regulate or restrict “any economic, financial, political or other secular activities which may be associated with religious practice” this distinction was important.

As a result, in 1954, when the Supreme Court first used the term “essential part of a religion” it was to separate an “essentially religious” activity from a secular activity in a case that involved government control over temples. Here the court gave the power to the religious denomination to decide what would constitute an essential practice.

However, the courts went beyond this in the next few years.

A 1958 Supreme Court judgment looked into ancient texts to determine if temples had the right to determine which ceremonies and rituals were essential in a case relating to the entry of Dalits. This was a shift in the court’s approach in dealing with religious cases, as noted in later judgments as well.

Thus from differentiating religious practices from secular ones, the essential religious practices test morphed into determining what practices are “essential to a religion”. With this, the courts also started looking into texts and the practices themselves to determine if a religious practice was essential.

What are some examples of essential practices?

The doctrine of essential religious practices has since been used in multiple instances, often with major consequences. The first instance of the Supreme Court deciding on a ban on cattle slaughter, in 1959, was tested on whether it was essential for Muslims to sacrifice cows on Bakr-Id. If it passed the essential religious practises test, it could then be protected under Article 25. The court looked at various scriptures and texts and decided that cow slaughter was not a compulsory practice in Islam.

In 1994, while deciding on the acquisition of property in and around the site of the Babri Masjid, the Supreme Court said that a mosque is not an essential part of Islam and prayers could be offered anywhere, even in the open. It also said that the government could acquire the site on which the mosque stood and that would not be prohibited by the Constitution.

In 2017, the Supreme Court held that instant triple talaq is not an essential practice of Islam.

In the Sabarimala case from 2018, where women between the ages of 10 and 50 were prohibited from entering the Sabarimala temple, the judges held that this was not an essential religious practice and thus women could be allowed to enter.

In 1962, the court held that the religious head of the Dawoodi Bohra sect of Islam has the power to excommunicate members while in 1983, it ruled that the tandava dance was not essential to the Ananda Margi sect of Hinduism.

Currently, the essentiality of different religious practices such as female genital mutilation and entry of Muslim women in mosques is pending before the Supreme Court.

What are the criticisms of the essential religious practices test?

The essential religious practices test developed by the Supreme Court has come under significant criticism. In the Sabarimala verdict, Justice DY Chandrachud spent an entire section talking about why this test is problematic and could be replaced with better tests given that courts don’t have the competence to rule on faith.

He pointed out that the essentiality test is a “judicial creation” and the court’s legitimacy to decide on the faith of people “may be questionable”. Other authors have pointed out that our judicial system exists to adjudicate on “secular constitutional statutory and common law issues” and not on theology.

Criticism has also revolved around the allegations that courts apply the test arbitrarily. For instance, Chandrachud said that the tandava dance in public was “prescribed in a religious text by the founder of the sect [Ananda Margis]”. Yet the Supreme Court disregarded that to rule that the practice was not essential since the practice did not date to the founding of the sect and the founder had not provided justification for it.

Currently, a review of the Sabarimala verdict from 2018 is pending before the Supreme Court. In that case, it will reconsider the legality of the essential religious practices test, amongst other issues.

How has essential religious practices been used in the hijab case?

The essential religious practices test has taken the centre stage in the hijab case. Although the petitioners have also argued that disallowing the hijab is discriminatory and affects freedom of speech, the primary argument from their side is based on the essentiality of the hijab to Islam.

This, in turn, has been challenged by the government. They have said that such a declaration would force other Muslim women to wear the hijab. “In a case like this, where you want to bind every Muslim woman, and which can give rise to religious sentiments and division, you should have shown more circumspection to lay a foundation,” the advocate general said.

He also added that the government has left the choice to institutions on what uniform they want to prescribe. The advocate general has further pointed out that the petitioners should have framed this issue not as a denial of a “religious symbol” but as a denial of a “head scarf”.

The government has also said that the burden is on the petitioners to show why the hijab is an essential religious practice. As part of its arguments, the government drew attention to instances where the court held certain Islamic practices to not be essential – such as cow slaughter, triple talaq and praying at a mosque.

Earlier, lawyers like Gautam Bhatia had also pointed out that framing the hijab as an essential religious practice takes away the individual agency of the woman to decide if they wish to wear the hijab. Rather, arguments along the lines of freedom of speech, right to privacy and freedom of conscience would respect individual agency better in this case.

Source: Explainer: Why is Karnataka HC deciding if the hijab is an ‘essential religious practice’ in Islam?

Ghayyur: Canada’s realpolitik ignores the plight of Muslims in India

Of note:

Human Rights Watch’s 2022 World Report argued that while there is still hope for the world’s democracies, there remain plenty of threats in the distance. In particular, the report noted that a number of governments around the world are committing atrocities while enjoying the reputational benefits of being a democratic country.

India, the world’s most populous democracy and one that was founded on a secular constitutional order, has become one of the worst offenders among them.

After a 2014 electoral victory for his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – a political wing of the Hindu-nationalist paramilitary group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – Prime Minister Narendra Modi has propelled Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, into the Indian mainstream. Over the past eight years, the BJP government has adopted policies that discriminate against minority groups, and there has been a surge in violence against those who are not members of the country’s Hindu majority, including attacks on Christian churches and Sikh farmers and abuse of Dalits – all while the government has largely stood idly by.

Muslims have been particularly targeted. In 2019, the Modi government enacted the Citizenship Amendment Act, which allows religious-minority refugees to become citizens unless they are Muslim; it also created a national register of citizens, which threatens to disenfranchise Muslim immigrants or deport others without documentation. High-ranking party officials have vilified Muslims in public remarks. Incidents of mob vigilantism in defence of cows, which are sacred to Hindus, have increased in recent years, with most cases leaving Muslim victims. And in December, a video recording from a conference in northern Indiaattended by party members and religious leaders with ties to the BJP showed militant Hindutva extremists calling for an armed “cleansing” of the country’s more than 200 million Muslims. Mr. Modi has not denounced this incitement of hate and vilification of minority groups, which will only further embolden Hindutva extremists. “We should be crying genocide emergency for India,” declared Dr. Greg Stanton,president of Genocide Watch, a leading human rights watchdog group, at a recent leadership briefing on India.

Even documenting such human rights abuses in Mr. Modi’s India has become dangerous. The BJP and RSS have cracked down on human and civil rights organizations and media in the country. Amnesty International India was forced to shut down its operations in September, 2020, and last year Reporters Without Borders ranked India 142nd on its World Press Freedom Index, which deemed the Indian press less free than Myanmar’s or Uganda’s.

And yet, despite these documented horrific human-rights violations, Canada-India relations continue to improve. Even as India becomes hijacked by an ideology of hatred that aspires to transform the country into an entirely Hindu one, the increasingly authoritarian Modi government continues to hide behind facades of pluralism, democracy and the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violence. And Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has chosen realpolitik above holding the Modi administration accountable for human rights violations in the name of Canada’s economic and security interests.

With Canada’s ties to China deteriorating, the Trudeau government has been looking for partners to help it oppose China’s aggressive international stance. As a result, India is attempting to boost bilateral relations. Canada’s International Trade Minister Mary Ng’s recent meeting with her Indian counterpart, Piyush Goyal, “welcomed a re-engagement on negotiations toward a Canada-India comprehensive economic partnership agreement.”

Although India claims to share Canadian values and interests, its normalizing of Islamophobia and human-rights atrocities demonstrates that this is not the case. Canada must declare human rights a priority and a requirement for any economic or security deals with India.

In the 2022 Human Rights Watch report, executive director Kenneth Roth wonders: Will democratic leaders “act consistently, both at home and abroad, with the democratic and human rights principles they claim to defend?”

This is a question Canadians should ask Mr. Trudeau. Protecting human rights across the world must be a top priority for Canada in 2022. It is past time that Ottawa categorically oppose violence against Muslims and attacks on the religious freedoms of Christian, Dalit, Sikh and Indigenous Adivasi in India. Otherwise, by calling Mr. Modi a friend, Canada makes itself complicit on the international stage.

Source: Canada’s realpolitik ignores the plight of Muslims in India

Over 800,000 Indians have renounced their citizenship since 2016, US top choice

Of note, Canada and Australia after USA:

More than 800,000 Indians have renounced their citizenship to become citizens of other countries, while India granted citizenship to nearly 5,000 foreigners in the last five years.

According to the Indian government’s data, nearly 610,000 Indians became foreign citizens in the five years to December 2021.

The data shows that 42% of the more than six lakh Indians who renounced their citizenship did it to become US citizens, according to a report by The Times of India.

In the first nine months of 2021, more than 50,000 Indians acquired US citizenship.

After the US. Canada was the most favoured country of Indians who renounced their Indian citizenship. As a result, 91,000 Indians became Canadian citizens between 2017 and 2021.

86,933 Indians gave up their Indian citizenship to become Australian citizens, followed by England (66,193) and Italy (23,490). 83,191 Indians have acquired citizenship in one of the 86 other countries worldwide.

The Indian government says 4,844 foreigners were granted Indian citizenship in the last five years.

On Tuesday, India’s Minister of State, Home Affairs, Nityanand Rai, told Lok Sabha that as many as 4,844 foreigners had been granted Indian citizenship under the Citizenship Act 1955 since 2016.

The minister informed that most foreigners (1,773) received Indian citizenship in 2021. As many as 639 foreigners became Indian citizens in 2020, 987 in 2019, 628 in 2018 and 817 in 2017.

People from Pakistan (2,405) were at the top of the table acquiring Indian citizenship between 2016 and 2019, followed by Afghans (431), Bangladeshi (132), Sri Lankans (92) and the US (80).

Union Home Minister of State Rai responded to a question about the total number of foreigners granted Indian citizenship by the Central government during the last five years to clarify reasons for taking it.

“The citizenship to eligible foreigners is granted by registration under section 5, by neutralization under section 6 or by incorporation of territory under section 7 of the Citizenship Act, 1955,” he said in a written reply.

Also, 10,635 applications were pending with the Ministry of Home Affairs as of December 2021. Most of these applications are from Pakistan (7,306), followed by Afghanistan (1,152).

Source: Over 800,000 Indians have renounced their citizenship since 2016, US top choice

As Officials Look Away, Hate Speech in India Nears Dangerous Levels

Of note:

The police officer arrived at the Hindu temple here with a warning to the monks: Don’t repeat your hate speech.

Ten days earlier, before a packed audience and thousands watching online, the monks had called for violence against the country’s minority Muslims. Their speeches, in one of India’s holiest cities, promoted a genocidal campaign to “kill two million of them” and urged an ethnic cleansing of the kind that targeted Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.

When videos of the event provoked national outrage, the police came. The saffron-clad preachers questioned whether the officer could be objective.

Yati Narsinghanand, the event’s firebrand organizer known for his violent rhetoric, assuaged their concerns.

“Biased?” Mr. Narsinghanand said, according to a video of the interaction. “He will be on our side,” he added, as the monks and the officer broke into laughter.

Once considered fringe, extremist elements are increasingly taking their militant message into the mainstream, stirring up communal hate in a push to reshape India’s constitutionally protected secular republic into a Hindu state. Activists and analysts say their agenda is being enabled, even normalized, by political leaders and law enforcement officials who offer tacit endorsements by not directly addressing such divisive issues.

After the monks’ call to arms went viral, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his top leaders remained silent, except for a vice president with a largely ceremonial role who warned that “inciting people against each other is a crime against the nation” without making a specific reference to Haridwar. Junior members of Mr. Modi’s party attended the event, and the monks have often posted pictures with senior leaders.

“You have persons giving hate speech, actually calling for genocide of an entire group, and we find reluctance of the authorities to book these people,” Rohinton Fali Nariman, a recently retired Indian Supreme Court judge, said in a public lecture. “Unfortunately, the other higher echelons of the ruling party are not only being silent on hate speech, but almost endorsing it.”

Mr. Narsinghanand was later arrested after he ignored the police warning and repeated calls for violence. His lawyer, Uttam Singh Chauhan, said his speeches may have been a reaction to anti-Hindu comments by Muslim clerics.

Mr. Modi’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party did not respond to requests for comment.

“Does the prime minister or home minister need to address every small, trivial issue?” said Vinod Bansal, a spokesman for the World Hindu Council, a party affiliate. “The accused have already been arrested. The secular groups will always highlight such incidents, but not when Hindus, Hindu gods and goddesses are under attack.”

The hate speech is stoking communal tensions in a country where small triggers have incited mass-death tragedies. The monks’ agenda already resonates with increasingly emboldened vigilante groups.

Vigilantes have beaten people accused of disrespecting cows, considered holy by some Hindus; dragged couples out of trains, cafes and homes on suspicion that Hindu women might be seduced by Muslim men; and barged into religious gatherings where they suspect people are being converted.

In recent weeks, global human rights organizations and local activists, as well as India’s retired security chiefs, have warned that the violent rhetoric has reached a dangerous new pitch. With right-wing messages spreading rapidly through social media and the government hesitant to take action, they are concerned that a singular event — a local dispute, or an attack by international terror groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State — could lead to widespread violence that would be difficult to contain.

Gregory Stanton, the founder of Genocide Watch, a nonprofit group, who raised similar warnings ahead of the massacres in Rwanda in the 1990s, told a U.S. congressional briefing that the demonizing and discriminatory “processes” that lead to genocide have been well underway in India.

In an interview, he said Myanmar was an example of how the easy dissemination of misinformation and hate speech on social media prepares the ground for violence. The difference in India, he said, is that it would be the mobs taking action instead of the military.

“You have to stop it now,” he said, “because once the mobs take over it could really turn deadly.”


The Dasna Devi temple in Uttar Pradesh state, where Mr. Narsinghanand is the chief priest, is peppered with signs that call to prepare for a “dharm yudh,” or religious war. One calls on “Hindus, my lions” to value their weapons “just the way dedicated wives value their husbands.”

The temple’s main sign prohibits Muslims from entering.

The monks’ anger is rooted in a sense of internalized victimhood that dates to the founding of India’s republic after independence from British rule in 1947. When Pakistan was carved out of India in a bloody partition that left hundreds of thousands dead, the Hindu right was incensed that the founding fathers turned what remained of India into a secular republic.

They celebrate a Hindu hard-liner’s assassination of Mohandas Gandhi — a renowned symbol of nonviolent struggle, but to them a Muslim appeaser. Pooja Shakun Pandey, a monk at the Haridwar event, has held re-enactments of Gandhi’s assassination, firing a bullet into his effigy as blood runs down.

The forces that shaped the ideology of Gandhi’s assassin, Nathuram Godse, have slowly risen from the fringes to dominate India’s politics.

Mr. Modi, the prime minister, spent decades as a mobilizer for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the century-old right-wing organization to which Mr. Godse belonged. Mr. Modi’s party sees the group as the fountainhead of its political ideology and has relied heavily on its vast network of volunteers to mobilize voters and secure victories.

When he was chief minister of Gujarat, Mr. Modi saw firsthand how unchecked communal tensions could turn into bloodletting.

In 2002, a train fire killed 59 Hindu pilgrims. Although the cause was disputed, violent mobs, in response, targeted the Muslim community, leaving more than 1,000 people dead, many burned alive.

Rights organizations and opposition leaders accused Mr. Modi of looking the other way. He rejected the allegations as political attacks.

After he rose to the country’s highest office in 2014 on a message of economic growth, there was hope that Mr. Modi could rein in the fury. Instead, he has often reverted to a Hindu-first agenda that inflames communal divides.

In 2017, Mr. Modi picked Yogi Adityanath, a monk who had started a youth group accused of vigilante violence, to lead Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest state with more than 200 million people.

In his saffron robe, Mr. Adityanath has legislated a ban on religious conversion by marriage, an idea that he calls “love jihad,” in which Muslim men lure Hindu women to convert them. His group has served as moral police, hounding interfaith couples and punishing anyone suspected of disrespecting cows.

As Mr. Adityanath campaigned for re-election, the group held a meeting in New Delhi around the same time as the monks’ event. With a picture of Mr. Adityanath behind them, attendees took an oath to turn India into a Hindu state, even if it meant killing for it.

Mr. Adityanath’s office would not address his current relations with the group, but said the chief minister “had nothing to do” with the meeting.

Dhirendra K. Jha, a writer who has studied the rise of Hindu nationalism, said he worried that extremists now dominate India’s politics in such a way that those who call for violence feel protected.

“Unless this is dealt with, the kind of consequences that may happen — I can’t even imagine, I don’t dare to imagine,” said Mr. Jha.

The choice of Haridwar as the venue for a bold call to violence was strategic — the city attracts millions of visitors annually, often for religious festivals and pilgrimages.

The riverbank was recently busy with seers and worshipers. Families picnicked and took dips in the chilly water. Even as some religious authorities appeared troubled by the calls for violence, they were reluctant to condemn them.

Pradeep Jha, the main organizer of the city’s largest pilgrimage festival, said he shared the vision of a Hindu state, not through violence but by urging India’s Muslims to convert back; in such a view, everyone in India was Hindu at one point.

“I believe we need to pursue our goals with patience, with peace,” he said. “Otherwise, what is our difference with others?”

Mr. Narsinghanand has made a name for himself doing the exact opposite.

As he sees it, India’s Muslims — who account for 15 percent of the population — will turn the country into a Muslim state within a decade. To prevent such an outcome, he has told followers that they must “be willing to die,” pointing to the Taliban and Islamic State as a “role model.

In 2020, Mr. Narsinghanand was among the hard-liners stoking tensions during monthslong protests over a citizenship amendment seen as discriminatory toward Muslims. He called for violence, using the language of a “final battle.” “They are jihadis, and we will have to finish them off,” he said.

Riots followed in New Delhi, with 50 people killed, a majority of them Muslims.

Mr. Narsinghanand was always observant, but not an extremist, according to his 82-year-old father, Rajeshwar Dayal Tyagi.

He was a top college student, earning a scholarship to study food technology in Moscow. There, he helped open a vegetarian restaurant for Indian students that still operates.

Returning to India in 1996, he started a computer training institute with money from Mr. Tyagi’s pension. He soon dedicated his life to being a monk, leaving behind his wife and young daughter, said his father.

“I feel pained, I feel angry, it gives me stress,” his father said. “It’s not a good idea to use harsh words against anybody.”

Despite the police warning, Mr. Narsinghanand and his fellow monks repeated their messages of hate, including on national television and social media.

“This Constitution will be the end of the Hindus, all one billion Hindus,” Mr. Narsinghanand said at a virtual event. “Whoever believes in this system, in this Supreme Court, in these politicians, in this Constitution, in this army and police — they will die a dog’s death.”

When the police came to arrest an associate, he threatened the officers, who politely urged him to calm down. “You will all die,” Mr. Narsinghanand is seen in a video telling them.

The police arrested Mr. Narsinghanand on Jan. 15, and he was charged in court with hate speech.

“He said nothing wrong,” said Swami Amritanand, an organizer of the Haridwar event. “We are doing what America is doing, we are doing what Britain is doing.”

Mr. Amritanand said the call for arms was justified because “within the next 10 to 12 years there will be a horrible war that will play out in India.”

Late last month, the monks again sounded a violent call to create a Hindu state, this time at an event hundreds of miles away from Haridwar in Uttar Pradesh. They threatened violence — referencing a bombing of India’s assembly — if Mr. Narsinghanand was not released.

Ms. Pandey described their actions as defensive. “We must prepare to protect ourselves,” she said.

To the Haridwar police, the event in Uttar Pradesh did not count as a repeat offense. Rakendra Singh Kathait, the senior police officer in Haridwar, said Mr. Narsinghanand was in jail because he had acted again in the city; others like Ms. Pandey got a warning.

“If she goes and says it from Kolkata, it doesn’t count as repeat here,” Mr. Kathait said.

Source: As Officials Look Away, Hate Speech in India Nears Dangerous Levels

Owners of 30 immigration firms in Chandigarh booked

At one point, the Canadian consulate had a “wall of shame” of fraud examples ….

Two days after the UT police booked owners of 29 immigration consultancy companies for not providing their information to the Police Department, the owners of 30 more such companies operating from Sector 17 and 22 have been booked for the same offence.

As per the District Magistrate’s orders, the immigration consultancy companies are supposed to provide information about the company and their antecedents to the police. The list of these companies is then uploaded on the Chandigarh Police website to assist people.

A police official said a majority of the companies operating from the city had not provided information to the police following which a check was being conducted and action being taken against erring company owners.

“We advise people to choose among the consultants whose names are mentioned in the list as in case the consultant commits a fraud, the police can easily track them,” said an official.

Meanwhile, an investigation has been initiated into the cases at the Sector 17 police station.

Source: Owners of 30 immigration firms in Chandigarh booked

India’s proud tradition of celebrating multiculturalism is facing a crisis

Of note:

In Saeed Akhtar Mirza’s 1995 film Naseem (streaming on Mubi), an ailing old man regales his granddaughter with anecdotes of his youth, a time when India’s Hindus and Muslims rejoiced in one another’s festivities and fought in solidarity against British colonial rule. The grandfather’s narrative of religious harmony and national integration is juxtaposed with the tensions leading up to the Babri Mosque demolition in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, by Hindu extremists on December 6, 1992 — a tragic event now widely considered to be a turning point in the rise of Hindu nationalism.

The film’s fraught backdrop, as witnessed by 15-year-old Naseem (Mayuri Kango), offers a stark contrast to the pre-independence past described by her grandfather as India’s secular fabric begins to slowly erode. But what sadly makes Naseem as relevant today as it was upon its release — if not more so — is that contemporary India continues to mirror the tumultuous nation depicted in the film. In fact, now more than ever, India is consumed by hate towards the “other,” marking a shift away from the more pluralistic values historically espoused in its films, poetry, music, and even (to the ire of the conservative ruling party) its TV ads.

Naseem ultimately ends with the death of the grandfather coinciding with the demolition of the Babri Mosque, symbolically marking the fall of India’s pluralistic bastion. Actor and Urdu-language poet Kaifi Azmi, whose grandfather character is the embodiment of secularism in the film, was pained by the grinding down of his country’s secularism in real life, too. His lament found expression in the poem “Doosra Banwas” (“The Second Exile”), which imagines the Hindu deity Rama visiting his birthplace, Ayodhya, on the day of demolition and becoming despondent upon witnessing the carnage and politics played out in his name. Rama subsequently decides to go into exile again.

Fortunately for Azmi, when he recited the poem at an event in the late 1990s, the sociopolitical climate of India was a bit more tolerant than it is now. If such an act of “blasphemy” were to be attempted today, in all probability the socialist poet would have to languish in jail alongside many other artists and activists, on account of “hurting religious sentiments.”

Ever since the right-wing forces rose to power in the previous decade, a wave of religious intolerance has been sweeping over India, rendering artists and their work extremely vulnerable to attack. Stand-up comic Munawar Faruqui found himself at the receiving end of such bigoted absurdity at the beginning of the new year when he was arrested on Jan. 1 in the central Indian city of Indore for allegedly making objectionable jokes about Hindu deities, following a complaint by the son of a politician who belonged to the ruling right-wing party, BJP. Faruqui was eventually released on bail after more than a month in prison.

That witch-hunt mentality might also explain the outcry by many educated Indians over an advertisement for the jewelry brand Tanishq. The 45-second ad depicts a baby shower for a Hindu wife by her Muslim in-laws, but right-wingers criticized the clip for promoting love jihad, a term used by radical Hindu groups to accuse Muslim men of converting Hindu women by marriage. Similarly, consumer goods company Dabur recently withdrew an advertisement for a skin-bleaching cream that showed a same-sex couple celebrating Karwa Chauth — a Hindu festival where married women observe fast from sunrise to moonrise for the safety and longevity of their husbands — hours after the home minister of India’s second-largest state, Narottam Mishra, warned of legal action against the firm.

Meanwhile, the clothing company Fabindia came under fire for running a Diwali-themed advertisement for a clothing collection named “Jashn-e-Riwaaz,” an Urdu phrase meaning “celebration of tradition.” Advertising a collection by that name in connection with the Hindu festival of Diwali drew accusations of “unnecessarily uplifting secularism and Muslim ideologies” from critics who “claimed it hurt their religious sentiments,” The New Indian Express recounts. BJP leader Tejasvi Surya further slammed Fabindia for its “deliberate attempt of Abrahamanization of Hindu festivals and depicting models without traditional Hindu attire.” The message was loud and clear: The secular rhetoric of a pluralistic society needs to give way to the hegemony of Hindutva ideology. Further, any individual, entity, or even brand acting as proponents of a composite culture must be prepared to face clampdown.

But such close-mindedness flies in the face of a long history of progressivism that can easily be located in India’s art; arguably, even the narrative commercials censored by the government are an extension of this tradition. Ironically, it is the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, which had a long history of religious syncretism before the Babri mayhem, that has been at the forefront of the deepening religious divide in the country. Yet long before the spread of fundamentalism in the state, Uttar Pradesh was emblematic of the “Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb,” a poetic phrase comparing the Hindu-Muslim camaraderie to the holy confluence of India’s major rivers, the Ganga and Yamuna. The late musician Ustad Bismillah Khan and his predecessors — who hailed from the city of Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh — stand as easy examples of this inclusive culture, since their Muslim identities never prevented them from performing at temples and Hindu festivals.

ia’s tradition of multiculturalism can be further witnessed in Niharika Popli’s documentary Rasan Piya (2015), about the life of renowned Hindustani (Indian) classical musician Ustad Abdul Rashid Khan. Belonging to a lineage of artists who performed in provinces of diverse faiths, he was appointed as a court singer to the Hindu king of Gwalior in the state of Madhya PradeshAn exemplar of polytheism and yet a devout Muslim, Rashid Khan was also a devotee of the Hindu god Lord Krishna, and would fast on Janmashtami (the birth anniversary of Krishna) every year.

It is evident that for centuries, then, the heterogeneous culture of India was capable of embracing the ethos of the Sanskrit phrase “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam,” meaning “the world is one family.” However, any traces of “unity in diversity” that persist today stand threatened by the hijackers of culture and religion who are hellbent on ignoring the nation’s age-old multicultural narrative, otherwise so evident and celebrated in its art.

Source: India’s proud tradition of celebrating multiculturalism is facing a crisis

Mohanty: Culture wars & claims of multiculturalism

Interesting commentary from an Indian perspective:

DESPITE the claim of universality, we are far from finding conclusive answers to the multiculturalism debates in the media, academia and the larger community today. The British philosopher C.E.M Joad once observed: “Socialism is like a hat which has lost its shape, because everybody wears it.”1 In a similar manner, Nathan Glazer’s book We are all Multiculturalists Now2 seems to suggest that multiculturalism has come of age. What began as an attempt to reform pedagogy in the Eurocentric context has acquired, over the years, the nature of a ‘culture war’ in the name of multiculturalism, which threatens to Balkanise societies the world over. What may be the answers to this crisis? Is multiculturalism a battleground or a meeting ground?

Recent scholarship at the international level has questioned the dominant paradigms of national identity. For instance, in The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital,3 the critic Lisa Lowe brilliantly unmasks the contradictions between the emergence of the United States’ economy in search of cheap labour and the role of the political state that ensured “the disenfranchisement of existing labour forces to prevent accumulation, by groups of Chinese, Japanese, Filipino and South Asians”. Thus, it may be logical to conclude that “immigration has been historically a locus of racialisation and the primary site for the policing of political, cultural and economic membership in the U.S. Nation State”.4

The intersection between politics, society and culture has led to newer understandings, a welcome shift, in the U.S. for instance, from the concept of the American melting pot to that of the salad bowl or the mosaic and beyond that to the notion of hyphenated identities5 and multiculturalism that act as a beacon for a liberal order. It has significant implications for postcolonial nation states like India as well. Many issues of multiculturalism nevertheless remain unresolved. We need to make a deeper inquiry into the movement and its underlying philosophy if we are to go beyond the commonly accepted “feel-good” factor that societies and individuals often adopt as an easy palliative.

Key questions

The problems of multiculturalism could be articulated in a series of questions: How do we determine our individual and collective self-image? How to resolve our allegiance to the multiple identities—linguistic, ethnic, national and global—that participation in a democratic order entails? How is the question of our collective identities linked to our view of the past? How shall we retrieve alternative pasts and submerged memories? How much of the memories of this past shall we retain and how much of the trauma and nightmare shall we abandon? Some of the answers are being attempted by feminist projects of archival retrieval and some in the fields of Holocaust studies, for instance.

A challenge is to ask whether these seeming divergences could be harmonised by a multicultural thinking under the larger umbrella of inclusiveness. How can such inclusiveness be promoted in literary, cultural and ethnic terms in the context of embattled marginalised groups? This is easier said than done. Modern societies have not fashioned the magic tool that can harmonise rival claims.

I had an opportunity to pose some of these questions to Edward Said, one of the most distinguished thought leaders of the 20th century, at the international seminar on “History and Literature” in Cairo, Egypt, in 1994. His answers were full of insights and illuminations. We need to highlight, he said, “the face of the many dissenting traditions”, of women, of coloured people, of culturally marginalised groupings and of modern nation states. He added: “It is better to offer resistance to the bigger monolithic nation that has always usurped the state apparatus for its hegemonic role.”6

Literature and multiculturalism

We must begin the exercise by asking the most basic question: How is literature related to multiculturalism since that is the primary academic discipline where the problem appears to have originated? Literature has traditionally been defined as a body of canonised texts. To canonise is to valorise, to impose values upon texts. Shakespeare is mandatory reading in the classroom, it is argued, since his texts are viewed as transcultural and transhistorical. In other words, he has “stood the test of time”.

In recent years, however, this traditional view of the literary canon and canon making has been challenged on literary, theoretical, pedagogic, demographic and cultural grounds. The canon is seen as ahistorical; it must give way to an alternative perspective that reflects the changing literary climate in consonance with alternative theoretical paradigms and the needs of an increasingly diverse student population.

The romantic-modernist conception of literature accorded uniqueness to the text and the author. It lent singularity to the creative artist and the literary artefact. William Wordsworth spoke of the “inward eye”;7 S.T. Coleridge, in his celebrated Biographia Literaria,8 theorised about the “Primary” and “Secondary Imagination”, holding the latter to be the unique attribute of the “authentic” poet; for William Blake, the “true God was the human imagination”;9 in his Defence of Poetry(1821), P.B. Shelley defined poets as “the unacknowledged legislators of the world”; and, finally, to John Keats, who said: “If poetry comes not as naturally as leaves to a tree, it had better not come at all.”10 It was the mind of the poet that gave birth to poetry and art, and therefore, this mind and heart were held as sacred and sacrosanct. All other aspects such as the sociopolitical, ideological and contextual factors may have had a role to play, but they were invariably held as subordinate and secondary.

Radical critique of the canon

Such views of art and artist were seen as elitist, a reflection of the long-cherished Euro-American “high modernism”. Four volumes, pivotal in nature, may be cited in this context: Richard Ohmann’s English in America: A Radical View of the Profession, 1976;11 Alvin Kernan’s The Death of Literature, 1990;12 Gerald Graff’s Literature Against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society, 1982;13 and Leslie Fiedler’s What Was Literature?: Class, Culture and Mass Society,1982.14 Varied groups of multiculturalists such as feminists, minorities, African Americans, Hispanics and, in India, Dalits and Adivasis attacked the view—considered axiomatic and self-evident at one time and unquestioned for long—as flawed, narrow and exclusive for excluding and marginalising the literary-cultural experience on political grounds.

Conservative backlash

In America, it led to a conservative backlash. Four books that became in due course bestsellers in the mainstream media may be mentioned here: The Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom (1987),15 Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know by E.D. Hirsh (1987),16 Tenured Radicals: How Politics has Corrupted Our Higher Education by Roger Kimball (1990),17 and Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus by Dinesh D’Souza (1991).18

In The Closing of the American Mind, Bloom laments how American students have fallen victim to mindless destruction by treating all traditional literature as oppressive and reactionary.19 Similarly, in his 1987 book, the conservative critic Hirsh regrets the state of academic affairs. “To be culturally literate,” he argues, “is to possess the basic information needed to thrive in the modern world.”20 Much of this knowledge, he maintains, lies in texts of European origin. Cultural relativism, he argues, is not likely to lead the American youth anywhere.

The attack against the traditional literary canon and syllabi began in America, famously in the Stanford Movement in 1985 wherein large sections of black students on the Stanford University campus protested against William Bennett, the Conservative U.S. Secretary of Education, and demanded inclusion of texts they could relate to, those that were historically denied to them by the faculty and academic administrators, dominated for long by upper-class white males.21

Inspired by this movement, protesters occupied the offices of deans, provosts and presidents in various American campuses. The protest had the desired effect: hiring policies were changed; syllabi were altered; anthologies such as The Norton Anthology and The Heath Anthology of American Literature underwent changes to reflect newer approaches to the study of works by women, minorities and the historically marginalised groups in schools and colleges; and researchers in the field produced new textbooks

The disciplines of history, literature, philosophy, sociology, anthropology and psychology found greater acceptance in the context of the emergence of identity politics. With immigrants of colour and diverse ethnic and class backgrounds around, liberal democracies in the West began to listen to the voices of multicultural thinkers such as Charles Taylor and Anthony Appiah when it came to city planning and citizenship rights. Despite such progressive measures, present-day America appears to be beset with serious problems in the classroom. For instance, a recent article entitled “Culture War, Academic Freedom, Teaching History”,22 reports: “Between January and September 2021, 24 legislatures across the United States introduced 54 separate bills intended to restrict teaching and training in K-12 schools, higher education, and state agencies and institutions. The majority of these bills target discussions of race, racism, gender and American history, banning a series of ‘prohibited’ or ‘divisive’ concepts for teachers and trainers operating in K-12 schools, public universities, and workplace settings. These bills appear designed to chill academic and educational discussions and impose government dictates on teaching and learning. In short: They are educational gag orders.”23

Lasting changes: new historicism

Despite resistance from conservative sections of the legislature and the political establishment in America, it must be admitted that the changes in the direction of multiculturalism have been deep and lasting. In Marvellous Possessions: The Wonders of the New World,24 Stephen Greenblatt, the founder of the influential school of new historicism, offers a profound meditation on Christopher Columbus’ discovery of America, redefining in the process the relationship between mainstream and marginal cultures. He makes a fundamental distinction between Columbus and Sir John Mandeville as travellers. In contrast to Mandeville, who travelled for travel’s sake, Columbus, he argues, was carrying a passport, royal letters and edicts. He was on a state-sponsored mission. He offers not an account of a battle but a series of “speech acts” and “proclamations” by which he takes “possession” of the islands, followed by the giving of names. For him, taking possession is primarily a set of “linguistic acts”, “decoding, witnessing and recording”. He is not only the medium through which the crown could take possession, he also “enacts the ritual of possession” on his own behalf and on behalf of his descendants.25

Secondly, argues Greenblatt, Columbus invokes the medieval concept of natural law, according to which “the claim to sovereignty” is by “the right to discovery”. That is to say, if you discover a land, you have the right to own it. Therefore, Columbus “empties the land” by making it uninhabitable, terra nullius. He denies the natives linguistic competence. At landfall, he decides that he has offered to serve Portuguese, English and Spanish monarchies. All “rituals of naming”, Greenblatt argues, are “the rituals of possession”. Columbus therefore goes on a naming spree: San Salvador, El Salvador, and so on. The “claim of possession” is grounded in “the power of wonder”. Columbus never gives up hope. God, he declares, “spake so clearly of these lands by the mouth of Isaiah in many places of the Book… His holy name should be spoken to them”. Here is an extraordinary manner in which Columbus’ “discovery” of America is given a multicultural reading; the lessons here are applicable to all societies and cultures that strive to go beyond inequities and injustice.

The learning and education can begin in the classroom, and therefore, the classroom becomes the primary locus for multicultural thinking and action. Properly taught, the classroom becomes not a battleground but a meeting ground. Gerald Graff’s “staging the debate” is an outstanding example of such dialogues in the classroom that promote, in a Socratic manner, critical thinking rather than rote learning and indoctrination.

Greenblatt’s project in revisionist history cannot be comprehended without a critique of the Enlightenment model of modernity (and capitalism) that logically leads to colonisation of the world.

As the historian Dilip Menon correctly states: “The term modernity comes to us masking both its origins within a distinct geographical space as well as an imagination almost entirely concerned with a description of change in Europe and America (what we refer to euphemistically as the West). It is precisely because the term modernity appears to be neither temporarily nor geographically grounded that there is increasing suspicion towards its relevance as a term for understanding historical change.”26

Multicultural education

Thus, what is valid for Europe is not necessarily applicable to the rest of the world. Each nation, community and groups of people must be allowed to shape their destiny, their systems of thought and governance. Approaches to multicultural education vary. In his seminal book, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (1992),27 the eminent Canadian theorist Charles Taylor advocates public institutions recognising particular group identities as part of multicultural education, and others like Stephen Rockefeller caution against a particular cultural identity over the universal identity of democratic citizens. Yet others, like Susan Wolf, see the need to correlate the demand for multicultural education with the American sense of who they essentially are.28

On the other hand, in his book, Identity Against Culture: Understanding of Multiculturalism (1994), Kwame Anthony Appiah, one of the leading exponents in the field, voices “the need and possibilities of maintaining a pluralistic culture of many identities and subcultures while retaining the civil and political practices that sustain national life in the classic sense”.29

The future of multiculturalism

On the basis of the above reflections, we could come up with the following tentative conclusions:

First, despite the setback in electoral politics, multiculturalism is here to stay; it addresses fundamentally and inescapably the demographic and democratic concerns of learners and the citizenry across class, caste, region and ethnicity. It must remain resilient, flexible and imaginative and respond to changing demands and times in a creative manner.

Secondly, multiculturalism must not be equated with identity politics of a narrow, sectarian and dogmatic kind that leads its acolytes and followers to a dead end. The answer to Orientalism, Edward Said tells us wisely, is not Occidentalism. Nor does it envisage revenge history, violence and annihilation of the “other” in the name of rectifying historical wrongs, both real and imaginary, through acts of revenge and reprisals. Rather, it calls for truth and reconciliation through acts of reading and acts of atonement. Lessons very relevant for contemporary India, which finds itself tragically polarised across caste, community, religious and ethnic lines.

Thirdly, multiculturalism does not envision a set of windowless boxes, erection of walls or ghettos that block communion; rather it stands for dialogues, for mutual understanding, for mutual benefit and welfare. It eschews all self-righteous acts of contempt and condemnation in favour of understanding and acceptance.

Fourthly, multiculturalism does not suggest that the answer to Eurocentrism is Afrocentrism. While all forms of anthropocentrism are abhorrent, the primacy of any systems of thought in a hegemonic manner over others leads to asymmetry in cultural transactions among communities and nations.

Next, multiculturalism entails allegiance to multiple loyalties: to the individual, the family, the commune, the province, the nation and the world in a non-hierarchical manner; that is to say, not one at the cost of the other. To realise the truth of the one, one needs to simultaneously see the truth of the others. This relationship is not based on self-interest in the narrow sense of the term. It must not be mercenary; it must encompass the deeper core of our being and seek to realise the greatest good of the largest number of the people and organisations, especially the deprived and the dispossessed.

It must accept cultures and life values of individuals, groups and communities without force or duress of any kind. Most of all, it must not look at the market or the state as the arbiter of individual or social behaviour. At the deepest level, this approach will enable us to give up the habitual binary of the modern mind and embrace the deeper core of our being, indeed our psychic and spiritual selves, as Soren Kierkegaard, Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo and other existential/spiritual thinkers have taught us.

The new culture in the academia, as I see it, believes in democratic pluralism. The main problem of democratic pluralism, as Patrick J. Hill suggests, “is less that of taking diversity seriously than that of grounding any sort of commonality. It is the problem of encouraging citizens to sustain conversations of respect with diverse others for the sake of their making public policy together, for forging over and over again a sense of shared future.”30

It is in the search for a shared future that multiculturalism will find its true meaning.

Sachidananda Mohanty is a former professor and Head of the Department of English, University of Hyderabad. Winner of many national and international awards, he has published extensively in the field of British, American, gender, translation and postcolonial studies. He is a former Vice Chancellor of the Central University of Odisha.

Source: Culture wars & claims of multiculturalism

Mass exodus: India sees rise in number of people surrendering citizenship

Would use the term mass but nevertheless of note:

More than 60,000 Indians have given up their citizenship in the last five years, while in the same period just over 4,000 people became Indian. Analysts and surveys indicate a variety of reasons for the exodus.

Though the reason for a large number of Indians surrendering their citizenship was not stated by the junior home minister Nityanand Rai in parliament this week, quality of life, employment opportunities, social structure, financial and social security, development and gender equality have been suggested.

About 40 percent of the citizenship renunciation requests come from the United States, followed by Australia and Canada, which amount to a chunk of around 30 percent of such requests.

This year saw the steepest spike in Indians giving up their citizenship as worldwide travel and outdoor restrictions started to ease because of the pandemic.

Since 2016, when India announced a sudden move to demonetise its high denomination currency notes, there has been a dramatic fall in economic growth, with a large number of mid-level companies losing business.

“India is seeing an exodus of talent like never before in history. Economic blunders such as demonetisation and the bulldozing of democratic rights by the Narendra Modi government have led to this,” Congress national spokesperson Shama Mohamed said.

Flight of millionnaires

Statistics from the Global Wealth Migration Review show that 2 percent of India’s millionaires already flocked overseas in 2020.

While China topped the migration list with a total of 16,000 High Net worth Individuals (HNWI) exits, India came in second at 7,000 exits and Russia 5,500 exits.

Another study by AfrAsia Bank covered only individuals with a net worth of  between 1 million and 9.9 million dollars, who took up residency in a new country and spent at least half of the year there.

According to the report, work, opportunities, tax and financial concerns were among the reasons HNWI were deciding to make the move.

In October, West Bengal Finance Minister Amit Mitra cited three different studies to claim that 35,000 Indian entrepreneurs of high net worth left the country between 2014 and 2020 during the tenure of the Narendra Modi government.

He wondered whether this was due to “fear psychosis”, and demanded that Modi must acknowledge in parliament the “massive flight of Indian entrepreneurs during his regime”.

“I also hear tales of tax terrorism and demands being faced by the industry on various counts. Put together, many of them are relocating,” Mitra said.

Higher passport index

India does not offer dual citizenship yet, and people seeking citizenship in other countries must give up their Indian passport as per law.

A majority of Indians surrender their passports because of the privileges they get using the passports of other countries. India stands at the 69th number on the passport power rank according to the world passport index.

When comparing it with other countries – the rank of Australia is 3rd, USA is 5th, Singapore is 6th and Canada is 7th. At the top are UAE on number 1 and New Zealand on number 2.

“The higher the passport index ranking, the better access they get to travel visa-free to many countries,” said passport index findings.

“They are also exempted from bureaucratic delays in the immigration process which is beneficial for traders and businessmen.”

Modi and his ministers and supporters have repeatedly emphasised the incumbent government had increased India’s stature in the world.

A number of measures have been initiated by the Indian government to stop the brain drain such as prioritising skill development through its National Skill Development Mission that aims to train approximately 400 million people across the country by 2022.

Source: Mass exodus: India sees rise in number of people surrendering citizenship

Why the Modi government is unlikely to repeat the farm laws pullback with the citizenship law

Of note:

On November 19, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did something that he isn’t known for – revoke a major policy decision under public pressure.

He even topped it off with a public apology, which is a far cry from his otherwise haughty and unrepentant style of leadership. Whether it was a faux apology or a genuine one is a different matter.

Why did Modi walk back on the controversial farm bills after a year?

To put it simply, the costs of defending and maintaining the laws in the face of a year-long resistance by farmers had risen dramatically. With elections in the agrarian states of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh looming over his head, Modi couldn’t afford to appear dismissive of farmer unions, which have a strong sway in both states. And he certainly can’t afford to lose a crucial state like Uttar Pradesh – the hearth of the modern Hindutva political project.

But, the electoral imperative is a secondary, derivative factor. This isn’t the first time important state elections are taking place in Modi’s India. More importantly, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s current senior leadership isn’t quite the type to reverse major policy decisions before state polls. It has other political tricks up its sleeve to stay ahead in the game and offset any negative impact of its national-level decisions on state-level constituencies.

Meeting its match

What really made a difference this time was the extraordinarily defiant nature of the farmers’ movement, which not just successfully weathered all kinds of pressure from the top, but also handled its internal contradictions and shortcomings with much aplomb. This is a government that has mastered the art of attrition when it comes to protests. But this time, it met it’s match in the farmers who kept at it through four seasons.

From overt force to covert subterfuge, the Modi government deployed every single strategy in its playbook to diffuse the protests, but failed miserably. Even a concerted attempt by the pro-regime media to demonise the protesting Sikhs as Khalistani terrorists, anarchists and what not fell flat on the ground. Let’s be clear – we don’t get to see this very often in Modi’s India.

Thus, to only attribute Modi’s turnaround to sheer electoral realpolitik, would be to underplay the movement’s own role in creating fertile ground for a pullback. Without the grit, tact, conviction and consistency that the farmer unions showed in the face of an insolent administration, the farm laws wouldn’t have become an election issue in the first place, that too an issue big enough for Modi to do the unthinkable – retrench and apologise.

A movement with an edge

But here’s another important thing about the farmers’ movement that helped it win – it had a certain degree of social, political and economic leverage that other mass movements in Modi’s India have lacked. This is both an organic leverage, and one that the movement leaders crafted from scratch.

First, the Hindutva regime can’t target farmers in a manner that it can target religious minorities like Muslims. Even for a government as malevolent and divisive as this one, a strategy of ignoring and vilifying the large agrarian voter base can be a huge political gamble. It can backfire not just at the polling booths, but also at a deeper social level within the ambit of the Hindutva project.

Second, the farmers’ movement cut across specific identities, which allowed the union leaders to forge a rare cross-sectional coalition and stand up for each other. While Sikhs, a religious minority that is routinely profiled with various derogatory political markers, remained a dominant force within the movement and were repeatedly demonised by pro-government elements, the North Indian agrarian class straddles many sub-regional and religious identities, which reflected very well in the movement.

For instance, Hindu Jats from the sugarcane belt in western Uttar Pradesh played a central role in the second phase of the movement. The leadership of Rakesh Tikait, who eventually became one of the most prominent faces of the movement, was instrumental in this. Even some Muslim farmers from the sub-region rallied behind him, despite his murky past as a prime agent of the anti-Muslim Muzaffarnagar riots in 2013.

Show of defiance

One could even argue that it was Tikait’s tactful show of defiance and emotions at Ghazipur in late January that took the spotlight away from the “Khalistani infiltration” narrative that reared its head after the dramatic farmers’ march into the Red Fort on Republic Day. It might have been an unintended outcome of his actions, but was effective nonetheless.

This multiplicity of identities, sub-regional leaderships and the solidarity between them erected a protective fence around the movement. More significantly, despite the many sub-regional identities at play, the farmers, as a class of protestors, had become a singular political force. It was clear that eventually, the Modi government ran out of ways to deal with such a kaleidoscopic body of protestors with a common set of demands. It was no longer viable to launch sectarian attacks at one group of protestors without insinuating the others. Add to this the constant political risk of losing the agrarian constituencies for good.

This is where we come to the movement against the Citizenship Amendment Act – how it is very different from the farmers’ movement and why Modi is highly unlikely to kneel before it.

No pullback

The most obvious difference between the farmers protest and the movement against the citizenship initiatives is that unlike farmers, Muslims are not a core voter base for the BJP. Modi will not lose anything by plainly ignoring them. In fact, he stands to gain additional political points by crushing a movement that is primarily led by Muslims – the number one cultural enemy of Hindutva.

So, his government can go on dismissing them for years and still win one election after another. Occasionally, he can get a few of them thrown behind bars for “terrorism” or sedition and win a few extra votes in the next poll. While the government has filed hundreds of cases against protesting farmers too, the political costs of doing so are far lower in the case of Muslims.

Next, the farmers’ movement is based on a narrative that is primarily economic in its persuasion. Political concerns about the ruling party’s attacks on federalism and state excesses do routinely feature in union speeches and pamphlets, but the collective anxiety against privatisation of the agrarian market and the demand for a guaranteed Minimum Support Price continue to take centrestage in the movement repertoire.

This is compelling for all social groups invested in the agricultural sector in one way or the other. Even for the non-farming urban and semi-urban middle classes from the majority community, agrarian concerns matter as daily consumers of farm products. If not anything, farmer strikes affect them directly. That’s also why it eventually became a poll issue that the government had to take seriously.

This isn’t true in the case of the movement against the Citizenship Amendment Act, which is primarily centred around a single minority religious identity. The pool of stakeholders is much narrower here. While many conscientious Hindus participated in the movement, their numbers remained low and their commitment inconsistent. The social elite, including the Hindu middle classes in urban/semi-urban settings, remained apathetic – even hostile – to the movement.

The reality here is truly bleak: only Muslims stand to lose the most from the dangerous Citizenship Amendment Act-National Register of Citizens combine while the others couldn’t care less. In fact, most of the others see the movement as, at best, an irritant and at worst, a destructive force.

Further, by strategically decoupling the proposed all-India National Register of Citizens from the Citizenship Amendment Act (despite Home Minister Amit Shah unambiguously linking them both in the beginning), the government was able to project the sectarian citizenship law as a benign amendment that doesn’t really affect Indian Muslims in any way. This diffused overall participation. No such tactical decoupling was possible in the case of the three farm laws.

In all, the movement against the Citizenship Amendment Act lacked a watertight social coalition that could cut across identity and class lines, of the kinds seen in the farmers’ movement. It had no safety net that could absorb the state’s repressive and divisive offensives. This made it fairly easy for the Modi government to use the law enforcement machinery, pliant media and belligerent proxies to go after the protestors. The pandemic only came as a force multiplier.

Finally, if Modi revokes the Citizenship Amendment Act after repealing the farm laws, it would be nothing short of political suicide for the BJP. While the core party machinery is busy lauding him for the farm laws pullback, large sections of the wider Hindutva ecosystem are incensed. They see it as a betrayal, a meek surrender that is reminiscent of the seemingly weak Congress regimes. This is not the valiant prime minister they have grown to love.

Defying logic

There’s nothing to suggest that the Modi government isn’t aware of this. Modi is a leader who is highly conscious of what his people think about him. For him, his image is paramount. After all, that is literally the only pillar on which he has erected his shining political career. While he possibly has a plan to manage the publicity fallout (we don’t quite know what it is yet), bad PR from his own cheerleaders can very quickly spiral into a situation that even he could lose control over.

In such a scenario, revoking the Citizenship Amendment Act would defy all logic. It would only add to the badmouthing and alienate both hardliners and moderates. A strategy of attrition based on brute force, sectarian vilification and state intimidation has worked well for Modi with the protestors against the Citizenship Amendment Act so far. There’s no reason for him to abandon that playbook.

As far as the electoral imperative is concerned, several state polls have happened since the protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act began, but BJP never considered repealing the divisive amendment. In fact, it has used the legislation to energise the Hindu voter base and strengthen their numbers. For instance, in Assam, defying popular belief, the BJP secured a landslide win this year despite months of fierce protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act.

In short, the Citizenship Amendment Act has been a winning formula for the BJP from the beginning, unlike the farm laws. So the Modi government has no reason to junk it now.

This might be a cynical reading of the future, but it is crucial to understand the distinctions between the two movements precisely so that lessons can be learnt and strategies replicated. It is worth noting that the movement against the citizenship initiatives did manage to secure a critical concession – temporary rollback of the proposed all-India National Register of Citizens, which Shah had promised in the Parliament. Since the protests, he hasn’t mentioned it again. This too was no less than a victory, even if partial.

So, for the movement against the Citizenship Amendment Act , the possibility of a total triumph remains. But for now, it remains hidden behind a thick fog of cynical politics, anti-Muslim majoritarianism and authoritarian arrogance.

Angshuman Choudhury is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Delhi, and a former visiting fellow to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin.

Source: Why the Modi government is unlikely to repeat the farm laws pullback with the citizenship law