Davantage de demandeurs d’asile en Ontario, mais moins de débats?

Good long read in Le Devoir contrasting Ontario and Quebec, featuring comments by Mireille Paquet and me:

Depuis maintenant près de deux ans, le gouvernement de François Legault réclame une meilleure répartition des demandeurs d’asile au Canada. L’un de ses arguments phares, répété récemment par le ministre de l’Immigration, Jean-François Roberge, est le fait que le Québec accueille plus de demandeurs d’asile que sa part démographique dans le Canada.

En d’autres mots, la province représente 22 % de toute la population canadienne, mais compte 40 % de tous les demandeurs d’asile sur son territoire, selon Statistique Canada.

C’est vrai, mais c’est aussi le cas en Ontario. Bon an mal an depuis au moins 2021, la province voisine compte sur son territoire près de la moitié des demandeurs d’asile au pays, alors que son poids démographique est de 39 %. Les données montrent ainsi une histoire légèrement différente du récit politique.

Ainsi, même lorsque Québec a transféré des demandeurs d’asile par autobus, surtout vers l’Ontario, à partir de l’été 2022 et plus intensivement à l’hiver 2023, la province voisine comptait déjà entre 46 % et 49 % de tous les demandeurs au pays.

Le Québec a bel et bien reçu plus de demandes d’asile que son voisin pendant plusieurs années depuis 2017 ; mais l’Ontario l’a aussi dépassé en 2021, en 2024 et pour les quatre premiers mois de 2025. Les arrivées sont donc à distinguer du nombre de personnes présentes ou réellement installées dans une province.

Le phénomène est aussi plus complexe, car il s’étend souvent dans une migration secondaire : les demandeurs en question peuvent atterrir au Québec ou franchir la frontière vers la province, mais ensuite se déplacer vers l’ouest. Le Devoiravait déjà révélé qu’entre 25 % et 33 % des demandeurs d’asile avec une première adresse au Québec déménageaient ensuite dans une autre province.

Politisation

Le premier ministre de l’Ontario, Doug Ford, a beau avoir essayé de faire des vagues autour des permis de travail pour les demandeurs d’asile au Conseil de la fédération en juillet, il s’est rétractéune semaine plus tard. Il faut dire que la délivrance des permis de travail est maintenant beaucoup plus rapide qu’en 2022 ou en 2023, c’est-à-dire en 45 jours, a confirmé au Devoir Immigration, Réfugiés et Citoyenneté Canada.

M. Ford a aussi formulé le souhait d’avoir plus de pouvoirs en immigration, notamment en 2022 pour pouvoir accueillir plus de travailleurs qualifiés — et non moins. S’il l’a mentionné au détour d’une ou deux conférences de presse, il n’a pas utilisé le dossier dans un bras de fer avec Ottawa, contrairement au Québec, où les échanges sont même devenus plutôt acrimonieux.

Pour Mireille Paquet, professeure à l’Université Concordia, difficile de dire si l’on en parle réellement moins en Ontario qu’au Québec, puisqu’elle ne connaît pas d’études sur cette question précisément. « On en parle certainement différemment », affirme-t-elle toutefois, reconnaissant une politisation de l’immigration propre au Québec.

Ses recherches montrent que les questions migratoires sont en effet de plus en plus politisées dans l’espace politique québécois, et plus clairement depuis le scrutin de 2018, qui a porté la Coalition avenir Québec au pouvoir. « Le gouvernement provincial a décidé de s’emparer de cette question et d’en faire un enjeu de revendication auprès du fédéral », observe-t-elle.

« Et cela se reflète aussi dans la manière dont le public réfléchit à ces questions : plus on parle du fait que les demandeurs d’asile créent des pressions sur les services, plus on augmente l’anxiété dans la population — que ce soit à tort ou à raison, ce n’est pas à moi de le dire. »

C’est aussi que la province voisine s’est « rapidement désengagée de ce dossier », signale-t-elle. Quand les arrivées ont commencé à s’accélérer plus clairement au chemin Roxham en 2017, « l’Ontario a essayé de se mobiliser, mais a dit rapidement que c’est un domaine de compétence fédérale : on ne s’en mêle pas ».

L’enjeu est alors retombé plutôt sur le gouvernement local à Toronto qui a à son tour réclamé du financement à Ottawa, sans que Queen’s Park soit impliqué.   

Étude comparative

Une rare comparaison a été réalisée par les chercheuses Audrey Gagnon et Lindsay Larios, qui ont utilisé les plateformes électorales et la couverture médiatique du Toronto Star et de La Presse entre 1987 et 2018 dans leur analyse.

Fait intéressant : les deux autrices notent qu’au début des années 2000, les politiques d’immigration étaient davantage discutées pendant les campagnes électorales en Ontario qu’au Québec. Mais cette relative importance a diminué à partir de 2010, « peut-être parce que la politisation n’a pas apporté beaucoup de bénéfices électoraux », indiquent-elles dans leur article publié en 2021 dans le Canadian Journal of Political Science.

La trajectoire du Québec montre plutôt une plus grande importance à partir de 2003, en croissance jusqu’à 2018. Ce sont les tensions autour de l’intégration, ainsi qu’une polarisation plus grande, surtout à partir de l’affaire Hérouxville en 2007. Ce n’est qu’ensuite que les candidats aux élections québécoises « ont su exploiter l’inquiétude de la province concernant la préservation de sa langue et de sa culture ».

En Ontario, « la présence des nouveaux arrivants n’est pas considérée comme une menace pour l’identité culturelle, mais plutôt comme une partie intégrante de celle-ci », écrivent-elles.

Le ton et les arguments

« Au Québec, l’attention est plus soutenue qu’épisodique, à cause des questions identitaires », note aussi Andrew Griffith, ancien directeur général au ministère fédéral de l’Immigration.

« Oui, il y a eu un changement notable dans l’opinion publique au Canada, mais on y communique surtout en termes de besoins en logement, et pas de peurs », note celui qui est aussi un associé de l’Institut Environics. Au Québec, le mot « menace » a été associé explicitement à « demandeurs d’asile » par le ministre Roberge dès février 2024, avant qu’il ne soit à l’immigration.

C’est donc sur le fond et sur le ton que les débats sont différents, observe M. Griffith. Mais cette attention n’a pas que du mauvais, au contraire. Dans le reste du Canada, il était presque tabou de parler d’immigration pendant longtemps : « C’est compréhensible, mais c’est aussi malsain. J’ai toujours pensé qu’il était souhaitable d’avoir une discussion basée sur des faits et de réfléchir aux impacts de l’immigration. »

Les demandeurs d’asile étaient aussi en quelque sorte « plus visibles » au Québec. D’une part, parce que les arrivées à la frontière terrestre par le chemin Roxham ont marqué l’imaginaire dès 2017. Mais aussi parce qu’ils se concentrent ensuite surtout à Montréal, alors qu’ils sont plus dispersés en Ontario dans des agglomérations urbaines comme Ottawa, London, Niagara, Waterloo, York, Durham, Peel et Hamilton.

Dans les dernières années, d’autres questions ont également été politisées avant en Ontario, conclut néanmoins Mme Paquet, notamment celle des étudiants internationaux et des collèges privés.

Source: Davantage de demandeurs d’asile en Ontario, mais moins de débats?

For almost two years now, François Legault’s government has been calling for a better distribution of asylum seekers in Canada. One of its key arguments, recently repeated by the Minister of Immigration, Jean-François Roberge, is the fact that Quebec welcomes more asylum seekers than its demographic share in Canada.

In other words, the province represents 22% of the entire Canadian population, but has 40% of all asylum seekers in its territory, according to Statistics Canada.

It’s true, but it’s also the case in Ontario. Good year bad year since at least 2021, the neighboring province has on its territory almost half of the asylum seekers in the country, while its demographic weight is 39%. The data thus show a slightly different history of the political narrative.

Thus, even when Quebec transferred asylum seekers by bus, especially to Ontario, from the summer of 2022 and more intensively in the winter of 2023, the neighboring province already had between 46% and 49% of all applicants in the country.

Quebec has indeed received more asylum applications than its neighbor for several years since 2017; but Ontario has also surpassed it in 2021, in 2024 and for the first four months of 2025. Arrivals are therefore to be distinguished from the number of people present or actually settled in a province.

The phenomenon is also more complex, because it often extends into a secondary migration: the applicants in question can land in Quebec or cross the border to the province, but then move west. Le Devoir had already revealed that between 25% and 33% of asylum seekers with a first address in Quebec then moved to another province.

Politicization

Ontario Premier Doug Ford may have tried to make waves around work permits for asylum seekers at the Federation Council in July, but he retracted a week later. It must be said that the issuance of work permits is now much faster than in 2022 or 2023, i.e. in 45 days, confirmed to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.

Mr. Ford has also expressed the desire to have more powers in immigration, especially in 2022 to be able to accommodate more skilled workers – and not less. If he mentioned it at the turn of one or two press conferences, he did not use the file in a tug-of-war with Ottawa, unlike in Quebec, where the exchanges even became rather acrimonious.

For Mireille Paquet, a professor at Concordia University, it is difficult to say whether we really talk about it less in Ontario than in Quebec, since she does not know any studies on this issue precisely. “We certainly talk about it differently,” she says, however, recognizing a politicization of immigration specific to Quebec.

His research shows that migration issues are indeed increasingly politicized in Quebec’s political space, and more clearly since the 2018 election, which brought the Coalition avenir Québec to power. “The provincial government has decided to seize this issue and make it a challenge with the federal government,” she observes.

“And this is also reflected in the way the public thinks about these issues: the more we talk about the fact that asylum seekers create pressures on services, the more we increase anxiety in the population – rightly or wrongly, it’s not up to me to say. ”

It is also that the neighboring province has “quickly disengaged from this file,” she says. When arrivals began to accelerate more clearly on Roxham Road in 2017, “Ontario tried to mobilize, but quickly said it was a federal area of competence: we don’t get involved.”

The issue then fell rather on the local government in Toronto, which in turn called for funding in Ottawa, without Queen’s Park being involved.

Comparative study

A rare comparison was made by researchers Audrey Gagnon and Lindsay Larios, who used election platforms and media coverage of the Toronto Star and La Presse between 1987 and 2018 in their analysis.

Interestingly, the two authors note that in the early 2000s, immigration policies were more discussed during election campaigns in Ontario than in Quebec. But this relative importance has decreased since 2010, “perhaps because politicization has not brought many electoral benefits,” they indicate in their 2021 article in the Canadian Journal of Political Science.

The trajectory of Quebec shows rather greater importance from 2003, in growth until 2018. These are the tensions around integration, as well as greater polarization, especially since the Hérouxville affair in 2007. It was only then that the Quebec election candidates “were able to exploit the province’s concern about the preservation of its language and culture”.

In Ontario, “the presence of newcomers is not seen as a threat to cultural identity, but rather as an integral part of it,” they write.

The tone and arguments

“In Quebec, attention is more sustained than episodic, because of identity issues,” notes Andrew Griffith, former Director General at the Federal Ministry of Immigration.

“Yes, there has been a notable change in public opinion in Canada, but we communicate mainly in terms of housing needs, and not fears,” notes the one who is also a partner of the Environics Institute. In Quebec, the word “threat” was explicitly associated with “asylum seekers” by Minister Roberge in February 2024, before he was in immigration.

It is therefore on the substance and on the tone that the debates are different, observes Mr. Griffith But this attention is not only bad, on the contrary. In the rest of Canada, it was almost taboo to talk about immigration for a long time: “It’s understandable, but it’s also unhealthy. I have always thought it was desirable to have a fact-based discussion and to reflect on the impacts of immigration. ”

Asylum seekers were also somehow “more visible” in Quebec. On the one hand, because the arrivals at the land border by Roxham Road marked the imagination as early as 2017. But also because they then concentrate mainly in Montreal, while they are more dispersed in Ontario in urban agglomerations such as Ottawa, London, Niagara, Waterloo, York, Durham, Peel and Hamilton.

In recent years, other issues have also been politicized before in Ontario, however, concludes Ms. Paquet, especially that of international students and private colleges.

Griffith: What individual Canadians and organizations should do about China

My latest:

How should Canadians react to Chinese government actions?

With justified criticism regarding Chinese government repression of its Uighur minority, imposition of the Hong Kong security law, the hostage-taking of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in retaliation for the U.S. extradition request regarding Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou and escalation with Taiwan and the Indian border dispute, the focus has understandably been on protesting these belligerent actions.

To provide pressure for change, consumers should ask whether there are viable non-Chinese substitutes available for the products they seek, and consider shifting their purchasing accordingly. Given the pervasiveness of Chinese-made goods, consumers should distinguish between those assembled in China and those branded as Chinese. For example, should consumers purchase Huawei devices given that the detention of the two Michaels is directly related to the detention of Meng Wanzhou?  Foodstuffs provide another opportunity to switch to non-Chinese suppliers, given Chinese government targeting of Canadian agriculture exports.

Users of Chinese social media sites such as WeChat, Weibo and TikTok, or sites with China-based servers, may also wish to reconsider their use.

Individuals need to reconsider attendance at events hosted by the Chinese Embassy and consulates, or where Chinese diplomats are key speakers without another speaker invited to counter their aggressive talking points. This applies also to elected officials, given the business-as-usual signals that their presence at such events sends. If attendance is required, any speaking notes should include Canadian concerns regarding Chinese government actions: bilateral (the two Michaels) and general (Hong Kong, Uighurs).

Alternately, individuals should consider showing visible signs of protest at such events, such as turning their backs, carrying protest signs, or asking pointed questions.

Similarly, should Canadian non-governmental organizations invite Chinese diplomats to speak at events, given the questionable value of hearing belligerent talking points and the unlikelihood of open and free dialogue? And if so, can organizations structure events that include critical voices regarding Chinese government actions as a requirement of participation?

Should Canadian media run Chinese diplomat opinion pieces without corresponding rebuttals or commentary?

Organizations — academic, think-tanks or business — need to ask themselves harder questions regarding the objectives of their collaboration, and the nature of the organization they are collaborating with. Is Chinese government funding involved, or gifts? Will collaboration be portrayed as endorsement, and will be an open exchange of perspectives? In particular, organizations should be cautious of collaboration with entities that are part of the United Front, the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign influence arm.

Educational institutions and academics that have agreements with Confucius Institutes or other Chinese government organizations have to ask whether these undermine the values of the educational institution. Institutions may need to review their conflict-of-interest codes regarding academics accepting Chinese government funding. All should recognize that gifts often play a political role and thus should be treated with caution.

And to reiterate, any such action needs to be carefully focused on the Chinese government, not Chinese-Canadians or Chinese people. Unfortunately, Chinese-Canadians have been subject to racist attacks during the pandemic; proposing the actions I suggest places the focus where it should be: on the actions of the Chinese regime.

At the same time, we also need to recognize that some Chinese-Canadians have attachment to the People’s Republic of China, related both to their home culture as well as pride in China’s increased importance. The former is not at issue, the latter, combined with the Chinese regime’s diaspora and geo-political strategies, is – and that makes targeted messaging even more important.

While many of these actions I propose may appear as “virtue signalling,” given the power imbalance between Canada and China, not acting would be a missed opportunity to send a message to Chinese government officials that their public diplomacy, as pointed out by Canadian Ambassador Dominic Barton, is counterproductive and not supported by most Canadians.

Source: https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/griffith-what-individual-canadians-and-organizations-should-do-about-china/wcm/828b05d2-dd81-461c-9590-66147a82ca19/